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Abstract
Black-white racial disparities in drug arrests are large and longstanding in the
U.S. criminal justice system, as black Americans are arrested for drug offenses at a rate
nearly five times the rate of white Americans. Because drug offending data mostly show
that blacks are no more likely than whites to use or sell drugs, racial disparities in drug
arrests appear to be attributable to factors other than drug offending. This dissertation
assesses whether neighborhood contextual factors can explain racial disparities in drug
arrests across St. Louis neighborhoods between 2009 and 2013. Using mixed methods,
the quantitative and qualitative components test leading explanations of the racial
disparity problem: differential drug involvement theory, differential scrutiny theory, and
racially-biased policing theory.
The findings refute differential drug involvement theory and show some evidence
of differential scrutiny, although differential scrutiny cannot explain the racial disparity in
drug enforcement. Instead, the results lend the greatest credence to racially-biased
policing theory. Specifically, the multivariate statistical analysis shows that neighborhood
racial composition is the strongest predictor of the racial disparity problem, net of
neighborhood-level drug problems, violent and property crime, citizen calls for drug
service, and social disorganization. Racially-biased drug enforcement manifests as racial
incongruity, or “out-of-placeness,” as citizens face the greatest risk for drug arrests when
their race is incongruent with the neighborhood racial context.
Additionally, a grounded theory analysis of officers’ narratives in drug arrest
reports reveals qualitative differences in drug enforcement practices across racialized
neighborhoods and between blacks and whites. Police tend to use reactive policing to
initiate drug arrests in white neighborhoods and of white citizens. In contrast, police tend
to use officer-initiated, more invasive policing practices in drug arrests of black citizens
and in black and mixed neighborhoods. Officers sometimes justified initiating these
proactive encounters based on characteristics of the neighborhood or citizens’ demeanor,
even when citizens were not engaging in prohibited behaviors. Thus, the excessive use of
officer-initiated vehicle and pedestrian stops and officer surveillance of black people and
in black and mixed neighborhoods appears to widen the net for blacks as drug arrestees.
Findings from this dissertation suggest avenues for future research and have important
implications for social change and police reform.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“…A national drug law enforcement strategy that casts a wide net…”
-Office of National Drug Control Policy, 1989, pg. 18
One of the most pervasive social problems in the United States is the
overrepresentation of black Americans in the criminal justice system. Though whites
comprise most of the nation’s arrestees (Reitzel 2011, 169), blacks are overrepresented in
the criminal justice system relative to their small makeup of 13% of the U.S. resident
population (Rastogi et al. 2011; U.S. Census Bureau 2014). Blacks account for almost
one-third of the nation’s arrests, including 38% of violent crime arrests, 30% of property
crime arrests, and 32% of drug crime arrests (Uniform Crime Report 2012). These arrest
percentages more than double blacks’ representation in the U.S. Looking at prison
populations, 37% of male prisoners and 23% of female prisoners are black (Carson and
Golinelli 2013). This overrepresentation translates to stark imprisonment rates. Black
males have an imprisonment rate six times the rate for white males (2,841 vs. 463 per
100,000, respectively), and the imprisonment rate for black females more than doubles
the rate for white females (115 vs. 49 per 100,000, respectively) (Carson and Golinelli
2013). Consequently, one in three black men, compared to one in 17 white men, have a
lifetime risk of imprisonment, and one in 18 black women, compared to one in 111 white
women, face such risk (Ghandnoosh 2015, 11).
Researchers have been only partly successful in explaining racial disparities in the
criminal justice system. For example, evidence shows that blacks’ disproportionate
involvement in violent offending explains racial disparities in arrests and incarceration
for violent crimes (Elliott and Ageton 1980; Lauritsen 2010; Sampson and Lauritsen
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1997; Huizinga, Loeber, and Thornberry 1994; Katz 1988). Relatively rare offenses,
violent crimes (e.g. murder, non-negligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, and aggravated
assault) comprise 4% of the nation’s total crime (Uniform Crime Report 2012). While
scholars can explain racial disparities in arrests and incarceration for violent crimes, the
sources of racial disparities in arrests for non-violent crimes—the majority of the nation’s
crimes—remain less understood. This is particularly the case for drug arrests, which
contain relatively large black-white racial disparities that have persisted for decades
(Blumstein 1982; Langan 1985; Tonry and Melewski 2008). Evidence on drug offending
patterns shows that blacks are no more likely to use or sell drugs than whites (Mitchell
2009; Mitchell and Caudy 2013). Therefore, racial disparities in drug arrests cannot be
explained by drug offending and appear to be unwarranted. If drug offending cannot
explain why blacks are disproportionately punished for drug crimes, then what factors
can explain this racial disparity? This dissertation seeks to empirically answer this
important, unresolved inquiry.
THE WAR ON DRUGS
The War on Drugs from the 1980s provides the backdrop to the topic of racial
disparities in drug arrests. This political shift was a key force behind burgeoning arrest
and incarceration rates and increased racial disparities in the criminal justice system,
particularly for drug crimes (Mitchell 2009; Tonry 1995). Throughout the 1800s and
1900s, the U.S. imposed many variations of the War on Drugs to suppress racial and
ethnic groups of color (Provine 2007). Reminiscent of these racialized anti-drug
initiatives, President Ronald Regan launched an unprecedented, consequential War on
Drugs during the 1980s. This period was characterized by media frenzy, public panic, and
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political fervor surrounding drug use and drug trafficking, particularly of crack cocaine
that emerged in urban areas where blacks were more likely to live. Fueling this frenzy
were the deaths of Len Bias and Don Rogers, two young black star athletes, who died
from a cocaine overdose within a week (Mitchell and Lynch 2011). Capitalizing the
momentum, media sources touted the dangers of crack cocaine, linked crack use to
violence and other crimes, and argued that crack reached unprecedented proportions.
Thousands of stories about cocaine appeared in the nation’s prominent newspapers, many
proclaiming the so-called crack epidemic (Trebach 1987). Politicians and the media
propagated negative associations between crack and other social problems, and many of
these associations were based on unfounded evidence, such as crack-using mothers
giving birth to crack babies who would later suffer from permanent brain damage and
low IQ scores and alleging that the crack epidemic was spreading from inner cities to
middle-class suburbs (Mitchell and Lynch 2011). Moreover, the War on Drugs shifted the
public’s perceptions about the significance of drug problems and the profile of drug
offenders. In 1985, for example, 1% of respondents identified drug use as the most
important problem in America at that time; this increased to 10% of respondents in 1986
and then to 65% of respondents in 1989 who identified drug use as the most important
problem, despite the fact that drug use, including cocaine use, had been decreasing for
several years prior to 1989 (Reinarman and Levine 1997, 24). Moreover, racial
stereotypes reeked as the media linked crack use to black Americans. Reeves and
Campbell (1994) found that prior to the War on Drugs, 60% of the cocaine users and
sellers shown on the television news were white, which reversed after 1986 when news
stations depicted 66% of the cocaine users and sellers as people of color. Consequently,
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public opinion studies revealed the public’s stereotyping of drug offenders as black.
Burston, Jones, and Roberson-Saunders (1995) found that 95% of respondents in a survey
in Washington D.C. envisioned the typical drug user or drug trafficker as a black person.
Media frenzy, political propaganda, and hysteria among the public about drugs,
especially crack, spurred unprecedented responses to drug crime and the legislation of a
series of harsh anti-drug policies. As such, Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Acts
of 1986 and 1988, which reflected the punitive shift in drug enforcement, such as
imposing deportation penalties for alien drug traffickers, mandatory minimum prison
sentences of 10 years for first time drug offenders, and life sentences for drug offenses, to
name a few (99th Congress 1986; 100th Congress 1988). Moreover, the federal laws
distinguished between crack cocaine and powder cocaine by imposing the same penalty
for one gram of crack as the penalty for 100 grams of powder cocaine. Adding to these
statutes, the National Drug Control Strategy (ONDCP 1989) comprised laws that
explicitly targeted street-level drug offenders—who tend to be people of color—who use
and sell small quantities of drugs in public spaces. In doing so, the federal law
overlooked drug offenders in closed drug markets who tend to be white users or dealers
who handle large quantities of drugs (Dunlap, Johnson, and Manwar 1997). Furthermore,
the federal government instituted laws, such as the 1994 Omnibus Crime Bill (103rd
Congress 1994), that funded billions of dollars to states that enacted a range of anti-drug
initiatives and penalties, such as building more prisons, enacting drug-free school zone
laws that stiffened the sentences of mostly offenders of color, and instating aggressive
law enforcement practices (Ghandnoosh 2015; Mitchell 2009).
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Figure 1.1 U.S. Rates of Adult Drug Arrests by Race, 1980-2007 (rates calculated
per 100,000 residents of each race)

Retrieved from: Human Rights Watch (2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/node/81105/section/4
Data source: Uniform Crime Report

As depicted in Figure 1.1, in 1980 before the drug war, the black drug arrest rate
was 554 per 100,000 black residents compared to the white drug arrest rate of 190 per
100,000 white residents, a ratio of three black drug arrests for every one white drug arrest
(Human Rights Watch 2009). During the peak of the drug war in 1989, drug arrest rates
increased for both groups, but most dramatically and more rapidly for blacks: 2,009 per
100,000 blacks and 363 per 100,000 whites, an increased ratio of five and a half black
drug arrests for every one white drug arrest (Human Rights Watch 2009). Contemporary
drug arrest rates still reflect these stark racial disparities across the U.S. In 2007—21
years after President Reagan launched the War on Drugs—the average black-to-white
disparity ratio in the U.S. was 4.98; 17 states had disparity ratios above that average
(Mitchell and Lynch 2011, 144–145). Racial disparity ratios vary across states, but there
is no state where the white drug arrest rate exceeds the black drug arrest rate (Mitchell
and Lynch 2011, 144–145). Additionally, state and federal prison populations rose for
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drug offenses. There were 48,391 incarcerated drug offenders in 1985 prior to the War on
Drugs, which increased to 326,700 incarcerated drug offenders by 2003, an increase of
575% (Mitchell 2009). Of the 22,000 newly admitted inmates with a drug offense as their
most serious conviction in 1985, 39% were black and 38% were white. By 2003, of the
112,000 newly admitted inmates with a drug offense as their most serious conviction,
53% were black and 30% were white (Mitchell 2009). In addition, the average time
served in prison for drug crimes rose from 14 months in 1983 to 24 months in 2001, a
70% increase during this period (Western 2006).
RACIAL DISPARITIES FUEL INEQUALITY

“The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar
left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be
either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana
and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities.
We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night
after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”
-John Ehrlichman (President Nixon’s Chief Domestic Advisor), 1994
Source: (Baum 2016)
Ultimately, the War on Drugs was deemed a racially-biased policy that declared
war on black people and exacerbated preexisting racial disparities (Alexander 2010;
Miller 1996; Mitchell 2009; Provine 2011). As such, blacks’ overrepresentation in drug
arrests, especially if unwarranted, constitutes a serious social problem. First,
disproportionately targeting blacks contradicts America’s values of fairness, justice, and
equality. In the same vein, such racial profiling violates federal civil rights laws and the
4th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution that protect against unreasonable policing
practices and guarantee equal protection. Indeed, the federal government has determined
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that simply stopping or ticketing black Americans at disproportionately high rates is
unconstitutional. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that New York City’s stopand-frisk practices racially-profiled blacks and Hispanics and violated their constitutional
rights (Floyd et al v. City of New York 2013). The U.S. Department of Justice recently
found the Ferguson Police Department in Missouri to violate constituents’ 4th and 14th
Amendment rights by disproportionately stopping and ticketing black divers, among
other problematic practices (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 2015).
Thus, unwarranted, racially-disparate drug arrests could also fall in line with these other
unconstitutional practices.
Contact with the criminal justice system can be life-altering. Blacks’
overrepresentation as drug arrestees disproportionately exposes them, their families, and
communities to potentially serious, long-term collateral consequences that compound
racial and socioeconomic inequality in the U.S. (Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll 2004; Pager
2007; Pettit and Western 2004; Travis 2005; Western, Pettit, and Guetzkow 2002).
Simply being arrested can create psychological and financial strain and result in job loss.
Arrestees who are able will need to post bond while those less fortunate might remained
jailed. In addition, blacks’ disproportionate contact with the police intensifies already
strained relations between the police and black community and can easily translate into
perceptions of procedural injustice (Gau and Brunson 2010; Gau and Brunson 2015).
Perceptions of procedural injustice, such as racial profiling, foster crime by eroding the
legitimacy of the police and undermining the capacity of officers to influence citizens’
behavior and control crime (Tyler 2006). Additionally, being disproportionately stopped
and arrested can entangle blacks into a cycle of offending and criminal justice
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involvement. Negative perceptions of the police can amplify antisocial attitudes and
offending behaviors in the long term (Slocum, Wiley, and Esbensen 2016).
The collateral consequences of criminal justice contact worsen when drug
arrestees are subsequently convicted, imprisoned, and must reintegrate into society. A
criminal record can create a barrier to gainful employment, especially for blacks who
already experience racial discrimination in the workforce, even without a criminal record
(Pager 2007). Further, because the drug war extended beyond the criminal justice system
to other social institutions, drug felons are restricted from benefits that even violent and
sex offenders can attain, such as food stamps, cash assistance, and financial aid for
college (100th Congress 1988; 104th Congress 1996). Because ex-offenders experience
economic hardships, they often rely on family members for primary support, which can
be stressful for families, especially those that were already fragile. Additionally, many
states prohibit felons from voting. Blacks’ overrepresentation among the disenfranchised
has strong implications for communities of color whose voices and interests are muted in
the political process, reducing their political power. In addition, removing large
percentages of blacks from the population undermines family formation in the black
community. It jeopardizes existing marriages and reduces marriage prospects (Braman
2004; Carlson and Cervera 1992; Comfort 2009), and black children face a greater risk
for being reared in single-parent households and experiencing a host of adverse
consequences associated with parental incarceration (Gaston 2016; Wakefield and
Wildeman 2011; Western and Wildeman 2009). Further, incarcerating large percentages
of blacks destabilizes black communities and erodes informal social control, leaving
black communities vulnerable to crime (Clear 2007; Rose and Clear 1998).
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Disproportionately arresting black Americans for drug offenses can translate into
a vicious cycle of impediments for arrestees, families, communities, and the larger
society. Many of these impediments are criminogenic and can confer long-term harm and
inhibit socioeconomic mobility. Racially-disparate collateral consequences that stem
from racial disparities in drug arrests perpetuate racial, social, and economic inequality in
America, erode the economic and social buffers that prevent crime, and reinforce the
system of white supremacy that has continually oppressed blacks. Therefore,
longstanding, ostensibly unwarranted racial disparities in drug arrests constitute a
substantial social problem that requires scholarly attention and possibly appropriate
policy and police reforms.
GOALS OF THE DISSERTATION
Clearly, the drug war exacerbated preexisting racial disparities in criminal justice
in a way that disproportionately affected black Americans. Yet, it is unclear what specific
features of the drug war provided the impetus. Arrests are the entry point to the criminal
justice system and account for 61% to 80% of black overrepresentation in prisons
(Blumstein 1982; Langan 1985; Tonry and Melewski 2008). Because drug offending
cannot explain racial disparities, examining the factors that influence officers’ drug arrest
decisions is a necessary endeavor. Despite the social, political, and criminological
significance of the problem, few empirical studies have directly examined factors that
might explain why officers disproportionately arrest blacks for drug crimes given the
racial parity in drug involvement. So far, this developing body of research has found that
factors other than drug offending, such as law enforcement practices, seem to explain the
racial disparity. Such studies have employed many methodologies at various levels of
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analysis (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Mitchell and Caudy 2013; Parker, Stults, and
Rice 2005). However, to date, no empirical research has assessed this inquiry at the
neighborhood level.
Police behave differently in different neighborhood contexts, and understanding
the interplay between neighborhood context and drug enforcement practices might
elucidate the racial disparity problem. For example, scholars have hypothesized that
officers use aggressive or proactive policing tactics in crime-ridden neighborhoods while
others argue that officers use less vigor in areas with high disadvantage and crime (Black
2010; Klinger 1997). Some research reports higher levels of police disrespect and use of
force against citizens in economically disadvantaged neighborhoods (Mastrofski, Reisig,
and McCluskey 2002; Terrill and Reisig 2003). Further, neighborhood racial composition
can shape policing practices (Fagan and Davies 2000; Smith 1986; Stewart et al. 2009).
Studies have found that the percentage of black residents is positively related to
perceptions of neighborhood crime and disorder, controlling for actual levels of crime
and disorder (Quillian and Pager 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004).
This dissertation research examines whether neighborhood contextual factors can
explain racial disparities in drug arrests. Focusing on drug arrests in St. Louis, Missouri
between 2009 and 2013, it seeks to answer the following research questions: (1) Do
neighborhood-level factors help explain racial disparities in drug arrests? (2) Can
qualitative differences in drug enforcement practices across racialized neighborhoods and
arrestee race help explain the racial disparity problem? Two components address these
research questions. First, the quantitative component uses multivariate statistical
techniques to assess whether neighborhood characteristics can explain racial differences
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in drug arrests. Neighborhood characteristics include: the number of illicit drug overdose
deaths as a proxy for drug involvement, violent and property crime, citizen calls for drug
service, racial composition, residential instability, and economic disadvantage. Second,
the qualitative component analyzes a sample of officers’ narratives in drug arrest reports
that correspond to the drug arrests in the quantitative analysis. Based on officers’
descriptions of drug arrest incidents, the qualitative component explores whether the
nature of drug enforcement varies by neighborhood racial context and by arrestee race.
Variations in policing practices might be observed in the way drug arrests are initiated
(e.g. from citizen complaints, calls for service, traffic stops, ongoing drug investigations,
pedestrian stops), styles of policing (e.g. reactive, proactive), or factors that motivate
officers’ decisions to arrest. A rich supplement to the quantitative component, the
qualitative analysis has the potential to reveal how variations in the nature of drug
enforcement practices might contribute to racial disparities in drug arrests. Together, both
components can potentially advance knowledge about racial disparities in the criminal
justice system and inform policies that lead to more equitable policing and alleviate harm
done to people of color, families, communities, and the larger society.
The next chapter—Chapter 2—explores three theoretical frameworks scholars
have used to explain racial disparities in drug arrests, and it reviews extant research on
this topic. Chapter 3 contextualizes this dissertation research by describing St. Louis, the
setting of the study. It places emphasis on historical and political factors that gave rise to
present-day neighborhood conditions and grounds our understanding of the racial
disparity problem. Chapter 4 is devoted to the quantitative component of the dissertation.
It discusses the data set, measures, analytic strategy, descriptive parameters, and bivariate
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and multivariate results. Chapter 5 focuses on the qualitative component of the
dissertation and describes the data, analytic strategy, and qualitative findings. The last
chapter, Chapter 6, summarizes the major findings from the quantitative and qualitative
components and discusses the implications for research and policy.
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Frameworks and Literature Review
Researchers have offered three theories to explain racial disparities in drug
arrests: differential drug involvement theory, differential scrutiny theory, and raciallybiased policing theory. According to differential drug involvement theory, groups of
color are more likely to experience economic deprivation, making them prone to using
and selling drugs in order to cope with poor economic conditions and other strains. Thus,
scholars believe racial disparities in drug arrests reflect racial disparities in the extent of
drug offending (Baumer 1994; Currie 1993; Duster 1997; Hagan 1994). Differential
scrutiny theory posits that police deployment is concentrated in disadvantaged, crimeprone areas where blacks are more likely to live, which places blacks at greater risk for
arrest (Engel, Smith, and Cullen 2012; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Tomaskovic-Devey,
Mason, and Zingraff 2004). Scholars also contend that the public nature of urban drug
markets adds to this increased scrutiny by making drug offenders more susceptible to
police detection (Blumstein 1993; Coker 2003; Dunlap, Johnson, and Manwar 1997;
Goode 2002; Human Rights Watch 2008; Ramchand, Pacula, and Iguchi 2006; Tonry
1995). Thus, differential scrutiny theory attributes the racial disparity problem to greater
police surveillance in disadvantaged, crime-ridden, predominately black neighborhoods.
The third explanation, racially-biased policing theory, hypothesizes that officers
differentially police black people and black communities in order to protect white
dominance (Blalock 1967; Liska and Chamlin 1984) or because of the implicit racial
biases they hold against blacks (Alexander 2010; Beckett et al. 2005; Beckett, Nyrop, and
Pfingst 2006; Ghandnoosh 2015; Human Rights Watch 2008; 2009). This chapter
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provides an in-depth discussion of these three theories and the research that accompanies
them. Then it discusses extant empirical research on the racial disparity problem.
DIFFERENTIAL DRUG INVOLVEMENT THEORY
Some scholars argue that racial disparities in drug arrests reflect racial differences
in the extent of drug involvement. Put simply, this hypothesis posits that blacks use and
sell drugs more frequently than whites and, as a result, blacks are disproportionately
arrested and punished because they are disproportionately involved in drugs (Baumer
1994). In addition, proponents of this theory believe that growing racial disparities in
drug arrests in the 1980s stem from growing economic inequality between blacks and
whites during that period. As a result, blacks were more likely to cope with stressors by
using drugs or by gaining employment in the illicit drug market in order to generate
income (Baumer 1994; Currie 1993; Duster 1997; Hagan 1994). If racial disparity in drug
involvement is the primary cause of the racial disparity in drug arrests, as this theory
asserts, we would expect blacks to have higher levels of drug involvement than whites,
especially during the late 1980s when drug arrests, and racial disparities among them,
began to soar. Nevertheless, when examining evidence of drug offending patterns by
race, it generally shows similarities between black and white drug offending patterns over
time, therefore refuting the differential drug involvement theory.
Arrest and incarceration statistics come from criminal justice agencies and reflect
a combination of factors, including offending patterns, organizational practices, and
discretionary decisions, and are likely biased estimates of offending (Lauritsen 2010;
Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2011). Alternate data sources, such as national self-report,
social, and health data sources, curtail the potential biases reflected in official data and
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are better suited to describe the extent of drug offending. Collectively, these data sources
mostly reveal that blacks are no more likely to use or sell drugs than whites (Mitchell
2009; Mitchell and Caudy 2013; Ramchand, Pacula, and Iguchi 2006; Snyder and
Sickmund 1999; Snyder and Sickmund 2006).
According to the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a nationally
representative panel study of approximately 9,000 youth, whites are more likely to use
and sell marijuana than blacks, and there are no racial differences in the selling of hard
drugs (e.g. crack, cocaine, heroin) (Snyder and Sickmund 1999; 2006). Going a step
further, Mitchell (2009) used the same dataset to test whether racial differences in drug
use and drug sales can explain racial differences in arrests for drug possession and drug
distribution. Mitchell found that although blacks were significantly less likely to use
drugs (including hard drugs) than whites, blacks reported significantly more arrests for
drug possession; specifically, 9% of black drug users and 7% of white drug users
reported ever being arrested on a drug possession charge (Mitchell 2009, 61). Likewise,
Mitchell’s findings showed that blacks were significantly less likely to sell drugs
(including hard drugs) than whites, but blacks were significantly more likely to report
being arrested for drug distribution; specifically, 29% of black drug dealers versus 12%
of white drug dealers were arrested on a drug distribution charge (Mitchell 2009, 62).
Mitchell’s analysis of data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth concluded
that racial differences in drug involvement could not explain racial differences in drug
arrests.
In the same vein, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, a representative
sample of households, reports higher levels of drug use among non-Hispanic whites than
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non-Hispanic blacks (SAMHSA 1998). Estimates from its successor, the National Survey
of Drug Use and Health, show that in 2008, 80% of all self-reported drug users 18 years
or older were white, and there were four white drug users for every one black drug user;
whites comprised 78% of marijuana users, 84% of cocaine users, 80% of crack users,
91% of hallucinogen users, and 96% of inhalant users (Mitchell and Lynch 2011, 147).
Figure 2.1 National Data on Drug Use by Race and Type, 1979-2003

Retrieved from: Mitchell and Lynch 2011, pg. 149
Data source: National Household Survey of Drug Use and National Survey of Drug Use and Health,
various years

Some data sources provide trends of race-specific drug use patterns over time.
One example is the Monitoring the Future dataset, a nationally representative sample of
high school seniors. Data from Monitoring the Future found that during every year
between 1975 and 2010, black high school seniors had lower rates of illicit drug use in
the past year than their white and Hispanic counterparts (Johnston et al. 2011). Moreover,
blacks reported lower levels of each type of illicit drug use than other races every year
during this period. Illicit drug types included: marijuana, crack, other cocaine, heroin,
inhalants, hallucinogens, and methamphetamine. Because Monitoring the Future is a
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school-based sample, students who have a greater likelihood of drug use (e.g. dropouts,
chronic absentees) were excluded, which might underestimate the prevalence of drug use
in the sample. Overcoming this limitation, data from the National Household Survey of
Drug Use and the National Survey of Drug Use and Health tell a similar story. Mitchell
and Lynch (2011) compiled longitudinal trends of drug use by race and drug type
between years 1979 and 2003, as displayed in Figure 2.1. These trends show that blacks
reported slightly more illicit drug use throughout the period; the largest racial disparity
during the series was a black-white difference of 4 percentage points. However, when
excluding marijuana from the analysis, black and white rates of drug use were very
similar, indicating that blacks were more likely to use marijuana, but not other drugs,
than whites. Adding to these themes, the Food and Drug Administration and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention recently uncovered evidence of a heroin epidemic,
especially for non-Hispanic whites. Analyzing data from the National Survey on Drug
Use and Health and the National Vital Statistics System, the agencies found that between
2002 and 2013, heroin use rates per 1,000 non-Hispanic whites significantly increased
114% (from 1.4 in 2002-2004 to 3.0 in 2011-2013) while rates per 1,000 blacks and
Hispanics decreased 15% (Jones et al. 2015). Rates of heroin use among non-Hispanic
whites nearly double the rates for their counterparts (3.0 versus 1.7, respectively, per
1,000). Together, drug use trends show that black drug use declined and converged with
white drug use over time, even after 1980 when drug arrests—and racial disparities
among them—began increasing. These studies contradict trends that show sustained and
growing racial disparities in drug arrests over time and refute differential drug
involvement theory.
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Despite the fact that these national datasets capture involvement in hard drugs
(e.g. heroin, crack/cocaine), some researchers argue that the prevalence of drug
involvement in these sources might not reflect the kinds of serious drug use that could
lead to an arrest (Goode 2002; Western 2006) and recommend the use of other measures
of serious drug use, such as drug-involved emergency room visits and accidental drug
overdose deaths. The Drug Abuse Warning Network monitors the number of drug-related
emergency room visits in a nationally representative sample of 24-hour emergency
departments. Of the 1.3 million emergency room visits for illicit drugs in 2011, 51% of
patients were white, 31% were black, and 11% were Hispanic (SAMHSA 2013, 27–30).
These estimates showed that whites comprised the largest group of illicit drug users of
marijuana, heroin, cocaine, amphetamines, methamphetamines, and hallucinogens, but
blacks’ representation among drug users more than doubled their presence in the general
U.S. population. Another indicator of serious drug use is fatal drug overdose. A study in
New York City between 1990 and 1998 found that black and Latino rates of fatal drug
overdose were consistently higher than those of whites during the time period, especially
for cocaine-related deaths. In 1998, fatal drug overdose rates were 21.3 per 100,000
blacks, 18.9 per 100,000 Latinos, and 15.2 per 100,000 whites (Galea et al. 2003). While
drug-related emergency room visits and fatal drug overdoses offer an additional source of
data on drug offending, they could be a function of accident proneness (Martínez,
Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008) or differential access to resources for those who survive (i.e.
wealthy users might have private doctors) (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006).
With the exception of emergency room data and accidental drug overdose data,
the evidence shows that blacks are no more involved in drugs than whites. In the few
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instances where blacks have greater drug involvement than whites, the racial disparity in
drug involvement is minuscule relative to the racial gap in drug arrests. Together, these
data sources call into question differential drug involvement theory and suggest that
factors other than the extent of drug offending account for stark racial disparities in drug
arrests and incarceration.
Though support for differential drug involvement theory is limited, this
dissertation must still consider the hypothesis. This is because national data on drug
offending are gathered from individuals and averaged to compute national averages.
National averages might mask geographical differences in drug offending across places.
In other words, though there are no racial disparities in drug offending among individuals
at the national level, drug involvement might be concentrated in the most disadvantaged
places where blacks are more likely to frequent and where police are more likely to
patrol. By including a measure of drug overdose deaths—a proxy for the distribution of
serious drug involvement—this dissertation will be able to assess the validity of
differential drug involvement theory at the neighborhood level by determining whether
there is variation in drug involvement across racially-characterized neighborhoods and by
assessing whether neighborhood-level drug involvement predicts racial differences in
drug arrests when controlling for relevant covariates.
DIFFERENTIAL SCRUTINY THEORY
Unlike differential drug involvement theory which focuses on quantitative
differences in black and white drug offending, differential scrutiny theory argues that
differential police deployment, coupled with racial differences in the nature of drug
offending, puts people of color at greater risk for arrest and explains the racial disparity
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problem (Mitchell and Lynch 2011). Also known as the “deployment hypothesis,”
differential scrutiny theory contends that police presence is greater in disadvantaged
neighborhoods characterized by high crime rates, particularly violent crime, and large
volumes of citizen complaints (Engel, Smith, and Cullen 2012; Warren et al. 2006).
People of color are more likely to live in such areas. Thus, the heavy deployment of
officers to areas where blacks are more likely to live and frequent increases the risk for
police detection. Further increasing police scrutiny is the visible and violent nature of
drug involvement in disadvantaged neighborhoods. In such areas, drug use and drug
dealing are more likely to occur in public places (e.g. street corners) and semi-public
places (e.g. drug houses) that are visible to police rather than in private places where
whites are more likely to use and deal drugs (Blumstein 1993; Coker 2003; Dunlap,
Johnson, and Manwar 1997; Goode 2002; Human Rights Watch 2008; Ramchand,
Pacula, and Iguchi 2006; Tonry 1995). In addition, drug transactions that occur publicly
in disadvantaged areas tend to be characterized by frequent, small transactions between
strangers whereas drug transactions in private spaces tend to involve the exchange of
large quantities of drugs among acquaintances (Dunlap, Johnson, and Manwar 1997;
Ramchand, Pacula, and Iguchi 2006). Taken together, law enforcement’s tendency to
heavily patrol predominately black neighborhoods and the public nature of drug
offending in such areas expose disadvantaged areas—and the people frequenting them—
to greater police surveillance, increasing the risk of black arrest and decreasing the risk of
white arrest.
Legislation, public pressure, and fear of crime influence police organizations, and
police organizational structure and policies, in turn, influence police behavior (Reitzel
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2011). Police administrators are more likely to concentrate police enforcement and
directed patrol practices in high crime areas (Engel, Smith, and Cullen 2012).
Increasingly, police agencies rely on workload formulas based on crime reports and
citizens’ calls for service in order to identify high-crime areas. Crimes reported to the
police and citizens’ calls for service have historically shaped workload formulas, such as
determining the size of police beats and the location of patrols (Coe and Wiesel 2001;
Cordner 1979; Orlando Winfield Wilson 1941). In effort to reduce crime, agencies
deploy rapid, focused personnel and resources to areas signaling the most need (Leonard
1982; Skogan and Frydl 2004; Weisburd et al. 2003; Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd
2004; Wilson 1963). A series of experimental-based studies have demonstrated the
crime-reduction utility of such popularized hot spots policing and problem-oriented
policing (Braga et al. 1999; Rosenfeld, Deckard, and Blackburn 2014; Sherman, Gartin,
and Buerger 1989; Weisburd and Green 1995).
In addition to differential police deployment, researchers have pointed to race and
neighborhood differences in the nature of drug offending. In their large-scale
ethnographic study of crack, cocaine, and heroin dealers, Dunlap, Johnson, and Manwar
(1997) found two distinct types of drug-selling careers: inner-city drug dealing and
middle-class drug dealing. Dealers from both types were typically youths or young
adults, but inner-city dealers often lacked access to private settings and usually sold drugs
in small quantities in public locations to buyers they did not know. In contrast, middleclass drug dealers almost always sold drugs in large quantities to a consistent base of
customers whom they knew. Another characteristic distinguishing these two types of
dealers was the use of violence. Violence was typically rare for middle-class dealers, but
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violence was common among inner-city drug dealers. Research consistently demonstrates
a strong relationship between urban drug markets and violent crime (Baumer et al. 1998;
Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008; Ousey and Lee 2004). Ramchand, Pacula, and
Iguchi (2006) also found evidence of racial differences in the nature of drug offending.
They examined the purchase patterns of marijuana users from the 2002 National Survey
on Drug Use and Health and found that blacks were significantly more likely to engage in
risky purchasing patterns. Specifically, the researchers found that compared to whites,
blacks were nearly twice as likely to buy marijuana outdoors, three times more likely to
buy marijuana from a stranger, and more likely to buy marijuana away from their homes.
Together, the concentration of police deployment and the visible and violent nature of
drug markets in disadvantaged neighborhoods expose groups of color to greater police
scrutiny and increase their risk for drug arrest.
This dissertation considers differential scrutiny theory in some respect. The
quantitative analysis examines whether economic disadvantage, violent and property
crime, and citizen calls for drug service are related to drug arrests when controlling for
other relevant factors. A positive association between these neighborhood characteristics
and drug arrests would suggest that disadvantaged, crime-prone neighborhoods with high
calls for service attract police deployment and increase the likelihood of drug arrest.
RACIALLY-BIASED POLICING THEORY
Overlapping with differential scrutiny theory, racially-biased policing theory
departs from focusing on racial differences in the nature of drug offending and focuses
strictly on policing practices. Whereas differential scrutiny theory partly attributes
seemingly race-neutral policing strategies to racial disparities in drug arrests, racially-
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biased policing theory contends that racial disparities in drug arrests are a function of
racial biases by police agencies and officers. In other words, the theory argues that policy
makers, police agencies, and police officers have explicit or implicit racial biases that
shape their construction of policies, perceptions of crime problems, and responses to
crime in a way that disproportionately targets people of color (Alexander 2010; Beckett
et al. 2005; Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Ghandnoosh 2015; Human Rights Watch
2008; 2009).
Racially-biased policing is central to current national discourse and civil unrest
surrounding a series of police killings of unarmed black men across the country. During a
speech at Georgetown University in February 2015, FBI director James Comey openly
acknowledged that police officers widely rely on racial biases as mental shortcuts in
policing, and their behaviors stemming from those biases have strained their relationship
with communities of color (Comey 2015). He is the first FBI director to ever speak
publicly about racial biases in policing. Nearly a month later, the U.S. Department of
Justice released findings from its investigation of the Ferguson Police Department and
Ferguson Municipal Courts in the suburb of St. Louis, Missouri. The investigation
uncovered substantial evidence of unconstitutional police practices, unduly harsh
punishments, and explicit racial biases and stereotyping by police and court staff, such as
officials’ use of racist epithets and “…emails circulated by police supervisors and court
staff that stereotype racial minorities as criminals, including one email that joked about
an abortion by an African-American woman being a means of crime control” (U.S.
Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 2015, 5). The federal investigation
highlighted that blacks’ disproportionate contact with Ferguson’s criminal justice
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officials “…cannot be explained by any difference in the rate at which people of different
races violate the law…[but] at least in part because of unlawful bias against and
stereotypes about African Americans” and “…discriminatory intent in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment” (U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 2015, 5).
These present-day tensions between law enforcement and black citizens are embedded in
three and a half centuries of lawful racism, subjugation of black Americans, and
racialized policing practices, starting with law enforcement’s early role as slave patrols
during the slavery era (Ivanov 1985; Jones-Brown 2007; Reichel 1988).
RACIAL CONFLICT THEORIES
Racial Threat Hypothesis
Racially-biased policing theory is rooted in conflict theories, such as racial threat,
benign neglect, and defended neighborhoods perspectives. While these perspectives
diverge in their predictions about the way race shapes social control, they all posit a
strong relationship between neighborhood racial composition and law enforcement.
Racial threat theory proffers that as the relative size of the black population increases in a
given area, whites perceive a threat to their political, economic, and social dominance.
Social control against blacks is expected to increase in racially heterogeneous areas
where opportunities for racial tensions are ripe and threat is perceived. Consequently,
more police enforcement is mobilized against blacks to curtail perceived threats and to
preserve white dominance (Blalock 1967). The theory also asserts that when the black
population size increases to the point of blacks becoming the majority, assuring blacks’
dominance, social control efforts allay. Thus, racial threat theory posits a curvilinear
relationship between neighborhood racial composition and law enforcement, arguing that
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social control will be greatest in areas where the relative black population size is small or
comparable to that of whites.
Benign Neglect Hypothesis
In racially homogenous areas where blacks and whites are segregated, it is
possible that racial segregation placates perceived racial threat and produces less social
control (Spitzer 1975). Consistent with racial threat theory, researchers have found a
positive effect of black percentage on police size, police expenditures, police killings, and
total arrest rates (Jackson and Carroll 1981; Liska and Chamlin 1984; Liska, Lawrence,
and Benson 1981). However, the inverse effect of black percentage has emerged when
examining race-specific arrest rates, a phenomenon known as “benign neglect” (Chamlin
1987; Chamlin and Liska 1992; Liska and Chamlin 1984). That is, blacks face less social
control in predominately black neighborhoods. Crime in such areas is expected to involve
a black perpetrator and a black victim. As a result of fewer instances of black-on-white
crime, white citizens put less pressure on officers to control crime involving a black
perpetrator. Moreover, because whites are not threatened and the government views
black victims as less deserving of official response (Hawkins 1987), less social control is
imposed on blacks in these contexts.
Studies testing racial threat and benign neglect hypotheses have produced mixed
results (for example, see Petrocelli, Piquero, and Smith 2003). While some research finds
no support for racial threat or benign neglect (Ousey and Lee 2008), others have
generally found evidence more consistent with benign neglect than racial threat, showing
increases in the black population to be related to decreases in arrests (Chamlin and Liska
1992; Liska and Chamlin 1984; Parker and Maggard 2005; Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005)
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and incarceration (Myers 1990). In their multi-level test of racial threat theory,
Stolzenberg, D’alessio, and Eitle (2004) found evidence consistent with benign neglect.
Controlling for relevant micro- and macro-level factors, they found that as the black
population increased in a city, the risk for violent crime arrests decreased, and in cities
with a large black population, crimes involving a black offender were less likely to result
in arrest. They also found that racial segregation conditioned the relationship between
offender’s race and arrest. In racially segregated cities, crimes involving black offenders
were less likely to result in arrest whereas in racially mixed cities, police were more
likely to make arrests of black offenders. They concluded that racial segregation serves as
a mechanism used to allay the potential threat of subordinate groups.
Defended Neighborhoods Hypothesis
Whereas racial threat theory predicts greater social control against blacks in
racially heterogeneous neighborhoods and benign neglect predicts less social control
against blacks in predominately black neighborhoods, the defended neighborhoods
hypothesis argues that blacks face more social control in predominately white
neighborhoods at the hands of white citizens and police, especially if the black population
has been growing (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998; Lyons 2007; Stewart et al. 2009).
This is because racial stereotypes that link blacks to social problems, such as drugs,
crime, violence, and poverty, are pervasive (Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Loury 2002), and
white citizens and police might view blacks as a threat to the neighborhood social order.
Animosity toward blacks in these contexts might motivate white citizens to defend their
territory and protect their interests by relying on the police, and blacks might be relatively
powerless to defend themselves (Weitzer and Tuch 2004; Weitzer and Tuch 2005).
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Stewart et al. (2009) investigated whether police discrimination against black citizens
varied by neighborhood context and found support for the defended neighborhoods
hypothesis. Controlling for neighborhood crime, socioeconomic conditions, and
individual factors, black adolescents were more likely to experience police-based
discrimination in predominately white neighborhoods that have had increases in the black
population.
Research testing racial conflict theories resoundingly concludes that
neighborhood racial composition shapes law enforcement practices. However, this body
of research has produced mixed findings about the nature of the relationship between
percent black and social control. Racial disparities in drug arrests, therefore, may reflect
officers’ differential use of social control in order to protect the interests of whites and to
keep blacks subordinate. The quantitative component of this dissertation considers racial
threat and benign neglect by testing the effect of neighborhood racial composition on
drug arrests when controlling for other factors.
IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS
Whereas racial conflict theories implicate racially-motivated biases, implicit
racial bias theory emphasizes unconscious racial attitudes. Social psychologists assert
that implicit bias stems from the unconscious system in the human brain that relies on
mental shortcuts in order to make automatic associations, such as associations between
blacks and crime, and to guide thinking and behaviors (Gladwell 2007). Implicit
associations are widespread among humans and influence their perceptions and reactions,
even unbeknownst to the perceiver and even among those who explicitly hold egalitarian,
non-prejudiced views (Payne 2001). In other words, one need not be racist, hold racial
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animus, or have racialized motivations to harbor implicit racial biases or to be influenced
by them (Fridell 2008; Gladwell 2007; Payne 2001). Research suggests that these implicit
racial associations are most likely to develop when police repeatedly encounter whites
and blacks under different crime conditions. They then develop stereotypical scripts that
reflect these experiences, and those scripts enable them to process new situations through
stereotyped filters, resulting in their biased treatment of racial groups (Grant and Holmes
1981; Noseworthy and Lott 1984; Smith and Alpert 2007). Experimental research lends
credence to implicit racial bias theory by linking participants’ unconscious racial biases
to racially discriminatory decisions (Correll et al. 2002; Eberhardt et al. 2004;
Greenwald, Oakes, and Hoffman 2003; Payne 2001).
RACIAL PROFILING
Regardless of whether racial bias is conscious or implicit, these processes can
manifest in racially-biased policing practices that result in the disparate treatment of
blacks and the lenient treatment of whites (Fridell 2008; Gladwell 2007; Payne 2001).
Compared to violent crime enforcement, police exercise higher amounts of discretion
when enforcing drug laws (Ghandnoosh 2015), and cultural stereotypes linking blacks to
drugs, crime, and undesirable behaviors can seep into these discretionary decisions
(Fridell 2008; Lynch and Patterson 1996). Additional evidence supporting racially-biased
policing theory in explaining racial disparities in drug arrests is informed by a larger body
of research that broadly examines the role of race in policing policies and practices in
general.
The Sentencing Project recently published a report of their analysis of uneven
policing practices in Ferguson, Missouri (Ghandnoosh 2015). In Ferguson, blacks were
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three and a half times more likely than whites to be stopped, and blacks were more likely
to be stopped for investigative reasons—one of the most discretionary reasons for traffic
stops of persons deemed suspicious (2015, 6). Racial differences in these discretionary
stops also exist in other jurisdictions. Among drivers under age 25 in Kansas City, for
example, black men were twice as likely as white men to be subjected to investigatory
stops (28% versus 13%, respectively) and black women were more than twice as likely as
white women to be stopped (17% versus 7%, respectively) (Epp, Maynard-Moody, and
Haider-Markel 2014, 67).
After deciding to make a stop, Ferguson police searched 12% of black drivers
compared to 7% of white drivers, though they were less likely to find contraband (e.g.
drugs, weapons) on black drivers than white drivers; 22% of black drivers who were
searched versus 34% of white drivers who were searched possessed contraband (2015, 6).
Similarly, a study in Boston found that blacks comprised 63% of the citizens whom the
Boston police observed, stopped, interrogated, frisked, or searched without making an
arrest, though blacks comprised 24% of the city’s population (ACLU Foundation of
Massachusetts 2014). Examining stop and frisk data in New York City, Fagan and Davies
(2000) found that blacks were significantly more likely to be stopped and frisked by the
NYPD than whites and Hispanics/Latinos, controlling for resident’s race, crime-specific
crime rates, and the racial distribution across the city’s 77 police precincts. They also
found that in precincts where black residents comprised less than 10% of the resident
population, blacks were more than twice as likely to be stopped for weapons offenses
compared to their arrest rates whereas whites were less than one time more likely to be

35

stopped compared to their arrest rates. Additionally, blacks were nearly three times more
likely to be stopped for alleged weapons violations in these neighborhoods.
Moreover, Ferguson police were twice as likely to arrest blacks as whites during
traffic stops (10% versus 5%). Findings from traffic stops in Ferguson echo those in other
jurisdictions. In New York City, blacks and Hispanics comprised 51% of the city’s
population over age 16 between years 2001 and 2013, yet blacks and Hispanics
accounted for 82% of misdemeanor arrests and 81% of those who received summonses
during that period (Ghandnoosh 2015, 8). National surveys show that once blacks are
pulled over, they are three times as likely as whites to be searched and twice as likely as
whites to be arrested (Eith and Durose 2011; Langton and Durose 2013). At the national
level, 95% of more than 3,500 police departments arrest blacks at a rate higher than that
of other racial/ethnic groups (Ghandnoosh 2015, 11). Together, these studies show that
racially-disparate policing practices are glaring not just in Ferguson but also in other
jurisdictions across the U.S.
In addition to racial differences in police stops, there are racial differences in
experiences of police brutality during police-citizen encounters. Results from the 1999
Gallup poll revealed that 58% of people of color, compared to 35% of whites, reported
that police brutality occurred in their local area (Gillespie 1999). Surveys from the
Bureau of Justice Statistics indicated that blacks were up to three times as likely as whites
to experience physical force or the threat of physical force during their most recent
encounter with the police (Eith and Durose 2011; Langton and Durose 2013). Moreover,
during deadly force encounters in recent years, police officers have killed young, black
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males at a rate higher than that of their white counterparts (Ghandnoosh 2015, 28,
endnote 2).
SUMMARY OF RACIALLY-BIASED POLICING THEORY
All in all, research suggests that black and white people and places experience
different policing practices; people of color encounter the police at different rates and for
different reasons and are treated differently during these encounters, suggesting that
racial bias—whether intentional or otherwise—is at play. This dissertation tests raciallybiased policing theory with regards to drug enforcement in a few ways. The quantitative
component includes neighborhood racial composition to gauge the relationship between
the relative black population and social control. Racially-biased policing will be
evidenced if racial composition is a significant predictor of drug arrests, controlling for
confounders. Specifically, racial threat will be evidenced if increases in the black
population significantly increase black drug arrests (Percent Black + Black Drug
Arrests) in white or mixed neighborhoods. A negative association between percent black
and black drug arrests (Percent Black - Black Drug Arrests) could indicate either
benign neglect or the defended neighborhoods hypothesis. The qualitative component
compares officers’ drug enforcement practices across racially-characterized
neighborhood as well as their treatment of black and white drug arrestees.
STUDIES ON RACIAL DISPARITIES IN DRUG ARRESTS
To summarize, current evidence casts doubt on differential drug involvement
theory and suggests that differential scrutiny theory and/or racially-biased policing theory
might be better explanations of the racial disparity problem. Though researchers have had
much to say about racial disparities in criminal justice, drug enforcement, and policing,
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most studies have been descriptive in nature or related to broader policing practices. A
small body of studies has directly and empirically assessed the predictors of racial
disparities in drug arrests at the individual level and city level.
In two studies using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997,
Mitchell and Caudy (2013; 2015) tested whether race differences in self-reported drug
arrests were explained by race differences in self-reported drug offending, controlling for
non-drug offending, neighborhood contextual factors (e.g. living in the city center and
living in neighborhoods with gangs), and other confounders. Focusing on arrests for any
drug charge, fixed-effects logistic regression models revealed that race differences in
drug offending and race differences in non-drug offending only reduced the magnitude of
the black-white disparity in drug arrests by 15% and could not explain the disparity
problem (2013, 20-21). The substantial racial disparity also remained when adding
proxies for neighborhood context to the models, indicating that neighborhood context
also could not explain the disparity problem. However, neighborhood context
significantly increased the log-odds of drug arrest by 78%, holding other variables
constant (2013, 20-21), suggesting the importance of neighborhood context on the risk
for drug arrests. Their study on drug distribution arrests drew similar conclusions (2015).
In fact, not only did drug offending and non-drug offending fail to account for racial
disparities in drug distribution arrests, adding the offending measures to the models
increased the magnitude of the racial disparity. This was because blacks and Hispanics
reported lower levels of drug use and drug distribution than whites although blacks and
Hispanics were significantly more likely to report being arrested for such offenses than
whites. Blacks had 190% and Hispanics had 55% significantly greater odds of drug

38

distribution arrests than whites after controlling for age, socioeconomic measures, and
several indicators of drug offending (e.g. use/sale of marijuana/hard drugs, drug sales
income) and non-drug offending (e.g. assault, gun carrying, property offenses) (2015,
16).
Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst (2006) used three data sources to study drug
distribution arrests in Seattle: 1) Seattle’s Needle Exchange Survey data which described
911 transactions and the race/ethnicity of drug deliverers, 2) drug delivery arrest data
from the Seattle Police Department (SPD) between 1999 and 2001, and 3) ethnographic
observations of two well-known open outdoor drug markets. The needle exchange data
showed that whites were the largest group of drug deliverers except for crack, which was
more likely to be used and exchanged by blacks. The arrest data revealed that 72% of
drug delivery arrests were for crack, and 79% of those arrested for selling crack were
black (2006, 118-119). The researchers used z-scores to compare the racial composition
of drug deliverers in the needle exchange data by drug type to the racial composition of
drug delivery arrestees by drug type. They found that the SPD’s focus on crack accounted
for the overrepresentation of blacks in drug arrests. Blacks were significantly
overrepresented and whites were significantly underrepresented among heroin, meth, and
crack arrests. These comparisons mirrored their comparisons between the racial
composition of drug delivery arrests and the racial composition of observed dealers in the
ethnographic observations of the two outdoor drug markets. In Downtown, a racially
mixed area, 38% of observed dealers were black and 39% were white, but 59% percent of
arrestees in that census tract were black and 21% were white. In Capitol Hill, a
predominately white census tract, 4% of observed drug dealers were black and 94% were
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white, yet 32% of those arrested were black and only 57% were white in that tract (2006,
120). Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst concluded that race shaped the perceptions of Seattle’s
drug problem and SPD organizational practices (e.g. focus on crack rather than all drugs,
focus on less-lucrative outdoor drug markets) explained why blacks were overrepresented
as drug arrestees.
Engel, Smith, and Cullen (2012) believed that Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst's
(2006) comparison of the needle exchange and observational data with drug arrest data
overstated the extent of racial disparities in Seattle’s drug delivery arrests. Engel and
colleagues proposed that drug-related calls for service by citizens are an underused but
more appropriate benchmark for comparing drug arrests. As such, they reexamined racial
disparities in Seattle’s drug arrests in Downtown and Capitol Hill and throughout Seattle.
This reanalysis differed from the original analysis by focusing on all drug arrests rather
than solely drug delivery arrests and focusing on a later time period (2004-2007 instead
of 1999-2001). Comparing the racial/ethnic composition of drug arrests with the
racial/ethnic composition of suspects being reported in calls for drug service, their
descriptive analysis of ratios revealed that blacks and Hispanics were either evenly
represented or underrepresented as drug arrestees in Downtown and Capitol Hill.
Moreover, they estimated ordinary least square regression models and showed that more
than 50% of the variance in drug arrests at the statistical reporting area-level and 75% of
the variance in drug arrests at the census tract-level was explained by calls for drug
service. However, the models did not include any control variables. In addition to this
limitation, scholars have cautioned against the use of calls for service data as estimates of
crime (see Klinger and Bridges 1997). While the study is limited by the questions it can

40

answer and the conclusions it can draw (see critique by Beckett 2012), it underscores the
importance of considering citizen calls for drug service in analyses of drug arrests.
Parker, Stults, and Rice (2005) tested racial threat theory by examining racespecific drug arrests among a sample of 245 U.S. cities in year 2000. The researchers
examined several measures capturing racial economic threat, including black
composition, racial inequality (e.g. black-to-white educational attainment and
unemployment rate), growth in the black immigrant population, and race-specific
measures of structural disadvantage while controlling for number of sworn officers,
residential mobility, Hispanic population, crime rates, political mobilization, and region.
They did not include a measure of aggregate drug offending, such as fatal drug overdoses
or drug-related hospital visits. The results showed, most notably, evidence of benign
neglect rather than racial threat. Percent black and percent of black immigrants were
negatively related to black drug arrests and not significantly related to white drug arrests.
These effects were significantly stronger for blacks than whites. Economic disadvantage
was positively related to arrests for both groups although its effect differed by racial
group. These results suggested that benign neglect and concentrated disadvantaged
contributed to racial disparities in drug arrests.
The before-mentioned studies at the individual and city levels advance research
on racial disparities in drug arrests. Yet, as discussed earlier, examining drug arrests
within the context of neighborhoods is an important endeavor since neighborhood
characteristics shape crime and police behavior (Klinger 1997; Smith 1986). Findings at
the individual or city levels might not hold at the neighborhood level where drug activity,
crime, and drug enforcement are manifested. Neighborhoods are more internally
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homogeneous than are cities and differ from one another more than cities (Martínez,
Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008). As such, this dissertation adds to this body of research by
offering the first neighborhood-level explanation of racial disparities in drug arrests.
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Chapter 3: Setting of the Study: St. Louis, Missouri

“…A city northern in industrial development but largely southern in its inter-racial attitude.”
-Elwood Street 1927, pg. 248
This dissertation research examines race-specific drug arrests made across
neighborhoods in St. Louis, Missouri between 2009 and 2013. St. Louis is divided into 79
established neighborhoods1 that are meaningful social units to its residents. An industrial,
Midwestern city, St. Louis has experienced rapid population decline in recent decades. In
1950, St. Louis had more than 850,000 residents but lost an average of 10,000 residents
each year up to 2000 (Gordon 2009, 23), resulting in a current population of roughly
319,000 residents. Much of the population decline was due to white flight, the exodus of
white residents from the city to the surrounding St. Louis County. Moreover, St. Louis’
population is split almost evenly with black (49%) and white (46%) residents, with
Hispanics and persons of other races comprising 5% of the population. A comparison of
the characteristics of St. Louis with those of other Midwestern cities (e.g. Chicago,
Indianapolis, Milwaukee, Kansas City, and Cincinnati) and the U.S. are presented in
Table 3.1. St. Louis’ relative black population size is higher than that in most U.S. cities
and is nearly four times higher than the national average. The lack of racial and ethnic
diversity is also relatively exceptional, although it has always been characteristic of St.
Louis. For example, in 1940, 99.9% of St. Louisans identified themselves as either black
(13%) or white (87%) (Gordon 2009, 11).

1

Due to one neighborhood being an industrial area with no resident population and subsequently, no data,
this dissertation examines 78 neighborhoods.
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Another defining feature of St. Louis is its marked racial segregation. Similar to
industrial, Midwestern cities like Chicago, Cleveland, and Cincinnati, St. Louis has
always been and remains one of America’s most hypersegregated cities since the
migration of southern blacks to the north (Massey and Denton 1989). St. Louis’ black
population is concentrated mostly in the city’s northern, and more recently, southeastern
neighborhoods. The white population resides primarily in the central corridor and
southwestern neighborhoods. Additionally, economic disadvantage is pronounced in St.
Louis and tends to be synonymous with race. Having relatively high poverty, 27% of St.
Louis residents have incomes below the poverty level, and 14% of residents are
unemployed. White households have a median income nearly twice that of black
households ($41,843 versus $23,067, respectively), and black unemployment rates more
than triple white unemployment rates (24% versus 7%, respectively) 2. Further
2

Census data retrieved from:
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=CF.
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demonstrating St. Louis’ economic disadvantage and decay, the city has a higher
percentage of vacant housing units (19%) than most cities and the national average of
11%.
Cities with high levels of racial segregation and economic disadvantage tend to
have high rates of violent crime (Logan and Messner 1987; Wilson 1987; Krivo and
Peterson 1996; Peterson and Krivo 1993). Consequently, as shown in Table 3.1, violent
crime rates in St. Louis are much higher than those at the national level and those in
comparable cities. St. Louis’ violent crime rate was 1,943 per 100,000 in 2010, a rate five
times the national average (404 per 100,000). In 2011, the rate of firearm assaults and
robberies in St. Louis was four times higher than that for all of U.S. cities with more than
250,000 residents (Rosenfeld, Deckard, and Blackburn 2014, 431).
The well-documented relationship between racial segregation and violence is due
to the fact that segregated black areas, in particular, face higher levels of criminogenic
conditions than segregated white areas or mixed areas, such as poverty, physical
deterioration, dependency, poor schools, low educational attainment, and high
unemployment rates (Massey, Condran, and Denton 1987; Peterson and Krivo 1993;
Sampson and Wilson 1995; Wilson 1987). Moreover, segregated black neighborhoods
are vulnerable to crime because they are isolated from mainstream society and networks
of social opportunities, impeding black upward mobility and creating frustration among
residents. With fewer middleclass and working class families to buffer the effects of
uneven and poor economic conditions, economically deprived neighborhoods have a low
capacity to sustain basic institutional structures. Fewer economic resources mean fewer
stable institutions to offer formal and informal social control to prevent crime (Rose and
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Clear 1998; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) and little political and economic
power to protect the interests of the community. Additionally, widespread joblessness
means idleness, more people hanging out, nonconventional role modeling, and
opportunities for criminal involvement (Liebow 2003; Wilson 1987). Further fostering
crime, residents are sometimes forced to adapt to these potentially dangerous conditions
by using or appearing ready to use violence to protect themselves and their property
(Anderson 1999).
HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS AND RACIAL SEGREGATION
Stark racial segregation and economic disadvantage in St. Louis are no accident.
They can be traced to a legacy of deliberate racial discrimination against blacks, which
has given rise to present-day neighborhood conditions, interracial tensions, and high
crime rates in St. Louis. An analysis of racial disparities in drug arrests is best understood
through this historical context.
St. Louis is best summarized as a northern city with southern character. As a slave
state that remained in the Union during the Civil War, Missouri has a legacy of anti-black
racism and white supremacism (Gordon 2009). Yet, Missouri has levels of housing
segregation and its corresponding social problems that are more consistent with northern
states. It was one of the first segregated states to start desegregating schools and other
institutions. St. Louis and Missouri have been the platform to seminal civil rights events
and landmark court cases that shaped the city’s and state’s social climate and even gained
national prominence. In 1857 in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that black Americans, whether enslaved or free, were prohibited from being
American citizens and had no standing to sue in federal court, and that the federal
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government had no power to regulate slavery (Finkelman 1996). This decision came after
Dred Scott, a slave in St. Louis whose owner leased him for work in Illinois and
Wisconsin where slavery was prohibited, attempted to sue for his freedom to no avail.
This seminal court case was one of the catalysts for the Civil War and was superseded by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th Amendment, which gave black Americans full
citizenship (Finkelman 1996). The Old Courthouse where the first two trials took place
for this case still stands in downtown St. Louis. Missouri and St. Louis were home to
countless landmark civil rights judgements related to housing segregation, educational
segregation, and employment discrimination, including a 1969 rent strike in St. Louis
public housing, which brought fair, affordable housing to the fore of the national civil
rights agenda (Lang 2009).
Additionally, St. Louis and its nearby areas were home to infamous race riots. The
East St. Louis riot in 1917 was the first and the deadliest of a series of race riots across
the U.S. during the World War I era (Barnes 2008). White mobs attacked blacks in the
streets of Eat St. Louis, Illinois during the spring and summer of 1917, which culminated
to a full-scale riot on July 2, 1917. Angered at blacks’ employment in the wartime
industries, white mobs attempted to drive blacks from the community by destroying
hundreds of homes and businesses with fire and killing dozens of people (Barnes 2008).
The official death toll was 48 people, including children and babies, but historians
believe upwards of 200 blacks were murdered during this gruesome riot. The East St.
Louis race riot garnered national attention and paved the way for the Civil Rights
Movement and contributed to the growth of the NAACP and Urban League (Barnes
2008).
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Also pivotal to the history of race relations in St. Louis was a race riot at
Fairground Park. St. Louis opened its first public swimming pool in Fairground Park in
1912, which was for whites only. In 1949, city officials opened the pool to black citizens
in response to a federal law that ruled that prohibiting blacks from golf courses violated
the 14th Amendment (Wiltse 2010). On the first day blacks accessed the pool, crowds of
hundreds to thousands gathered as mobs of whites threatened black swimmers and beat
them with bats. Police were called, and 150 officers intervened to restore order (Wiltse
2010). The pool was re-segregated for a year after the race riot before officials opened it
to blacks again. By 1954, the city closed the pool because it was no longer profitable.
White hatred and violence against blacks in St. Louis was precipitated by the
Great Migration in the early- and mid-20th-century. Hundreds of thousands of blacks
migrated from the rural south to northern, western, and Midwestern cities, like St. Louis,
seeking economic advancement and relief from Jim Crow laws. Fearing a “black
invasion,” whites believed blacks posed a grave threat to their interests, so they made
deliberate, earnest efforts to contain and segregate black people. Most notably, these
efforts were codified in the housing market as early as 1911 (Gordon 2009, 73). In 1916,
St. Louis passed an ordinance that restricted blacks from living in areas more than 75%
white based on the justification that blacks decreased property values and were a public
nuisance. The Buchanan v. Warley (1917) Supreme Court decision struck down the
ordinance, but local property owners and realty interest groups devised original deed
covenants and restrictive agreements to continue racially discriminatory housing
practices (Gordon 2009). Equating black occupancy with blight, these covenants
prohibited selling, leasing, conveying, or renting to blacks in restricted areas. Blacks were
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relegated to reside in the most dilapidated neighborhoods. By the 1950s, deed covenants
and restrictive agreements waned as many of them expired and legal cases challenged
their constitutionality. A 1948 Supreme Court case that began in north St. Louis (Shelley
v. Kraemer) ruled that the state could no longer enforce restrictive deed covenants. Based
in north St. Louis County, the Supreme Court decision in Jones v. Mayer (1968)
prohibited racial discrimination in private real estate transactions. Despite legal efforts to
thwart racial segregation, it persisted through the practices of real estate boards and
commissions and redlining by realtors and financial institutions until local, state, and
federal fair housing regulations banned these practices in the late 1960s.
Similar to other Midwestern cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Milwaukee, St.
Louis was a manufacturing, transportation, and agricultural processing hub in the late 19th
century. The Mississippi River was its economic asset, and the city was known as the
“gateway to the west” from the steamboat era (Gordon 2009). St. Louis’ economy
declined shortly after World War II. Jobs in declining sectors, such as manufacturing and
mining, waned, and residents in north St. Louis, a large portion being black, lacked the
freedom to move when the local employment base evaporated. Deindustrialization set in
after the 1970s, and those who were economically able to move did. Between 1950 and
1970, scores of white residents fled the city to move to St. Louis County or south St.
Louis (Gordon 2009). White flight not only contributed to steep population declines but
also to economic declines as movers took with them their incomes, expenditures, and tax
payments that local communities needed to survive. Thus, deindustrialization,
depopulation, and disinvestment left St. Louis in physical decay and economically
deprived. And black residents were left to face the worst of it, even until today.
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The legacy of deliberate racial segregation, economic disadvantage, and white
hostility toward blacks in St. Louis shape the social, economic, and political climate of
today. The city’s civil rights tradition and resistance by African Americans paved the way
to positive change in the city, state, and even the nation, contributing to the rise of the
contemporary Civil Rights Movement. Current unrest in Ferguson and just recently, at
my university’s sister campus, the University of Missouri (in Columbia, Missouri), is the
manifestation of entrenched interracial strife that has always existed in the city and the
state. Commenting on the nation’s focus on racial tensions in Missouri, historian Colin
Gordon notes that, “When you have this deep-seated pattern of housing segregation that
becomes linked in people’s minds to public safety and home values,” blacks are viewed
as dangerous outsiders, “…not full citizens…and that plays into the way police behave”
and the way citizens view blacks (Marans 2016). Thus, this dissertation’s neighborhoodlevel analysis of racial disparities in drug enforcement in St. Louis is best understood
through this historical lens.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN ST. LOUIS
The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (hereafter SLMPD) is the agency
responsible for making the drug arrests examined in this study. SLMPD’s patrol and
enforcement responsibility is limited to the city of St. Louis rather than the entire St.
Louis Metropolitan area. Its enforcement was divided into nine police districts during the
study period. In 2010, SLMPD had 1,920 full-time employees, including 1,363 officers
and 557 civilian employees3. SLMPD’s policing style is consistent with order

3

Based on data from the FBI’s UCR: https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-inthe-u.s.-2010/tables/table-78/10tbl78mo.xls
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maintenance policing, rather than community-oriented policing, as a strategy to prevent
crime and deal with disorder.
I interviewed a high-ranking official from SLMPD to learn about the agency’s
priorities and organizational policies before and during the 2009-2013 study period. He
explained that the primary focus of the department was decreasing violent crime and
disorder. SLMPD developed and deployed a variety of task forces and specialized
operations units to target certain crimes and problems, like street violent crime, gangs,
and car break-ins. He contended that concerted drug enforcement efforts, like large-scale
drug interdictions and buy/bust operations, were infrequent given the priority to fight
violent crime. He mentioned that few buy/bust operations were deployed in response to
residents’ complaints about open-air drug crimes. Residents either complained directly to
the police department or through elected officials, like the alderman.
Studies have found evidence of racial profiling in SLMPD’s police traffic stops
(Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker 2012; Rosenfeld, Rojek, and Decker 2012). Black
motorists are more likely to be stopped by the police and once stopped, more likely to be
searched than white motorists. Blacks are more likely to be searched after a stop in white
neighborhoods, and whites are more likely to be searched after a stop in black
neighborhoods (Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker 2012). When examining drug arrests, the
focus of the dissertation, like most jurisdictions across the U.S., St. Louis has salient
racial disparities in drug arrests. Figure 3.1 depicts race-specific drug arrest trends for St.
Louis between 1960 and 2005. During this 45-year period, black drug arrests were
always higher than those of whites and constituted most of the city’s drug arrests. The
figure also shows that the black-white gap in drug arrests has grown during the series.
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This dissertation analyzes neighborhood-level drug arrests made by SLMPD
during 2009-2013. These drug arrests comprise incidents for which the primary, most
serious offense was drug possession, sale, or manufacturing. During the five-year study
period, SLMPD officers made 14,395 nonviolent drug arrests across the city. As Figure
3.2 shows, blacks were overrepresented and whites were underrepresented in drug arrests.
Although blacks made up 49% of the St. Louis resident population, they comprised 74%
of drug arrestees. Whites made up 46% of the St. Louis resident population but accounted
for only 26% of drug arrests. Put into a different perspective, black drug arrest rates
(68.35 per 1,000 black residents) were more than two and half times greater than white
drug arrest rates (26.22 per 1,000 white residents) during the time period4.

4

I computed St. Louis’ drug arrest counts, percentages, and rates using arrest data from the St. Louis
Metropolitan Police Department, as discussed in the Data section of Chapter 4.
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Figure 3.2 City-Level Drug Arrests in St. Louis 2009-2013, by Race (N = 14,395)

In light of the city’s drastic population decline, marked racial segregation, high
economic disadvantage, high violent crime rates, and longstanding racial disparities in
drug arrests, St. Louis is ideally suited to the research question. St. Louis’ social ills are a
stark, dramatic form of conditions in other cities. Studying the racial disparity problem in
St. Louis can demonstrate how neighborhood conditions can influence race-specific drug
arrests in a city characterized by hyper-racial segregation and urban decay.
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Component
The goal of the quantitative component of the dissertation is to assess whether
neighborhood context can explain why blacks are overrepresented and whites are
underrepresented as drug arrestees in St. Louis. Prior empirical studies on racial
disparities in drug arrests focus on individuals (Mitchell and Caudy 2013; 2015) or larger
geographic units such as cities (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Parker, Stults, and
Rice 2005). Although those levels of analyses are informative in their own right,
contextualizing an analysis of drug arrests within neighborhoods is important.
Neighborhood contextual factors influence neighborhood crime and shape police
behavior (Klinger 1997; Smith 1986). Moreover, findings from larger geographic units
might not hold at the neighborhood level and likely mask differences in neighborhoods
(Engel, Smith, and Cullen 2012). This chapter is devoted to the quantitative component
of the dissertation. It describes the various data sources and measures used in the
quantitative analysis. Then it discusses the analytic strategy and describes the variables
before presenting results from the bivariate and multivariate analyses. This chapter
concludes with a discussion of the findings.
DATA
For the quantitative analysis, I culled multiple pieces of neighborhood-level data
to create a unique dataset. The dataset includes drug arrest data, violent and property
crime data, and citizen calls for drug service data from the St. Louis Metropolitan Police
Department (hereafter SLMPD) as well as neighborhood demographic data from the
American Community Survey (hereafter ACS) via the St. Louis Planning and Urban
Design Agency and fatal drug overdose data from the St. Louis Medical Examiner’s
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Office (hereafter SMEO). It should be noted that these neighborhood-level data are not
publicly available and must be requested from the agencies. Under normal circumstances,
these neighborhood-level data are hard to obtain. However, with the assistance and
support of Dr. Richard Rosenfeld and Sherri Schaefer of SLMPD, I was able to request
and obtain these restricted data from the agencies relatively seamlessly. This research is
possible because of Dr. Rosenfeld and Sherri and the cooperation and generosity of the
agencies. Moreover, the Institutional Review Board at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis approved my use of the data and the research activities for this dissertation (Project
#719568-1).
MEASURES
DRUG ARRESTS
Drug arrest data from SLMPD are used to construct the dependent variables.
SLMPD records the number of aggregate and race-specific drug arrests officers make
throughout St. Louis for drug possession and drug sale/manufacturing. This dissertation
focuses on drug arrests made between 2009 and 2013 for which the primary offense—the
most serious offense—was a drug crime. Thus, drug arrests involving a violent crime
arrest are excluded. During the five-year period, 14,805 drug arrest incidents across the
78 neighborhoods met this criterion. Of those incidents, 14,395 (97%) contained
addresses where the arrest occurred, resulting in only 3% of missing data. Arrests for
drug possession comprise the vast majority of drug arrests (89%) whereas drug
sale/manufacturing arrests makeup 11% of all drug arrests. To maintain the
confidentiality of the data, SLMPD used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to
geocode these drug arrest incidents to their respective neighborhoods, removed addresses,
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and provided aggregate and race-specific counts of total drug arrests, drug possession
arrests, and drug sale/manufacturing arrests for each neighborhood5. Accordingly, the
drug arrest data in the quantitative component are at the neighborhood level, do not
contain addresses, and are not individual drug arrest incidents.
Black and white counts of total, possession, and sale/manufacturing drug arrests
are the dependent variables, which are counts summed for the five-year period. The
analysis examines drug arrest counts rather than drug arrest rates because St. Louis
neighborhoods are highly racially segregated, which would produce inflated race-specific
rates. To demonstrate this distortion, neighborhood #69 has 18 white residents (white
resident population = 0%), but 144 white drug arrests occurred during the five-year
period, translating to a white drug arrest rate of 8,000 per 1,000 white residents. Similar
distortions exist across many St. Louis neighborhoods. Although researchers commonly
log transform the rate outcome to help normalize the distribution and then estimate least
squares regression models, this approach is inappropriate as it violates the assumptions of
least squares regression and can pose analytical problems that lead to biased results. As
such, this dissertation instead examines arrest counts and employs poisson-based analyses
that adjust for the exposure risk, a suitable alternative (see Osgood 2000 for a discussion
about these issues).
DRUG OVERDOSE DEATHS
Drug arrest measures reflect drug enforcement patterns, and they should not be
mistaken for patterns of drug crime. To test differential drug involvement theory and
5

The data cannot be portioned by drug type (e.g. marijuana, cocaine, crack, heroin, and methamphetamine)
because this information is not systematically recorded in the arrest data and is missing from roughly half
of these arrest incidents.
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gauge neighborhood-level drug involvement, this research includes race-specific
accidental drug overdose deaths (hereafter drug deaths) as a key independent variable.
Researchers and agencies commonly use drug deaths, drug-related hospital visits, and
comparable measures as indicators of drug involvement (Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst
2006; Galea et al. 2003; Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008; SAMHSA 2013). Drug
deaths represent the supply of and the demand for “hard drugs” in a given area. Thus,
more drug deaths denote more drug involvement in neighborhoods.
The drug death data come from the SMEO which investigates deaths in St. Louis
that occur under suspicious or unusual circumstances. Drug deaths represent the number
of accidental deaths caused by illegal drug use or drug toxicity, most involving cocaine or
heroin alone or combined with other illegal drugs. Drug deaths are coded according to the
address where the death occurred. Although the location of drug acquisition is unknown,
the location of death is a reasonable indicator of the spatial distribution of drug
involvement (Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008). Moreover, drug deaths are better
indicators of hard drug use than marijuana use and reflect drug possession more than drug
sale/manufacturing. However, hard drugs are expected to lead to an arrest more than
marijuana, and drug possession accounts for 89% of all drug arrests during the study
period.
Despite being an imperfect measure, the drug death rate is a more valid indicator
of drug involvement than drug arrests. Drug arrests are likely riddled with endogeneity
bias because, as this dissertation hypothesizes, police patrol urban neighborhoods with
high levels of violence more heavily than other areas, increasing the risk of drug arrests
in violent-prone neighborhoods. Drug arrests also likely reflect racially-biased policing
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practices as studies show that blacks are overrepresented as drug arrestees when
compared to the racial composition of drug offenders in surveys or qualitative data
(Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Mitchell and Caudy 2013; Mitchell and Lynch 2011;
Mosher 2001). Thus, drug deaths overcome these sources of bias because police
enforcement likely has no impact on drug deaths. Moreover, the drug death data likely
capture the less-visible drug involvement that occurs indoors away from direct
observation that drug arrest data likely miss (Mosher 2001). For these reasons, the drug
death measure provides a reasonable estimate of drug involvement.
The SMEO protected the confidentiality of the data by geocoding addresses to
their respective neighborhood, removing those addresses, and providing aggregate and
race-specific drug death counts for each neighborhood before providing the drug death
data. As such, the drug death data in this study are at the neighborhood level, do not
contain addresses, and are not individual drug death incidents. Between years 2009 and
2013, 339 illegal drug overdose deaths occurred across St. Louis. The white drug death
rate and black drug death rate are computed for each neighborhood by summing the total
number of drug deaths for each race during the five-year period, dividing it by the
neighborhood’s population size for each race, and multiplying by 1,000.
Equitable drug enforcement should be a function of drug involvement; areas with
high drug death rates should have more drug arrests as areas with low drug death rates
should have fewer drug arrests. Differential drug involvement theory suggests that
predominately black neighborhoods have more drug involvement than predominately
white neighborhoods, and these differences in drug involvement explain racial disparities
in drug arrests. A simple examination of the descriptive parameters will reveal whether
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drug death rates vary significantly across racially-characterized neighborhoods and by
decedent’s race. Further testing differential drug involvement theory, the multivariate
analysis will investigate whether each group’s arrest is a function of its race-specific drug
death rate. If drug enforcement is equitable and officers are truly responding to drug
involvement when arresting suspects, then the race-specific drug death rate will be a
significant predictor of drug arrests.
VIOLENT AND PROPERTY CRIME
Violent and property crime rates are included because, as differential scrutiny
theory contends, police deployment tends to be concentrated in crime-ridden
neighborhoods, thus increasing police scrutiny and the risk for drug arrest of frequenters
in those areas. In addition, violent crime is closely related to drug activity (Baumer et al.
1998; Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008), making it an important variable in the
study. SLMPD provided violent and property crime counts for each neighborhood
between years 2009 and 2013. These are crimes known to the police regardless of arrest
and are the same data SLMPD reports to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report for city-level
crime in St. Louis. Violent crime includes aggravated assaults, robberies, rapes, and
murders. Property crime includes larcenies, burglaries, auto thefts, and arsons. Violent
crime rates and property crime rates are computed, separately, by summing the total
number of crimes during the five-year period, dividing it by the neighborhood’s
population size, and multiplying by 1,000.
Differential scrutiny theory posits that differences in crime rates across
neighborhoods explain racial disparities in drug arrests. Police agencies allocate
resources based on reported crime so that neighborhoods with more crime problems—
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especially violent crime problems—have a greater police presence. Coupled with the
heightened presence of officers in disadvantaged, crime-prone neighborhoods is the
visible, violent nature of drug markets in such areas. Thus, neighborhood crime,
especially violence, might play a role in producing racial disparities in drug arrests. A
simple examination of the descriptive parameters will determine whether violent and
property crime rates vary significantly by racially-characterized neighborhoods, as
numerous studies have already demonstrated. The multivariate analysis will further
investigate differential scrutiny theory by testing whether violent and property crime rates
predict drug arrests. If differential scrutiny theory is valid, crime rates, especially violent
crime rates, will significantly predict drug arrests. Statistically significant racial
differences in the effect of crime on drug arrests would be evidence that differential
scrutiny theory explains the racial disparity problem.
CITIZEN CALLS FOR DRUG SERVICE
In addition to crime rates, differential scrutiny theory highlights the role citizens
play in shaping law enforcement practices. Police agencies rely on citizen calls for
service just as they rely on crime rates to determine where and how to deploy officers and
resources. Moreover, when citizens make emergency calls to the 911 dispatch, officers
are required to respond. Differential scrutiny theory suggests that disadvantaged, crimeprone neighborhoods where blacks are more likely to frequent have numerous citizen
calls for service, another factor that increases police presence in those areas. As such, this
dissertation research includes two measures of calls for drug service.
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Calls for drug service are conceptualized as two separate measures at the
neighborhood level between 2009 and 2013: suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls6.
Suspicious drug calls comprise all of the calls citizens made to the 911 center reporting a
suspicious person possibly using, selling, or manufacturing drugs. The dispatcher records
the call information, categorizes the call as “suspicious person-drugs” based on the
information, and sends it over the radio to beat officers who then respond to the reported
incident. Thus, officers responded to all suspicious drug calls, which may or may not
have led to an arrest. On the other hand, drug hotline calls are calls citizens made to
SLMPD’s Secret Witness Hotline7 to anonymously report drug activity, including the
use, sale, or production of illegal substances. The hotline operator tries to obtain as much
information about the drug activity as possible, but the minimum requirement is the
location of the drug crime. SLMPD treats drug hotline calls as tips, so officers did not
respond to all tips. In fact, according to personnel from SLMPD, only a small percentage
of the tips were investigated by officers. The suspicious drug calls measure is a
conventional indicator of calls for service in criminological research (Engel, Smith, and
Cullen 2012; Klinger and Bridges 1997). Nevertheless, the drug hotline calls offer an
additional source of information about drug crime.
SLMPD provided data on suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls as counts of
all citizen calls made between 2009 and 2013 for each neighborhood. During the time
period, there were 22,687 suspicious drug calls and 3,769 drug hotline calls across St.

6

The drug hotline calls measure has a partial count for year 2009, which starts on June 9, 2009, due to a
transition in record keeping systems.
7

View the website at http://www.slmpd.org/anonymous_tips.shtml.
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Louis. Neighborhood-level rates per 1,000 residents are computed for each measure by
summing the counts for the five years, dividing by the total population size, and
multiplying by 1,000. Unfortunately, callers did not always report the race of the suspect
and when they did, dispatchers did not systematically report it in the calls for service
data. Therefore, suspect’s race is unavailable, and race-specific calls for drug service
measures cannot be computed.
It is important to note that calls for drug service represent citizen complaints
about drug activity and are not valid estimates of the distribution of drug crime. This is
because calls for drug service capture only a subset of drug crimes and are biased by
many factors, such as citizens’ willingness to call the police, the possible inaccuracy of
the callers’ information about the legal nature of events, and discrepancies between what
callers report versus what call-takers record based on their interpretation of the
information (Klinger and Bridges 1997). Moreover, citizens stereotype blacks as
suspicious or criminal. These stereotypes influence their perceptions of neighborhood
problems (Quillian and Pager 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004) and are likely
reflected in their requests for police services. In racially segregated places like St. Louis,
the effect of race on the reporting of crimes to the police is likely strong (Xie and
Lauritsen 2012). In addition, citizen calls likely capture visible drug activity rather than
hidden drug crimes. To this end, this dissertation includes calls for drug service measures
not as proxies for drug involvement but as measures of citizens’ requests for police
services that likely shape drug enforcement practices.
An examination of the descriptive parameters will reveal whether calls for drug
service vary significantly across racially-characterized neighborhoods. The multivariate
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models will include suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls, separately, to assess
whether calls for drug service are related to drug arrests. If drug enforcement is driven by
calls for service, as differential scrutiny theory suggests, and officers are responding to
citizen complaints, then the models will show calls for service to be a significant
predictor of drug arrests. Moreover, if the effect of calls for drug service varies
significantly between white and black arrestees, then citizen calls for drug service will
explain the racial disparity in drug arrests.
NEIGHBORHOOD DEMOGRAPHICS
Research consistently reports that neighborhood context is related to
neighborhood crime (Baumer 1994; Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares 2008; McCarthy
1991; Sampson and Wilson 1995) and influences policing practices (Fagan and Davies
2000; Klinger 1997; Quillian and Pager 2001; Smith 1986). Thus, this dissertation
includes a host of neighborhood demographic data from the ACS as independent
variables. The ACS provided several measures capturing dimensions of social
disorganization (e.g. population heterogeneity, residential instability, economic
disadvantage) that are related to crime. These data are for years 2008-2012 and include
population size, racial composition, percentage of renters, and several indicators of
economic disadvantage.
Population Size
Population size is included as a measure of population density, which can
influence neighborhood conditions, neighborhood crime, and enforcement practices (e.g.
beat size). The ACS provided raw counts of the total number of residents and the number
of black and white residents in every neighborhood for each of the five years. These
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counts are averaged over the five-year period to produce annual average counts of total
and race-specific population sizes.
Racial Composition
Racial composition is included because of its relevance to the research question,
relevance to racially-biased policing theory, and significant relationship with perceptions
of neighborhood problems (Chiricos, McEntire, and Gertz 2001; Novak and Chamlin
2012; Quillian and Pager 2001; Stewart et al. 2009). Racial composition is expressed as
the annual average percentage of black residents and white residents in each
neighborhood during the five-year period. In addition to their use in the quantitative
analysis, I use these racial composition measures to racially-characterize neighborhoods
as either black neighborhoods (>75% of population is black), white neighborhoods
(>75% of population is white), or mixed neighborhoods (<76% black and <76% white)
throughout this dissertation. To consider the propositions of racially-biased policing
theory, the multivariate analysis will assess whether neighborhood racial composition,
expressed as the percentage of black residents in a neighborhood, significantly predicts
drug arrests. Racially-biased policing will be evidenced if percent black predicts drug
arrests when controlling for legal, race-neutral factors such as crime and the drug death
rate. Racial composition will explain the racial disparity problem if its effect significantly
differs between white and black arrestees.
Percentage of Rented Housing Units
This dissertation research accounts for residential instability by measuring the
percentage of rented housing units, a common indicator of residential instability in social
disorganization research (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Martínez, Rosenfeld, and Mares
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2008). A greater presence of owned housing units indicates that residents are less likely
to move and more likely to be economically and socially invested in the neighborhood.
Conversely, a higher presence of renters in neighborhoods denotes residential instability
as renters are more likely to move. Residential instability is hypothesized to disrupt
neighborhood organization, social networks, and social cohesion needed to safeguard
against neighborhood crime (Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1942). Percentage of
rented units is computed as the annual average percentage of rented housing units in each
neighborhood during the five-year period.
Economic Disadvantage
Moreover, the ACS provided several measures of economic disadvantage,
expressed as percentages, including: homes under the city’s median income of $35,000,
unemployed population, residents with less than a high school education, single mother
households with minor children, population below age 18, and vacant units. I computed
the annual average percentage of each measure during the five-year period and indexed
them into an economic disadvantage measure using orthogonal oblique rotation factor
analysis. The variables loaded well on a single factor, and the index has an alpha of .89.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
Analyses for the quantitative component begin by examining the descriptive
parameters for St. Louis neighborhoods and the extent of racial disparities in drug arrests.
During this stage, I also compare the descriptive parameters between raciallycharacterized neighborhoods (e.g. predominately black, white, and mixed neighborhoods)
and perform a series of t-tests to assess whether the means of the measures vary
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significantly across neighborhood types. Then, I inspect bivariate correlations among the
variables used in this research and perform diagnostic tests.
The multivariate analysis employs count-based regression models to investigate
whether neighborhood contextual factors explain the overrepresentation of blacks and the
underrepresentation of whites as drug arrestees. Similar to prior studies that use count
outcomes and explain racial disparities in arrests or crime (Ousey 1999; Parker and
Maggard 2005), I estimate separate models for black drug arrests and white drug arrests
and then test the equality of the coefficients across models. The race-specific dependent
variables include: total drug arrests, drug possession arrests, and drug sale/manufacturing
arrests for white arrestees and black arrestees. The independent variables include: racespecific drug death rate, violent crime rate, property crime rate, economic disadvantage,
rented housing units, percent black, and separate measures of citizen calls for drug
service (suspicious drug calls rate and drug hotline calls rate). Each outcome is regressed
onto the theoretically-relevant predictors. Race-specific population size is included as the
exposure variable (i.e. white population size in the white drug arrest models and black
population size in the black drug arrest models), thus transforming the count models into
an analysis of rates of race-specific drug arrests (Osgood 2000). Including the racespecific population size as the exposure variable accounts for the population at risk for
arrest as well as for variations in population size across neighborhoods. Additionally, the
negative binomial models use robust standard errors for the clustering of observations
within neighborhoods. Because the suspicious drug calls rate and drug hotline calls rate
capture the same construct and are strongly correlated (r = .71, p < .05), each measure is
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estimated in separate models in order to avoid model misspecification and to understand
how each measure is related to drug enforcement.
Estimating separate models for white and black arrests will reveal whether
neighborhood-level predictors are related to the risk for drug arrest for each group. Going
a step further, I test whether the effect of the predictors varies significantly between white
and black drug arrestees. Because white and black drug arrests come from the same
neighborhoods, it is possible that the error terms in the regression equations are
correlated. Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) post estimation is a technique that can
account for cross-equation correlations in error terms, allowing for comparisons of
coefficients across models that stem from the same units (Greene 2011; Ousey 1999;
Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005). The suest command in STATA allows the testing of SUR.
To employ SUR, I estimate each negative binomial model, store the estimates of both
models, and run the suest command in STATA to test for the equality of coefficients
across the white and black drug arrest models.
THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES
The quantitative analyses test the tenets of differential drug involvement,
differential scrutiny, and racially-biased policing theories. Differential drug involvement
theory attributes racial disparities in drug arrests to higher rates of drug involvement in
black neighborhoods than white neighborhoods. If there are racial and neighborhood
differences in drug involvement, then the univariate analysis will show that the black
drug death rate is significantly higher than the white drug death rate and that the drug
death rate is significantly higher in black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. If
differential drug involvement explains racial disparities in drug arrests, then the
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multivariate analysis will show that the drug death rate has a significantly stronger effect
on black drug arrests than white drug arrests.
Differential scrutiny theory argues that higher rates of violent crime and citizen
calls for drug service attract police to disadvantaged neighborhoods where blacks are
more likely to frequent. If this is true, the univariate analysis will show significantly
higher violent crime rates and citizen calls for drug service in predominately black
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. If differential police scrutiny explains racial
disparities in drug arrests, then violent crime rates and measures of citizen calls for drug
service (e.g. suspicious drug calls rates and drug hotline calls rates) will have a
significantly stronger effect on black drug arrests than white drug arrests.
Finally, the multivariate analysis will consider racially-biased policing theory by
assessing the relationship between racial composition—measured as the percentage of
black residents—and race-specific drug arrests. Fair, equitable drug enforcement should
be a function of drug involvement and not extralegal factors like racial composition. As
such, racially-biased policing will be evidenced if racial composition is significantly
related to drug arrests, controlling for the drug death rate, violent and property crime, and
relevant covariates. Racial threat will be evidenced if increases in the percentage of black
residents are associated with higher black drug arrests (Percent Black + Black Drug
Arrests), especially in white or mixed neighborhoods. A negative association between
percent black and black drug arrests (Percent Black - Black Drug Arrests) can indicate
support for either the benign neglect or defended neighborhoods hypothesis.
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DESCRIPTIVE PARAMETERS
Descriptive information on the 78 neighborhoods is presented in Table 4.1. In the
average neighborhood, officers arrest more black suspects than white suspects. For total
drug arrests, officers make 136.56 black drug arrests (SD = 171.61) and 47.50 white drug
arrests (SD = 56.81). Stated differently, officers make nearly 4 black drug arrests for
every one white drug arrest in the average neighborhood (mean = 3.78; SD = 3.69), and
this disparity ratio ranges from .14 to 15.6 across neighborhoods. Similarly, the average
black drug possession arrest count is 117.54 (SD = 147.99) compared to the average
white drug possession arrest count of 45.87 (SD = 54.97), a ratio of more than 3 black
drug arrests for every white drug arrest (mean = 3.39, SD = 3.30). The racial disparity in
drug arrests for sale or manufacturing is even greater. Officers arrest 19.03 black suspects
(SD = 24.41) and 1.63 white suspects (SD = 2.52) for drug sale/manufacturing in the
average neighborhood.
The average neighborhood has a black drug death rate of 1.04 (SD = 1.73) and a
white drug death rate8 of 7.37 (SD = 21.71). A calculation of a t-test of difference in
means shows that the white drug death rate is significantly higher than the black drug
death rate (t = -2.54, p < .05, two-tailed test), an initial finding that refutes differential
drug involvement theory’s assertion that blacks are more involved in drugs than whites.
The drug death rates are highly skewed in their original metric. To reduce skewness, I
log-transformed the drug death rates by computing the natural log of the rate, plus a
constant of 1, before entering them into the multivariate models (ln(variable + 1)).
8

One case was removed from the calculation of the mean due to an inflated white drug death rate of 1,000
per 1,000 white residents in neighborhood #53. Including this case would have produced an average white
drug death rate of 20.10 (SD = 114.44) for the population of neighborhoods.
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Parameters for Population of Neighborhoods (N = 78)
Dependent Variables (5-year sums)
Black Total Arrest Count
White Total Arrest Count
Black-White Disparity
Black Possession Arrest Count
White Possession Arrest Count
Black-White Disparity
Black Sale/Mftg Arrest Count
White Sale/Mftg Arrest Count
Black-White Disparity
Independent Variables
Black Drug Death Rate, per 1,000 black residents

(5-year sum)

Mean

SD

Min

Max

136.56
47.50
3.78
117.54
45.87
3.39
19.03
1.63
10.27

171.61
56.81
3.69
147.99
54.97
3.30
24.41
2.52
12.01

1
0
0.14
1
0
0.13
0
0
0

866
296
15.6
751
285
13.8
115
14
56

1.04

1.73

0

12.05

7.37

21.71

0

136.36

107.80

71.01

11.83

277.30

437.82

246.77

147.41

1667.17

4083.67
1998.95
1815.32

3233.58
1829.05
2452.88

323
46
1

16249
8753
9425

0.56
0.40

0.34
0.33

0.02
0

1.00
0.96

0.54
0.16
0.19
0.12
0.22
0.22

0.15
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.10

0.26
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.06
0.05

0.76
0.43
0.43
0.43
0.42
0.43

0.57

0.17

0.20

0.93

81.22

75.93

0

385.66

11.48

8.98

0

34.38

+

White Drug Death Rate, per 1,000 white
+,
residents (5-year sum) 1
Violent Crime Rate, per 1,000 population
(5-year sum)
Property Crime Rate, per 1,000 population
(5-year sum)
Population Size (5-year average)
Black Population Size
White Population Size
Racial Composition (5-year average)
% Black Population
% White Population
Economic Disadvantage Index (α = .89)
(5-year averages)
% Homes Under City’s Median Income
% Unemployed
% Low Education (< HS)
% Single Mom Homes
% Youthful Population
% Vacant Units
Percentage of Rented Housing Units
(5-year average)
Suspicious Drug Calls Rate, per 1,000 population

(5-year sum)+

Drug Hotline Calls Rate, per 1,000 population

(5-year sum)+

+Descriptive parameters for variable are in the original metric; variable is log transformed in the multivariate analysis
1

One case is omitted from the calculation of mean due to a very high white drug death rate of 1,000 per 1,000 whites

70

The average neighborhood has a five-year violent crime rate of 107.80 per 1,000
residents (SD = 71.01) and a five-year property crime rate of 437.82 per 1,000 residents
(SD = 246.77). The average neighborhood has a population size of a little over 4,000
residents (SD = 3233.58), which ranges between 323 and 16,249 residents across
neighborhoods. The average black population size and white population size,
respectively, is roughly 2,000 residents (SD = 1829.05) and 1,815 residents (SD =
2452.88). Racial composition is expressed as the percentage of black residents and
percentage of white residents in each neighborhood. In the average neighborhood, 56% of
residents are black (SD = .34), which ranges between 2% and 100% across
neighborhoods, and 40% of residents are white (SD = .33), a range between 0% and 96%.
These ranges indicate that some St. Louis neighborhoods are virtually all black or all
white. Categorizing the neighborhoods according to their racial composition (not shown
in table) reveals that 40% are predominately black neighborhoods (N = 31), and 23% are
predominately white neighborhoods (N = 18). Stated differently, 63% of St. Louis
neighborhoods are racially segregated while 37% are racially heterogeneous.
A proxy for neighborhood instability, in the average neighborhood, 57% of
housing units are rented (SD = .17). Moreover, several measures used to compute the
economic disadvantage index are presented as percentages in Table 4.1. These include:
home under the city’s median income of $35,000 (mean = 54%; SD = .15), unemployed
population (mean = 16%; SD =.09), residents with less than a high school education
(mean = 19%; SD = .09), single mother households with minor children (mean = 12%;
SD = .09), population below age 18 (mean = 22%; SD = .08), and vacant units (mean =
22%; SD = .10). Finally, the average rate of suspicious drug calls is 81.22 (SD = 75.93),
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and the average rate of drug hotline calls is 11.48 (SD = 8.98), both per 1,000 residents.
The distributions of rates for suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls were skewed, so
I log-transformed the variables by computing the natural log of each variable, plus a
constant of 1, before including them in the multivariate models (ln(variable + 1)).
RACIALLY-CHARACTERIZED NEIGHBORHOODS
Neighborhood characteristics vary by racial composition (Sampson and Wilson
1995; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002), and the theories that guide this
research suggest the need to understand the conditions of racially-characterized
neighborhoods. As such, Table 4.2 presents means of the before-mentioned measures for
white neighborhoods (N = 18), black neighborhoods (N = 31), and mixed neighborhoods
(N = 29). To assess whether any visible differences in means are statistically meaningful,
I conducted a series of two-sample t-tests that compare the variable means between white
and black neighborhoods, white and mixed neighborhoods, and black and mixed
neighborhoods. There are noteworthy differences across racialized neighborhoods.
All three measures of black drug arrests (e.g. total, possession,
sale/manufacturing) are significantly higher in black neighborhoods and mixed
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods. To illustrate, the average black total drug
arrest count is 199.87 in black neighborhoods and 141.83 in mixed neighborhoods
compared to 19.06 in white neighborhoods. However, this difference in drug arrest risk
across racially-characterized neighborhoods is not apparent for whites, as the white drug
arrest counts are statistically similar across racially-characterized neighborhoods. The
only exception is the white drug sale/manufacturing count is significantly higher in white
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Table 4.2 Mean Differences of Characteristics across Racially-Characterized
Neighborhoods (N = 78 neighborhoods)
Variables
White
Black
Mixed
N’hoods
N’hoods
N’hoods
(N = 18)
(N = 31)
(N = 29)
Dependent Variables (5-year sums)
Black Total Arrest Count
19.06 2; 3
199.87 1
141.83 1
White Total Arrest Count
34.28
42.71
60.83
2; 3
1; 3
Black-White Disparity
0.67
6.15
3.14 1; 2
Black Possession Arrest Count
16.56 2; 3
172.74 1
121.21 1
White Possession Arrest Count
32.11
42.03
58.52
2; 3
1; 3
Black-White Disparity
0.66
5.42
2.88 1; 2
2; 3
1
Black Sale/Mftg. Arrest Count
2.50
27.13
20.62 1
2
1; 3
White Sale/Mftg. Arrest Count
2.17
0.68
2.31 2
Black-White Disparity
0.85 2; 3
20.73 1; 3
8.72 1; 2
Independent Variables
Total Drug Death Rate (5-year sum)
0.81
1.35
1.06
+
Black Drug Death Rate (5-year sum)
1.48
0.90
0.92
White Drug Death Rate (5-year sum)+, X 0.85 2
17.14 1; 3
1.31 2
2; 3
1; 3
Violent Crime Rate (5-year sum)
30.94
162.89
96.60 1; 2
Property Crime Rate (5-year sum)
274.57 2; 3
468.39 1
506.48 1
2
1
Population Size (5-year average)
4,991.39
3,158.71
4,509.00
2; 3
1; 3
% Black Population (5-year average)
9%
92%
46% 1; 2
% White Population (5-year average)
87% 2; 3
6% 1; 3
47% 1; 2
Economic Disadvantage Index (5-year
averages)
% Homes Below Median Income 37% 2; 3
67% 1; 3
51% 1; 2
2; 3
1; 3
% Unemployed
8%
23%
17% 1; 2
% Low Education (< HS)
12% 2
25% 1; 3
16% 2
2; 3
1; 3
% Single Mom Homes
4%
18%
11% 1; 2
% Youthful Population
16% 2; 3
26% 1; 3
21% 1; 2
2; 3
1; 3
% Vacant Units
12%
27%
22% 1; 2
Percentage of Rented Housing Units (542% 2; 3
58% 1
65% 1
year average)
Suspicious Drug Calls Rate (5-year
15.39 2; 3
130.66 1; 3
69.23 1; 2
+
sum)
Drug Hotline Calls Rate (5-year sum)+
6.06 2
15.62 1; 3
10.42 2
two-sample t-test; p < .05 (two-tailed tests)
1 = sig differ from white n’hoods 2 = sig differ from black n’hoods 3 = sig differ from mixed n’hoods
+Descriptive parameters for the variable are in the original metric; variable is log transformed in the
multivariate analysis
X
One case is omitted from the calculation of mean due to a very high white drug death rate of 1,000 per
1,000 white residents
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neighborhoods (mean = 2.17) and mixed neighborhoods (mean = 2.31) than in black
neighborhoods (mean = .68). Additionally, the black-to-white disparity ratio for total
drug arrest, drug possession arrest, and drug sale/manufacturing arrest is significantly
higher in black neighborhoods (means of 6.15, 5.42, and 20.73, respectively) than in
white neighborhoods (means of .67, .66, and .85, respectively) and mixed neighborhoods
(means of 3.14, 2.88, and 8.72, respectively). Disparity ratios in mixed neighborhoods are
significantly higher than those in white neighborhoods. Part of the racial difference in
drug arrests across racially-characterized neighborhoods is a function of the race-specific
population size. For example, most of the residents in black neighborhoods are black, so
black arrests are expected to be higher there than in white neighborhoods. However, with
the exception of drug sale/manufacturing arrests, which make up only 11% of all arrests,
white arrests are not higher in white neighborhoods than in black or mixed
neighborhoods, as expected. This could be indicative of officers under-enforcing drug
laws in white neighborhoods. Moreover, in mixed neighborhoods where the white and
black population sizes are split nearly evenly, it is noteworthy that blacks face a higher
risk for drug arrest than whites. Together, these data reveal variations in drug
enforcement across racially-characterized neighborhoods.
In addition, the data revealed no significant differences in the black drug death
rate across the neighborhood types, although the white drug death rate is significantly
higher in black neighborhoods (mean = 17.14) than in white neighborhoods (mean = .85)
and mixed neighborhoods (mean = 1.31). In other words, the black drug death rate
appears to occur evenly across racialized neighborhoods whereas the white drug death
rate appears to be higher in black neighborhoods. An analysis of the total drug death rate
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(black and white drug death counts divided by total population size and multiplied by
1,000), shows that the overall drug death rate does not vary significantly across
neighborhoods. Furthermore, there are significant differences in violent and property
crime rates across neighborhoods. Black neighborhoods have significantly higher violent
crime rates (mean = 162.89) that are five times greater than rates in white neighborhoods
(mean = 30.94) and nearly two times greater than rates in mixed neighborhoods (mean =
96.60). Violent crime rates are significantly higher in mixed neighborhoods than in white
neighborhoods. Property crime rates in mixed neighborhoods (mean=506.48) and black
neighborhoods (mean = 468.39) are significantly higher than those in white
neighborhoods (mean = 274.57). These differences in crime rates across neighborhoods
are consistent with part of differential scrutiny theory which suggests that violent crime,
in particular, is higher where blacks are more likely to live. Also consistent with part of
differential scrutiny theory, rates of citizen calls for drug service vary across raciallycharacterized neighborhoods. Both the suspicious drug calls rate and the drug hotline
calls rate are significantly higher in black neighborhoods (means of 130.66 and 15.62,
respectively) than in mixed neighborhoods (means of 69.23 and 10.42, respectively) and
white neighborhoods (means of 15.39 and 6.06, respectively). The suspicious drug calls
rate is also significantly higher in mixed neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods.
Residential instability, measured as the percentage of rented housing units, is
significantly greater in mixed and black neighborhoods (means of 65% and 58%,
respectively) than in white neighborhoods (mean = 42%). Additionally, all measures of
economic disadvantage show that black neighborhoods are plagued with significantly
greater economic disadvantage than white neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods.
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With the exception of low educational attainment, indicators of economic disadvantage
show that mixed neighborhoods are significantly more economically distressed than
white neighborhoods.
Figure 4.1 Racial Composition, Drug Arrests, and Drug Deaths across St. Louis N’hoods,
2009-2013

To visually depict some neighborhood characteristics, I used GIS to map racial
composition, total number of drug deaths, and total number of drug arrests. Figure 4.1
shows a map of St. Louis divided into the 78 neighborhoods. Racial composition is
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denoted by the white-to-black grayscale: white-colored areas represent white
neighborhoods, light gray-colored areas represent mixed neighborhoods, and dark graycolored areas represent black neighborhoods. Total drug deaths are denoted by red dots;
more red dots indicate more drug deaths. Total drug arrests—a sum of white and black
arrests—are denoted by a blue car; larger blue cars indicate more drug arrests.
The map provides a striking visual depiction of differences in characteristics
across neighborhoods. Echoing the before-mentioned descriptive parameters, the map
shows that St. Louis neighborhoods are highly racially segregated. Even more salient is
the spatial distribution of these segregated neighborhoods: the entire northern part of St.
Louis is comprised of black neighborhoods, the entire southwestern part is comprised of
white neighborhoods, and mixed neighborhoods are in between. In other words, not only
are most St. Louis neighborhoods racially segregated, the entire St. Louis city is divided
by race. Moreover, the map shows that drug deaths—proxies for drug involvement—
occur throughout the city in no clear clustering or pattern, but drug enforcement is
concentrated in black neighborhoods and some mixed neighborhoods and is very low in
white neighborhoods. An examination of the raw drug arrest counts reveals that, of the
14,395 drug arrests during the five-year period, only 964 (7%) occurred in white
neighborhoods compared to 7,531 (52%) in black neighborhoods and 5,900 (41%) in
mixed neighborhoods. Stated differently, nearly all—93%—of drug arrests occurred
outside of white neighborhoods despite the even distribution of drug deaths across the
city. Low drug enforcement in white neighborhoods likely contributes to the
underrepresentation of whites in drug arrests and the racial gap in drug arrests.
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Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1 reveal important differences between raciallycharacterized neighborhoods. First, there are no statistically significant differences in
overall drug deaths by neighborhood type. Second, though drug offending is not
significantly different across racially-characterized neighborhoods, drug enforcement
varies significantly by arrestees’ race across racially-characterized neighborhoods. Third,
black neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods have significantly higher violent and
property crime rates and calls for drug service than white neighborhoods. Elevated crime
and citizen complaints in these areas might attract greater police deployment and
subsequently, more drug enforcement, as differential scrutiny theory predicts. Lastly,
black and mixed neighborhoods experience significantly more residential instability and
economic disadvantage than white neighborhoods. These descriptive differences across
racially-characterized neighborhoods will inform subsequent analyses that seek to explain
racial disparities in drug arrests.
BIVARIATE RESULTS
Table 4.3 presents bivariate correlations among the variables in the quantitative
analysis, many which are statistically significant. First focusing on the correlates of drug
arrests, correlations between the six race-specific drug arrest outcomes have a positive,
moderate to strong correlation with one another (r between .33 and .99, p < .05).
Additionally, the black and white drug death rates are not significantly correlated with
either of the race-specific drug arrest outcomes, except the white drug death rate is
positively correlated with the black drug sale/manufacturing arrest outcome (r = .23, p <
.05). Violent crime is positively correlated with drug arrests for both groups but is
strongly related to black total drug arrest (r = .62, p < .05), black drug possession arrest (r
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= .62, p < .05), and black drug sale/manufacturing arrest (r = .61, p < .05) and moderately
related to white total drug arrest (r = .27, p < .05) and white drug possession arrest (r =
.28, p < .05). Property crime is positively correlated with total, possession, and
sale/manufacturing arrests for blacks (r = .41, .41, and .42, respectively, p < .05) and total
and possession arrests for whites (r = .38 and .38, respectively, p < .05). Neither violent
crime nor property crime is significantly related to white drug sale/manufacturing arrest.
Population size is positively correlated with the six outcomes but is strongly correlated
with white total, possession, and sale/manufacturing arrests (r = .50, .49, and .42,
respectively, p < .05) and moderately correlated with black total, possession, and
sale/manufacturing arrests (r = .27, .27, and .28, respectively, p < .05). Percentage of
black residents is positively and strongly correlated with increases in total, possession,
and sale/manufacturing drug arrests for blacks (r = .42, .43, and .39, respectively, p <
.05). On the other hand, the percentage of black residents is unrelated to total and
possession drug arrests for whites but is negatively and moderately related to white
sale/manufacturing arrests (r = -.28, p < .05). Economic disadvantage is positively
correlated with total, possession, and sale/manufacturing drug arrests for blacks (r = .35,
.35, and .32, respectively, p < .05) but is unrelated to the three white drug arrest
outcomes. Percentage of rented housing units is moderately correlated with black total
and possession arrests (r = .24 and .25, respectively, p < .05), although it is not
significantly correlated with black sale/manufacturing arrest or any of the white drug
arrest outcomes. More citizen calls for drug service, by both measures, are related to
increases in black drug arrests but not white drug arrests. Specifically, the suspicious
drug calls rate is strongly correlated with total, possession, and sale/manufacturing drug
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arrests for blacks (r = .49, .49, and .51, respectively, p < .05). The drug hotline calls rate
has a correlation of .33 (p < .05) with each of the black drug arrest outcomes.
In addition to correlations between drug arrests and the predictor variables, there
are many other significant correlations worth mentioning. Violent crime is not
significantly correlated with the black drug death rate, although violent crime is
positively related to the white drug death rate (r = .46, p < .05), property crime (r = .62, p
< .05), percentage of black residents (r = .75, p < .05), economic disadvantage (r = .68, p
< .05), percentage of rented housing units (r = .36, p < .05), suspicious drug calls (r = .76,
p < .05), and drug hotline calls (r = .47, p < .05). In addition to being positively
associated with black drug arrests and violent crime, the percentage of black residents is
positively associated with increases in the white drug death rate (r = .39, p < .05), but not
the black drug death rate, as well as increases in economic disadvantage (r = .85, p <
.05), percentage of rented housing units (r = .28, p < .05), suspicious drug calls (r = .75, p
< .05), and drug hotline calls (r = .45, p < .05). In addition to being positively associated
with black drug arrests, violent crime, and percentage of black residents, economic
disadvantage is positively and strongly correlated with the white drug death rate (r = .43,
p < .05), but not the black drug death rate, suspicious drug calls (r = .67, p < .05), and
drug hotline calls (r = .48, p < .05). Economic disadvantage and percentage of rented
housing units are also positively correlated (r = .28, p < .05).

80

81

Suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls are positively and strongly correlated
with one another (r = .71, p < .05), which confirms the validity of the citizen calls for
drug service construct. Additionally, the suspicious drug calls rate is positively correlated
with the black drug death rate (r = .28, p < .05) and the white drug death rate (r = .36, p <
.05), just as the drug hotline calls rate is positively correlated with the black drug death
rate (r = .31, p < .05) and the white drug death rate (r = .25, p < .05). The positive,
significant correlations between the calls for drug service measures and drug death rates
confirm the validity of the drug death rate as a proxy for drug involvement although the
correlations are moderate enough to show that calls for drug service and the drug death
rate capture distinct dimensions of drug involvement. As mentioned previously,
suspicious drug calls and drug hotline calls are positively and significantly correlated
with the three black drug arrest outcomes, violent crime, percentage of black residents,
and economic disadvantage.
DIAGNOSTICS
Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, I examined a variety of regression
diagnostics. The distributions of some of the continuous variables are skewed and
kurtotic in their original metric. I therefore log transformed (ln(variable + 1)) the drug
death rates, suspicious drug calls rates, and drug hotline calls rates before entering them
into the models. Although the violent and property crime rates are slightly skewed and
kurtotic in their original metric, the final models use the original metric since the log
transformed version yields the same multivariate findings. Over dispersion characterizes
many of the variables, including the outcomes, as their variance exceeds their means. For
this reason, I chose negative binomial regression over poisson regression because it
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allows for over-dispersed variables. Moreover, a formal test confirms that the negative
binomial regression model is more appropriate than the poisson model because its BIC
(Bayesian Information Criterion) is lower. Despite strong correlations among some of the
variables, multicollinearity is not a concern in the data. The variance inflation factors are
all under 5.00.
MULTIVARIATE RESULTS
Multivariate analyses are used to test whether neighborhood characteristics help
explain racial disparities in drug arrests. Tables 4.4 (total drug arrests), 4.5 (drug
possession arrests), and 4.6 (drug sale/manufacturing arrests) present the negative
binomial regression results for white drug arrests and black drug arrests, separately. The
models regress race-specific drug arrests onto race-specific drug death rates, violent and
property crime rates, economic disadvantage, rented housing units, racial composition,
and each measure of citizen calls for drug service (suspicious drug calls rates and drug
hotline calls rates). Models 1 in Tables 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 display the full models with the
suspicious drug calls rate while Models 2 display the full models with the drug hotline
calls rate. In addition to estimating drug arrests in the average neighborhood, the analysis
examines the conditional effect of neighborhood racial context. As shown in Table 4.7,
the models examine the predictors of race-specific total drug arrests in white, black, and
mixed neighborhoods, separately.
The tables display incidence rate ratios (IRR)9, robust standard errors (RSE), and
statistical significance levels. Incidence rate ratios are presented and discussed to

9

Table 4.7 presents unstandardized b coefficients rather than IRRs due to extremely large or small IRRs for
the racial composition coefficients (e.g. 2.42e-07 or 4.07e03).
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facilitate a meaningful comparison of the effect sizes of the variables. However, tables
presenting the unstandardized b coefficients are available in Appendix A. As mentioned
previously, race-specific population size is included as the exposure variable in all
models to appropriately adjust the count outcomes, and the models use robust standard
errors and account for the clustering of observations within neighborhoods. In addition to
the regression results, the tables show χ2 results from the SUR post-estimation which tests
whether coefficients in the white and black models significantly differ (black coefficient
minus white coefficient).
TOTAL DRUG ARRESTS
Models 1 in Table 4.4 present results for total drug arrests for whites and blacks.
Results show that neighborhood-level factors are related to white and black drug arrests,
although different factors predict arrests for each group. The race-specific drug death rate
is significantly related to white drug arrests but not black drug arrests. Holding the other
variables constant, a one-unit increase in the white drug death rate is associated with a
36% increase in white drug arrests (IRR = 1.36, RSE = .13, p < .01) while the black drug
death rate is not significantly related to black drug arrests (IRR = 1.24, RSE = .22, p >
.05). In other words, when officers arrest white suspects, they are responding to drug
involvement. When officers arrest black suspects, they are responding to factors other
than drug involvement. Despite this difference, the SUR test of difference in coefficients
reveals that the race-specific drug death rate has a statistically similar effect on white and
black drug arrests (χ2 = .19, p > .05). Contrary to differential drug involvement theory,
the race-specific drug death rate does not explain racial disparities in drug arrests.
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Table 4.4 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Total Drug Arrest Counts (N = 78)

Models 1

Race-Specific Drug Death
Rate(Ln)
Violent Crime Rate
Property Crime Rate
Economic Disadvantage
Rented Housing Units
Racial Composition (% black)
Suspicious Drug Calls Rate(Ln)

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.36**
(.13)
1.01*
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.32
(.30)
0.06***
(.04)
30.47***
(20.84)
1.12
(.21)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.24
(.22)
1.01***
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
0.99
(.12)
0.88
(.30)
0.15***
(.05)
1.19*
(.09)

Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)
Constant
Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)
Wald χ 2

Models 2
SUR χ 2

0.19
0.42
0.99
1.44
14.42***
59.83***

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.35**
(.13)
1.01
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.29
(.28)
0.08***
(.05)
41.69***
(28.45)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.30
(.23)
1.01***
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
0.99
(.12)
0.94
(.37)
0.18***
(.06)

SUR χ 2

1.02
(.08)
0.04***
(.01)
1

1.82

122.24***

0.03
2.21
3.42
1.48
11.95***
66.70***

0.13

0.01***
(.01)
1

0.02***
(.01)
1

1.24
(.19)
0.01***
(.00)
1

379.17***

127.21***

407.13***

*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

Consistent with part of differential scrutiny theory, the models show that drug
enforcement is concentrated in neighborhoods with the most violent crime, although
violent crime has a modest, significant effect on white and black drug arrests. For
instance, holding the other variables constant, a one-unit increase in the violent crime rate
is related to a 1% increase in white drug arrests (IRR = 1.01, RSE = .00, p < .05) and
black drug arrests (IRR = 1.01, RSE = .00, p < .001). The violent crime rate has a
statistically similar effect on white and black drug arrests (χ2 = .42, p > .05), indicating
that neighborhood violent crime does not explain racial disparities in drug arrests, as part
of differential scrutiny predicts. Percentage of rented housing units, a proxy for
residential instability, significantly predicts white drug arrests (IRR = .06, RSE = .04, p <
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.001) but not black drug arrests (IRR = .88, RSE = .30, p > .05). A one percent increase in
residential instability decreases white drug arrests by 94%, holding the other variables
constant, suggesting that officers are more likely to arrest white suspects in stable
neighborhoods rather than in neighborhoods with high residential turnover. The effect of
rented housing units is significantly stronger for white drug arrests than black drug arrests
(χ2 = 14.42, p < .001), indicating that residential stability is related to the racial disparity
in drug arrests.
Differential scrutiny theory also posits that drug enforcement is likelier in
neighborhoods with more calls for drug service. The models show some support for this
claim, specifically when officers arrest black suspects. A one-unit increase in the
suspicious drug calls rate is associated with a 19% increase in black drug arrests (IRR =
1.19, RSE = .09, p < .05), although the suspicious drug calls rate is unrelated to white
drug arrests (IRR = 1.12, RSE = .21, p > .05). Black drug arrests are a function of
citizens’ suspicious drug calls, yet the suspicious drug calls rate has a statistically similar
effect on drug arrests for both whites and blacks (χ2 = .13, p > .05).
The models show that neighborhood racial composition has a substantial effect on
drug enforcement practices. Percentage of black residents significantly predicts white and
black drug arrests; however, the direction and magnitude of these relationships differ
between groups. Specifically, when holding the other variables constant, a one percent
increase in the black population significantly increases white drug arrests more than
thirty-fold (IRR = 30.47, RSE = 20.84, p < .001) and significantly decreases black drug
arrests by 85% (IRR = .15, RSE = .05, p < .001). Stated differently, when accounting for
drug deaths, violent and property crime, and relevant covariates, officers are more likely
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to arrest white suspects in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of blacks and are more
likely to arrest black suspects in neighborhoods with a higher percentage of whites.
Racial composition is the strongest predictor in the models, and it has a significantly
stronger effect on white drug arrests than black drug arrests (χ2 = 59.83, p < .001). These
results suggest that neighborhood racial composition explains racial disparities in drug
arrests.
Models 2 in Table 4.4 present comparable results for race-specific total drug
arrests, except with the drug hotline calls rate instead of the suspicious drug calls rate.
The substantive results are similar with two exceptions. Unlike results in Models 1,
Models 2 show that violent crime is not significantly related to white drug arrests (IRR =
1.01, RSE = .00, p > .05) although it is significantly related to black drug arrests (IRR =
1.01, RSE = .00, p < .001). Violent crime has a statistically similar effect on white and
black drug arrests (χ2 = 2.21, p > .05). The other exception is the second indicator of
citizen calls for drug service—drug hotline calls rate—is not significantly related to white
drug arrests (IRR = 1.24, RSE = .19, p > .05) or black drug arrests (IRR = 1.02, RSE =
.08, p > .05). In other words, officers are not responding to citizen calls to the drug
hotline when making drug arrests.
DRUG POSSESSION ARRESTS
Results in Table 4.5 focus on explaining racial differences in arrests for drug
possession, which constitute 89% of total drug arrests. As such, results for drug
possession arrests are substantively similar to those for total drug arrests. As Models 1 in
Table 4.5 show, a one-unit increase in the white drug death rate is associated with a 35%
increase in white drug arrests (IRR = 1.35, RSE = .13, p < .01) while the black drug death
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rate is not significantly related to black drug arrests (IRR = 1.24, RSE = .22, p > .05).
Race-specific drug death rate has a statistically similar effect on white and black drug
possession arrests (χ2 = .18, p > .05). Additionally, a one-unit increase in the violent
crime rate is significantly related to a 1% increase in white drug arrests (IRR = 1.01, RSE
= .00, p < .05) and black drug arrests (IRR = 1.01, RSE = .00, p < .001). Violent crime
has a statistically similar effect on white and black drug possession arrests (χ2 = .69, p >
.05). In contrast to the significant relationship between suspicious drug calls and black
arrests in Table 4.4 for total drug arrests, Models 1 in Table 4.5 show that the suspicious
drug calls rate is not significantly related to drug possession arrests for either group.
Likewise, Models 2 in Table 4.5 show that the drug hotline calls rate is not significantly
related to white or black drug possession arrests.
Similar to results for total drug arrests, rented housing units and racial
composition are the two factors related to racial disparities in drug possession arrests. A
one percent increase in rented housing units is associated with a 94% decrease in white
drug arrests (IRR = .06, RSE = .04, p < .001), indicating that whites have a greater risk for
drug arrest in residentially stable neighborhoods. Percentage of rented housing units is
not significantly related to black drug arrests (IRR = .95, RSE = .33, p > .05), and its
effect is statistically stronger on white drug possession arrests than black drug possession
arrests (χ2 = 14.28, p < .001). A one percent increase in the percentage of black residents
significantly increases white drug arrests 33-fold (IRR = 33.03, RSE = 22.84, p < .001)
and significantly decreases black drug arrests by 85% (IRR = .15, RSE = .05, p < .001), a
relationship that is statistically stronger for white arrests than black arrests (χ2 = 58.42, p
< .001).
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Table 4.5 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Drug Possession Arrest Counts (N = 78)

Models 1

Race-Specific Drug Death
Rate(Ln)
Violent Crime Rate
Property Crime Rate
Economic Disadvantage
Rented Housing Units
Racial Composition (% black)
Suspicious Drug Calls
Rate(Ln)
Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)
Constant
Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)
Wald χ 2

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.35**
(.13)
1.01*
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.32
(.31)
0.06***
(.04)
33.03***
(22.84)
1.12
(.21)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.24
(.22)
1.01***
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
0.98
(.12)
0.95
(.33)
0.15***
(.05)
1.15
(.09)

Models 2
SUR χ

2

0.18
0.69
1.55
1.49
14.28***
58.42***

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.35**
(.13)
1.01
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
1.29
(.28)
0.08***
(.05)
45.87***
(31.76)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.29
(.23)
1.01***
(.00)
1.00
(.00)
0.98
(.12)
0.98
(.39)
0.17***
(.06)

SUR χ 2

1.01
(.08)
0.03***
(.01)
1

2.19

124.38***

0.04
2.75
4.46*
1.49
11.58***
66.43***

0.02

0.01***
(.01)
1

0.02***
(.01)
1

1.26
(.19)
0.01***
(.00)
1

383.71***

125.93***

413.30***

*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

DRUG SALE/MANUFACTURING ARRESTS
Models examining the predictors of drug sale/manufacturing arrests are shown in
Table 4.6. Similar to results for total drug arrests and drug possession arrests, the racespecific drug death rate is significantly related to white drug sale/manufacturing arrests
and not black drug sale/manufacturing arrests. A one-unit increase in the white drug
death rate is associated with an 84% increase in white drug arrests (IRR = 1.84, RSE =
.28, p < .001) while the black drug death rate is not significantly related to black drug
arrests (IRR = 1.08, RSE = .15, p > .05). Unlike results from the preceding models, the
effect of the race-specific drug death rate is significantly stronger for white than black
drug sale/manufacturing arrests (χ2 = 7.38, p < .01). Moreover, a one-unit increase in the
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violent crime rate is significantly related to a 1% increase in black drug arrests (IRR =
1.01, RSE = .00, p < .001), although it is unrelated to white drug arrests (IRR = 1.01, RSE
= .00, p > .05), and has a statistically similar effect on both groups’ arrest (χ2 = .02, p >
.05). In addition, a one-unit increase in the suspicious drug calls rate is significantly
associated with a 59% increase in black drug arrests (IRR = 1.59, RSE = .15, p < .001)
although it is not significantly related to white drug arrests (IRR = 1.31, RSE = .22, p >
.05). The magnitude of suspicious drug calls is statistically similar for both groups (χ2 =
1.29, p > .05). Similar to results for total drug arrests and drug possession arrests, the
drug hotline calls rate, as shown in Models 2 in Table 4.6, is not significantly related to
drug sale/manufacturing arrests for either group.
While the percentage of rented housing units has a significantly stronger effect on
white total and possession arrests than black total and possession arrests, the percentage
of rented housing units is not significantly associated with drug sale/manufacturing
arrests for either group. Furthermore, racial composition shapes officers’ enforcement of
drug sale/manufacturing in a way that differs from its effect on total drug arrests and drug
possession arrests. Similar to the preceding models, a one percent increase in the relative
black population is significantly related to an 81% decrease in black drug arrests (IRR =
.19, RSE = .06, p < .001), an effect that is statistically stronger for black drug arrests than
white drug arrests (χ2 = 9.47, p < .01). Unlike the preceding models, racial composition is
not significantly related to white drug arrests (IRR = 1.35, RSE = .89, p > .05).
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Table 4.6 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Drug Sale/Mftg. Arrest Counts (N = 78)

Models 1

Models 2

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.84***
(.28)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.08
(.15)

SUR χ 2

White
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.77***
(.27)

Black
Arrests
IRR (RSE)
1.20
(.18)

SUR χ 2

Violent Crime Rate

1.01
(.00)

1.01***
(.00)

0.02

1.01*
(.00)

1.01***
(.00)

0.06

Property Crime Rate

1.00
(.00)

1.00
(.00)

0.82

1.00
(.00)

1.00
(.00)

0.27

Economic Disadvantage

0.99
(.22)

0.93
(.14)

0.10

1.02
(.25)

0.93
(.17)

0.23

Rented Housing Units

0.31
(.24)

0.73
(.30)

1.20

0.33
(.25)

0.81
(.42)

1.36

Racial Composition (% black)

1.35
(.89)

0.19***
(.06)

9.47**

1.81
(1.30)

0.24***
(.09)

8.90**

Suspicious Drug Calls Rate(Ln)

1.31
(.22)

1.59***
(.15)

1.29
1.11
(.20)

1.13
(.13)

0.01

Race-Specific Drug Death Rate(Ln)

Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)

7.38**

Constant

0.00***
(.00)

0.00***
(.00)

0.00***
(.00)

0.00***
(.00)

Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)

1

1

1

1

132.13***

167.74***

124.36***

110.21***

Wald χ 2

*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

TOTAL DRUG ARRESTS IN RACIALLY-CHARACTERIZED NEIGHBORHOODS
The substantial effect of racial composition on drug arrests in the average
neighborhood warrants further investigation in order to better understand the racial
processes at play in a given neighborhood context. This is especially important since
some racial conflict hypotheses make specific predictions about the relationship between
the relative black population and social control in racially-characterized neighborhoods.
The racial threat hypothesis posits a curvilinear relationship between percent black and
social control, expecting percent black to be positively associated with black drug arrests

3.21
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in white or mixed neighborhoods. According to the defended neighborhoods hypothesis,
black drug arrests should be significantly greater in white neighborhoods. Benign neglect
suggests that a higher percentage of blacks will lead to significantly lower black drug
arrests in black neighborhoods. To understand the importance of the relative black
population size on each group’s arrest in a given neighborhood context, the models in
Table 4.7 stratify the cases by neighborhood type (e.g. black, white, mixed
neighborhoods)10 and regress total drug arrests onto the theoretically relevant predictors,
including the suspicious drug calls rate11.

10

In supplemental analyses not shown, an examination of interaction terms between percent black and
white/black/mixed neighborhood dummy variables yielded substantively similar results. However, the
stratified analysis provides clearer, more direct results of the way neighborhood racial context conditions
the relationship between percent black and drug arrests.
11

Supplemental analyses (not shown) using the drug hotline calls rate in lieu of the suspicious drug calls
rate yielded substantively similar findings except the drug hotline calls rate was not significant in either
model.
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Table 4.7 presents unstandardized b coefficients rather than IRRs due to
extremely large or small IRRs for the racial composition coefficients (e.g. 2.42e-07 or
4.07e03). Similar to the results in the previous models, results in Table 4.7 show that
whites and blacks face a significantly greater risk for drug arrests in neighborhoods
incongruent with their race. In white neighborhoods, decreases in percent black
significantly increase black drug arrests (b = -15.23, RSE = 2.88, p < .001) while percent
black has no significant effect on white drug arrests (b = -3.08, RSE = 2.72, p > .05).
Percent black is significantly stronger for black drug arrests than white drug arrests (χ2 =
14.60, p < .001) in white neighborhoods. Results in white neighborhoods are consistent
with the defended neighborhoods hypothesis, as officers are more likely to arrest black
suspects where few blacks reside.
In black neighborhoods, increases in percent black significantly increase white
drug arrests (b = 17.52, RSE = 2.79, p < .001) and have no significant effect on black
drug arrests (b = 1.27, RSE = .92, p > .05), a difference that is significantly stronger for
white drug arrests (χ2 = 36.48, p < .001). The racial conflict hypotheses make no
predictions about white drug arrests, but this finding refutes the benign neglect
hypothesis since social control against blacks is neither higher nor lower in black
neighborhoods.
In mixed neighborhoods where the black and white population sizes are
comparable, decreases in percent black significantly increase black drug arrests (b = 1.95, RSE = .56, p < .001), an effect that is significantly stronger for black drug arrests
than white drug arrests (χ2 = 7.72, p < .01). Percent black is not significantly related to
white drug arrests in mixed neighborhoods (b = .95, RSE = .83, p > .05). Findings in
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mixed neighborhoods are similar to those in white neighborhoods: officers are more
likely to arrest black suspects where there are more white residents although white
suspects are immune from such risk. This finding is consistent with the defended
neighborhoods hypothesis.
The stratified analysis provides clear, direct results for the conditioning effect of
neighborhood racial context on the relationship between percent black and drug arrests.
Yet, the downside to the stratified analysis is the small subsample sizes. To verify the
curvilinear effect of racial composition on drug arrests, I conducted two sets of
supplemental analyses, which yielded results substantively similar to those in the
stratified analysis. In one set of analyses, I examined interaction terms between percent
black and white/black/mixed neighborhood dummy variables. In another set of analyses,
I included a squared term for percent black in the white and black arrest models to
determine the point at which the risk for drug arrests changes. To visually depict the
average curvilinear effect of racial composition, predicted probability graphs of these
models are shown in Figure 4.2 (white total drug arrests) and Figure 4.3 (black total drug
arrests).
Confirming results from the stratified model, Figure 4.2 shows that the risk for
white drug arrests is low and remains flat when percent black is between 0% and 70%, a
range that includes white neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods. The risk for white
drug arrests begins to increase exponentially when the black population exceeds 70%,
and this increase is steepest when the black population is over 90%. The average
marginal effects of racial composition on white drug arrests confirm that officers are

94

Figure 4.2 Marginal Effects of Racial Composition on White Total Drug Arrests
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Figure 4.3 Marginal Effects of Racial Composition on Black Total Drug Arrests
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more likely to arrest white suspects in black neighborhoods than elsewhere. Figure 4.3
for black drug arrests shows that the risk for black drug arrests is highest when the black
population is near 0%. The predicted number of black drug arrests declines rapidly as the
black population increases, and black drug arrests begin to flatten when the black
population is near 80%. Thus, the average marginal effects of racial composition on black
drug arrests confirm that officers are more likely to arrest black suspects in white
neighborhoods, followed by mixed neighborhoods, than in black neighborhoods.
While the purpose of the stratified analysis is to understand how racial context
conditions the effect of percent black on drug arrests, the models show other important
differences worth mentioning. However, these results should be interpreted with caution
due to the small subsample sizes. As Table 4.7 shows, officers are responding to drug
involvement when arresting white suspects in mixed neighborhoods (b = .43, RSE = .16,
p < .01) but are responding to other factors when arresting whites in any other
neighborhood context and when arresting blacks in any neighborhood context. Arrests of
black suspects in black (b = .01, RSE = .00, p < .001) and mixed neighborhoods (b = .01,
RSE = .00, p < .01), which have significantly higher violent crime rates than white
neighborhoods (see Table 4.2), are a function of increases in violent crime rates. Violent
crime is not significantly related to white drug arrests in any neighborhood context or
drug arrests made in white neighborhoods. In mixed neighborhoods, residential
instability, measured as the percentage of rented housing units, is positively associated
with black drug arrests (b = 1.80, RSE = .33, p < .001) and unrelated to white drug arrests
(b = -1.35, RSE = 1.09, p > .05), an effect that is significantly stronger for blacks than
whites (χ2 = 7.68, p < .01). Residential instability is not significantly related to drug
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arrests in white or black neighborhoods. Finally, the suspicious drug calls rate in racially
homogenous neighborhoods is positively related to the arrest of suspects whose race
matches the racial context. White drug arrests in white neighborhoods (b = .99, RSE =
.26, p < .001), and not black drug arrests (b = .83, RSE = .47, p > .05), are a function of
citizens calling the police just as black drug arrests in black neighborhoods (b = .37, RSE
= .09, p < .001) and not white drug arrests (b = .46, RSE = .27, p > .05). Similar to black
neighborhoods, in mixed neighborhoods, black drug arrests (b = .48, RSE = .11, p <
.001), and not white drug arrests (b = .30, RSE = .30, p > .05), are a function of citizens
calling the police. Together, these results show that the predictors of drug arrests vary by
neighborhood type.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
To check the robustness of the final multivariate results and to understand the
influence of each variable, I entered each covariate into the models alone and with each
of the other predictors in every possible combination and examined supplemental
regression models. Economic disadvantage is one measure of concern because it is
strongly correlated with percent black (r = .85, p < .05) and violent crime (r = .68, p <
.05). When entered into the models alone, it is significantly related to white drug arrests
but not black drug arrests. Yet the substantive results remain the same when including or
excluding economic disadvantage from the full models. Therefore, the final models
include economic disadvantage.
Measurement choices and other analytical decisions can influence results, so I
examined how sensitive the results were to different metrics of the same variables. For
example, the final dependent variables are the sum of drug arrests during the five-year
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period. I also computed the outcomes as average annual counts because the number of
drug arrests can vary by year and influence results. The summed counts and the average
annual counts produced substantively similar results. Additionally, the final models
include the log transformed race-specific drug death rates, although I examined whether
results would change if the drug deaths were computed as counts instead. While the
substantive results remained the same for black drug arrests, white drug arrests were
sensitive to whether race-specific drug deaths were computed as counts versus rates. The
final models included rates rather than counts to take into account the race-specific
population at risk for drug deaths. Although the race-specific drug death rate is more
informative than the total drug death rate, it is possible for black drug arrests to be a
function of white drug deaths and white drug arrests to be a function of black drug
deaths. It is also possible for total drug deaths to influence the results. Supplemental
analyses showed that each group’s arrest was not a function of the other group’s drug
death rate, nor were the results sensitive to the use of total drug death rates; consistent
with results in the final models, the total drug death rate was not significantly related to
black drug arrests but was significantly related to white drug arrests.
The race-specific population size is the exposure variable in the final models. It
adjusts the race-specific count outcomes by accounting for the population at risk for
arrest, which differs from including percent black as a predictor. It should be noted that
percent black is the expression of the relative black population size. Percent black and
black population size are significantly correlated (r = .57, p < .05) but are distinct, and
including percent black as a predictor helps test theoretical propositions. When excluding
it from the models, economic disadvantage becomes negative and significant for black
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drug arrests and becomes positive and significant for white drug arrests. This pattern is
similar to the finding for racial composition in the final models because economic
disadvantage is a proxy for race in St. Louis (r = .85, p < .05). The magnitude, direction,
and significance levels of the other predictors remain the same whether including or
excluding percent black or economic disadvantage. Therefore, the final models include
both measures. Additionally, it is possible that population density—the population size—
influences the risk for drug arrests. Therefore, I included the total population size and
race-specific population size, separately, as predictors in the model. Neither measure was
significantly related to either group’s drug arrest, so it is excluded from the final models.
DISCUSSION
Analyses from the quantitative component investigated whether neighborhoodlevel characteristics could explain why blacks are overrepresented and why whites are
underrepresented as drug arrestees. The quantitative results provide important insights
into drug enforcement, in general, and the racial disparity problem, specifically. First, the
results reveal the importance of a neighborhood-level analysis in understanding drug
enforcement practices. Just as scholars suggest that officers behave according to the
neighborhood context (Black 2010; Klinger 1997; Smith 1986), the quantitative
component shows that neighborhood context shapes drug enforcement in fundamental
ways. Second, the results reveal that different neighborhood characteristics matter when
officers arrest white suspects versus black suspects. Most notably, white drug arrests are
a function of drug deaths, along with other neighborhood characteristics, whereas black
drug arrests are a function of factors other than drug deaths. Third, drug arrests in
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racially-characterized neighborhoods are a function of different neighborhood
characteristics.
NO DIFFERENTIAL DRUG INVOLVEMENT
Three theories guided the analyses: differential drug involvement, differential
scrutiny, and racially-biased policing theories. Overall, the findings refute differential
drug involvement theory which attributes higher drug involvement among blacks and in
black neighborhoods to the overrepresentation of blacks as drug arrestees. A descriptive
analysis of the race-specific drug death rate—the proxy for race-specific drug
involvement—shows that blacks are significantly less likely to engage in drugs than
whites. Moreover, drug deaths occur evenly across racially-characterized neighborhoods
and are no greater in black neighborhoods than in white or mixed neighborhoods. Even
more, the multivariate analysis shows the black drug death rate is not significantly
associated with black drug arrests although the white drug death rate is related to white
drug arrests. This means that white drug arrests are a function of drug involvement, as
they should be, while black drug arrests are a function of factors other than drug
involvement. However, the magnitude of drug deaths was statistically similar for both
groups.
DIFFERENTIAL SCRUTINY
The analyses found some support for differential scrutiny theory, although it does
not appear to be the best explanation of the racial disparity problem. Differential scrutiny
theory contends that predominately black neighborhoods have higher violent crime rates
and higher calls for police services than their counterparts. Indeed, the descriptive
analysis of racially-characterized neighborhoods shows that compared to white or mixed
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neighborhoods, black neighborhoods have the highest violent crime rates and calls for
drug service rates in the city. The theory goes on to argue that high violent crime and
calls for service in black neighborhoods attract police deployment and consequently,
residents and frequenters in those areas are placed at greater risk for arrest. This
differential scrutiny is evidenced in the multivariate results but in a way that is not
racialized. Both white and black suspects have a greater risk for drug arrests in violentprone neighborhoods. Yet, the effect of violent crime on drug arrests is very modest and
is statistically similar for both groups. Furthermore, the suspicious drug calls rate is
positively related to black drug arrests, but not white drug arrests. Officers arrest black
citizens in neighborhoods with high drug-related calls to the 911 center. The statistically
similar effect of suspicious drug calls on drug arrests for both groups, however, indicates
that they do not explain the racial disparity in drug arrests. Relatedly, drug enforcement is
not a function of citizens’ anonymous calls to the drug hotline. This is likely because
SLMPD investigates very few of these tips and does not include them into their
deployment strategy. It is possible that overlooking this additional source of information
about drug involvement biases drug arrest patterns.
RACIALLY-BIASED POLICING
The quantitative analysis found the strongest support for racially-biased policing
theory, which appears to explain the racial disparity problem. When controlling for legal
factors such as drug deaths, violent and property crime, and calls for drug service,
neighborhood racial composition strongly shapes drug enforcement practices.
Specifically for drug possession, officers are more likely to arrest white suspects in black
neighborhoods and arrest black suspects in white neighborhoods, and the effect of racial
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composition is significantly stronger for whites than blacks. These findings do not
necessarily comport with the racial conflict hypotheses. Racial threat, benign neglect, and
defended neighborhood hypotheses make predictions about the use of social control
against blacks but are silent about the way social control is used against whites. Findings
from this dissertation suggest that officers are more likely to make arrests of individuals
when their race does not match the neighborhood racial context, a type of racial profiling
referred to as “out-of-placeness” or “racial incongruity” (Brunson and Weitzer 2009;
Fagan and Davies 2000; Novak and Chamlin 2012; Stewart et al. 2009). Studies on police
traffic enforcement have found a similar relationship (Novak and Chamlin 2012; Rojek,
Rosenfeld, and Decker 2012). For example, Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker (2012)
examined the racial composition of traffic stops in St. Louis and found that black drivers
were more likely to be searched after a stop in white communities, and white drivers were
more likely to be searched after a stop in black communities, controlling for
characteristics of officers, drivers, and stops. Echoing this pattern, this dissertation shows
that when officers are enforcing drug laws, “race serves as a marker of where people
‘belong,’ and racial incongruity as a marker of suspicion” (Fagan and Davies 2000, 477–
478).
The substantially larger effect of racial composition on white drug arrests
suggests that additional processes might be at play. It is likely that low drug enforcement
in white neighborhoods exacerbates the strong race effect for whites. Recall that of the
14,395 drug arrests during the time period, only 964 (7%) occurred in white
neighborhoods. Also whites makeup 26% of drug arrestees although they account for
46% of the population in St. Louis. In other words, just as blacks are overrepresented as
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drug arrestees, whites are underrepresented likely because white neighborhoods are
“below the radar” with regards to drug enforcement. Had drug enforcement been greater
in white neighborhoods, more whites would become drug arrestees, especially in white
neighborhoods. Thus, it appears that in addition to racial incongruity, the
underrepresentation of whites contributes to the large effect of racial composition on
white arrests and ultimately racial disparities in drug arrests. Another factor is the white
drug death rate is significantly higher in black neighborhoods than in other
neighborhoods although the black drug death rate is similar across neighborhood types.
This suggests that whites’ higher drug involvement in black neighborhoods might put
them at greater risk for arrest and contribute to the substantial race effect.
On the other hand, black drug arrests are likelier in white and mixed
neighborhoods where more whites reside. Unlike their white counterparts, evidence does
not show black drug offenders traveling to white neighborhoods to engage in drug
offending. In light of St. Louis’ legacy of white supremacy and explicit, concerted efforts
to restrict blacks from white places, as discussed in Chapter 3, the race effect for blacks
can be interpreted as officers’ raised suspicion of blacks in white areas (racial
incongruity) and increased social control in effort to protect white interests, as the
defended neighborhoods hypothesis posits. Regardless of the processes at play or if racial
biases are implicit or explicit, drug enforcement in St. Louis is racially discriminatory.
RESIDENTIAL (IN)STABILITY
In addition to theoretical predictions about racial disparities in drug arrests, the
results point to the importance of other neighborhood characteristics in shaping drug
enforcement practices. Most notably and unexpectedly, residential stability is positively
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related to white drug arrests and unrelated to black drug arrests, and has a stronger effect
for whites. This finding runs counter to expectations based on social disorganization
theory, which posits a negative association between residential stability and crime.
However, this dissertation predicts police behavior rather than crime. Collective efficacy
and the ability of some neighborhoods to align with the police might help explain this
antithetical finding (Kubrin and Weitzer 2003; Sampson 1997). White neighborhoods are
significantly more stable than black or mixed neighborhoods, as shown earlier in Table
4.2 and demonstrated by the moderate, negative correlation between rented housing units
and percent white in Table 4.3 (r = -.30, p < .05). Neighborhoods that are residentially
stable have more long-term residents who are invested in their neighborhoods, are keen to
unusual persons or behaviors, and have likely established rapport with patrol officers. As
such, residents in stable neighborhoods likely have the capacity to intervene against
crime and disorder and to provide officers with information that leads to an arrest. The
qualitative analysis might help elucidate this counterintuitive finding.
ARRESTS FOR DRUG POSSESSION VS. DRUG SALE/MFTG.
Because drug sale/manufacturing arrests comprise only 11% of the total drug
arrests and they have a larger racial disparity than drug possession arrests, it was
worthwhile to examine the predictors of each type of arrest. For both types of arrest,
officers are responding to drug involvement when arresting white suspects and to factors
other than drug involvement when arresting black suspects. While residential stability is
related to the racial disparity in drug possession arrests, it is unrelated to drug
sale/manufacturing arrests. Racial composition explains racial disparities in both types of
drug arrests but in different ways. Drug possession arrests for whites and blacks are a
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function of neighborhood racial incongruity. However, for drug sale/manufacturing
arrests, racial incongruity is only related to arrests for blacks and not whites. In other
words, racial composition does not shape officers’ arrest of whites who are suspected of
dealing or manufacturing drugs, but officers are more likely to arrest black suspects for
drug dealing/manufacturing where whites are the majority.
LIMITATIONS
While the quantitative analysis provides important insights into racial disparities
in drug arrests, it is not without limitations. It should be acknowledged that though the
models appropriately account for the population at risk by including the race-specific
population size as the exposure variable, one need not be a resident in a given
neighborhood in order to be arrested. This is another justification for using count
outcomes rather than rates. However, in neighborhoods such as downtown where tourists
visit, the racial composition of residents might not reflect the racial composition of the
frequenters at risk for arrest12. Another limitation is the inability to distinguish between
the types of drug that elicit arrests. The results cannot discern, for example, whether
marijuana leads to drug arrests as much as hard drugs might and whether officers
differentially enforce certain types of drugs by race, as some studies have shown
(Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006). Relatedly, drug deaths are reasonable indicators of
hard drug involvement (e.g. cocaine, heroin) but not marijuana involvement since none of
the decedents died from marijuana. Therefore, marijuana involvement is likely
underrepresented in the analysis, although including the calls for drug service measures

12

However, in supplemental analyses not shown, excluding known tourist neighborhoods (e.g. Downtown,
Downtown West, Central West End, and Midtown) from the models did not change the substantive results.
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might capture some of it. This limitation is important to acknowledge since marijuana
might be the drug of choice for blacks rather than hard drugs (Mitchell and Lynch 2011).
Chapter 5: Qualitative Component
The qualitative component of this dissertation seeks to answer the second
overarching research question: can qualitative differences in drug enforcement practices
across racially-characterized neighborhoods and arrestee race help explain the racial
disparity problem? Studies on broader policing practices suggest that officers use more
proactive, aggressive, surveillance-oriented policing styles in crime-ridden or
predominately black neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods (Bass 2001; Black
2010; Ghandnoosh 2015; Smith 1986; Terrill and Reisig 2003; Weitzer 2000). Relatedly,
black citizens are subjected to these policing styles more than their white counterparts, as
police disproportionately target them for involuntary stops and searches, and they bear
the brunt of police misconduct (Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson and Weitzer 2009;
Epp, Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Fagan and Davies 2000; Ghandnoosh
2015; Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap 2007; Weitzer 1999). This literature is replete with
quantitative and descriptive studies on police-citizen encounters, but qualitative
examinations are few. Whereas quantitative research methods are ideal for answering
“what questions” based on predetermined knowledge, qualitative research methods
provide a deeper understanding of complex processes and answers to “how” and why”
questions (Maxfield and Babbie 2011), such as how policing practices might translate
into racial disparities in drug arrests. Most of the qualitative research on police-citizen
encounters is informed by citizens (Brunson 2007; Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson
and Weitzer 2009; Schuck, Rosenbaum, and Hawkins 2008) more so than by officers
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(Vera Sanchez and Rosenbaum 2011) or observations of police-citizen encounters
(Mastrofski, Reisig, and McCluskey 2002; Mastrofski, Snipes, and Supina 1996; Reisig
et al. 2004). More closely related to this dissertation are studies of policing practices
within the context of racialized neighborhoods, and some of the leading qualitative
examinations have been conducted in St. Louis.
Based on in-depth interviews with black and white adolescents from
disadvantaged neighborhoods in St. Louis, Brunson and colleagues found that the vast
majority of adolescents summarized the city’s police tactics as aggressive and described
direct or vicarious harassment and mistreatment by the police in their neighborhoods
(Gau and Brunson 2010). The citizens reported widespread use of seemingly arbitrary
stops, questionings, and physically intrusive searches by the police (Gau and Brunson
2010; Brunson and Weitzer 2009). Citizens in black and mixed neighborhoods reported
that policing mostly consisted of pedestrian and vehicle stops by patrol officers and
specialized units and that police harassment was more common in black neighborhoods
than in white neighborhoods, with mixed neighborhoods falling in between (Brunson and
Weitzer 2009). Moreover, both white and black citizens reported unwelcome,
unwarranted police encounters, but white youth reported less trouble with the police and
more positive views than black youth. One exception is white citizens reported more
police harassment when they frequented black neighborhoods, were with black friends, or
wore hip-hop apparel (Brunson and Weitzer 2009). This racial incongruity theme echoes
findings from the quantitative component of this dissertation and prior quantitative
studies in New York City (Novak and Chamlin 2012) and in St. Louis (Rojek, Rosenfeld,
and Decker 2012).
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Vera Sanchez and Rosenbaum (2011) also examined the interplay between
policing, neighborhood context, and race, except from the point of view of officers.
However, rather than focusing on policing practices, the researchers gauged police
perceptions of racialized neighborhoods. Based on 40 interviews with officers who patrol
four Latino and African American communities in Chicago, the research revealed that
officers’ conceptions of communities of color were shaped by the quality of their
encounters with residents and the degree to which they felt respected. Officers reported
feeling misunderstood and unwelcome in communities of color, especially in black
communities, and this tension made their jobs difficult and their demeanor unfriendly.
Holding the most negative views against black communities, officers described black
communities as war zones and hopeless. Officers felt residents had a poor work ethic and
that the older generations were responsible for transmitting anti-social and anti-police
attitudes to youth. When discussing the neighborhood mixed with Mexican and black
residents, which had the lowest crime rates of the four communities, officers regarded
Mexican residents as more cooperative, hardworking, and respectful of their communities
and black residents as more difficult. One officer noted: “You have to change your
personality when you go to the north end [African American section]. You can’t be
cordial or polite. I know this from my experiences” (Vera Sanchez and Rosenbaum 2011,
169). When discussing racial profiling, officers thought the concept was “phony” (168),
illogical, and nonsensical in racially homogeneous communities, explaining that it is
impossible to engage in racial profiling if everyone in the community is of the same
racial group. Further, officers of color and white officers whose partners were of color
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believed it was impossible for them to engage in racially-biased policing because of their
race or the race of their partner.
These two groups of studies show that broader policing in racialized communities
is contentious. Yet more qualitative research is needed to understand drug enforcement
practices, specifically, and factors that influence decisions that lead to an arrest,
especially from the outlook of officers. Officers exercise greater discretion when
enforcing drug laws than crimes involving victims (e.g. violent, property crime). A close
examination of their discretionary decision making and policing styles in specific
contexts might help elucidate the racial disparity problem.
As such, this component of the dissertation uses qualitative research methods to
understand drug enforcement practices based on officers’ accounts. To illuminate exactly
why and how policing practices contribute to the overrepresentation of blacks and the
underrepresentation of whites in drug arrests, it compares policing practices across
racially-characterized neighborhoods and arrestee race. Complementing the quantitative
component, the qualitative analysis offers a nuanced depiction of drug enforcement
practices and a deeper, contextualized understanding of factors that influence officers’
arrest decisions. In addition to elucidating the racial disparity problem, the qualitative
component has the potential to fill gaps in criminological research by providing an
account of the nature of drug enforcement, as opposed to general policing, across places
and people. Additionally, by giving white and black places and persons equal empirical
inquiry in this study, the qualitative component adds to the literatures on policing,
neighborhoods, and race that generally neglect the study of white places and people at the
expense of studying disadvantaged neighborhoods and black citizens.
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This chapter is devoted to the qualitative component of this dissertation. It
discusses the data used in the analysis, characteristics of the sample of incidents,
analytical strategy, and results. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings.
DATA
Arrest decisions and practices can be best understood through the lenses of
arresting officers, and only qualitative research can provide such purview (Spradley
1979). Qualitative studies that capture officers’ perspectives are based on open-ended
interviews (Vera Sanchez and Rosenbaum 2011) and observations (Mastrofski, Reisig,
and McCluskey 2002; Jonathan-Zamir, Mastrofski, and Moyal 2013). These
methodologies are indeed valuable and have shed light on broader policing. However,
another rich source of data that researchers have yet to use is the narrative portion of
arrest reports. This component of the dissertation analyzes a sample of arrest reports that
stem from the drug arrests in the quantitative component in order to gain a deeper
understanding of drug arrest practices and how they might contribute to racial disparities
in drug enforcement.
When officers make arrests, the police department requires them to write an arrest
report detailing information about the arrest incident and suspect. The main part of the
report is the officer’s narrative, where she/he describes the drug arrest incident and
factors that influence their contact with citizens. The typical narrative in these data is the
length of one single-spaced typed document and contains detailed information. Because
police supervisors and others will read arrest reports and police misconduct and explicit
racially-motivated policing are illegal, officers who engage in misconduct or explicit
racially-motivated policing have strong incentives to misrepresent their actions and write
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reports in a way that hides any racial animus (Skogan and Frydl 2004). Thus, these
narratives may represent officers’ best presentation of themselves. It is also possible for
narratives to be incomplete or embellished.
Despite these limitations, the advantages of analyzing arrest reports rather than
employing observational or interview methods are numerous. To start, analyzing drug
arrest reports maximizes the use of existing data and reduces the amount of resources,
time, and labor involved in conducting observations or interviews. This is because the
narrative data already exist in typewritten electronic format, eliminating the need to
transcribe data. In addition, analyzing arrest reports can provide answers similar to those
derived from observations or interviews while overcoming potential biases inherent in
those methods that threaten internal validity (see Spano 2005 for a discussion of potential
biases in police observational data). These potential biases include: recall bias,
interviewer bias, question bias, respondent bias, sample bias, priming, and social
desirability bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Some of these biases can especially come into
play when studying sensitive topics such as race and racial biases in policing. For
example, social desirability bias can sway officers to modify their behaviors in the
presence of observers or answer interview questions in a certain manner in order to meet
socially desirable expectations, regardless of their true beliefs (Podsakoff et al. 2003;
Spano 2005).
Moreover, unlike interviews that gather information about abstract policing
practices, officers’ narratives are accounts of each specific drug arrest incident
immediately after each arrest occurred in a given neighborhood context. Thus, the arrest
reports offer a better way of assessing and contextualizing variations in police practices
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than interview data and possibly observational data. Another advantage to analyzing
arrest reports is the ability to examine a wide range of drug arrest incidents across
contexts, strengthening external validity and the generalizability of the findings, which
are common concerns in qualitative research. Studying a wide range and a large number
of incidents through observations or interviews might prove too laborious, expensive, and
impractical. All in all, the qualitative component is a novel approach to research because
it uses an under-utilized data source to examine the question of racial disparities in drug
arrests while incorporating arresting officers’ voices. It is important to note that the
qualitative data in this dissertation are not publicly available and must be requested from
the police department.
SAMPLE
The St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (hereafter SLMPD) has graciously
provided the drug arrest report data used in the analysis, thanks to the assistance and
support of Dr. Richard Rosenfeld and Sherri Schaeffer of SLMPD. Additionally, I
received approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Missouri-St.
Louis to collect these drug arrest reports and conduct this research (Project #719568-1).
The final sample is a stratified, random sample of n = 300 drug arrest incidents and is
drawn from a larger stratified, random sample of 10% (n = 1,440) of the arrest reports
associated with the 14,395 drug arrests in the quantitative component. Thus, the sample
of arrest reports represents drug arrests made in St. Louis between 2009 and 2013.
Asking the police department for a sample of the drug arrest reports was more
reasonable than requesting all 14,395 reports. Further, it is more feasible to analyze a
sample of reports while still ensuring the representativeness of the data through strategic
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sampling techniques. For these reasons, I drew a stratified random sample using
Microsoft Excel. A diagram of the stratified random sampling scheme is presented in
Figure 5.1. Using a list of all 14,395 drug arrest incident numbers from SLMPD and basic
incident characteristics (e.g. arrestee’s race, neighborhood number, neighborhood type,
etc.), the incidents were first divided into three strata: black neighborhoods (>75% of
population is black), white neighborhoods (>75% of population is white), and mixed
neighborhoods (<76% black and <76% white). Stratifying the sample by raciallycharacterized neighborhoods ensures that each type of neighborhood is sufficiently
represented in the sample and allows for comparison within and across these
neighborhood types. This is important since white neighborhoods and arrestees are
underrepresented in drug arrests. Thus, this sampling strategy over-samples white
neighborhoods and white arrestees and under-samples black neighborhoods and black
arrestees. Then, the “RAND” command in Microsoft Excel was used to assign a random,
unique number to each drug arrest incident. These random numbers were sorted in
ascending order before drawing the appropriate number of drug arrest incidents from the
top of the list in each stratum. For example, white neighborhoods constitute 23% of St.
Louis neighborhoods, which means that 23% of the desired 1,440 drug arrest reports
should come from white neighborhoods (e.g. 1,440 x 23% = 331 reports).
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Figure 5.1 Stratified Random Sampling Scheme for Sample of 300 Drug Arrest Reports,
2009-2013

After drawing the desired 1,440 drug arrest incidents, I sent a list of the incident
numbers to SLMPD and requested the corresponding drug arrest reports. After receiving,
cross-checking, and organizing the data, I began conducting the analysis with the goal of
ending once I reached saturation, or the point during analysis when the data do not
produce new information (Silverman 2011). Saturation was achieved by the time I
analyzed 100 reports since the same themes recurred and no new patterns were detected.
However, to facilitate an analysis by neighborhood type and arrestee race and to ensure a
sufficient number of cases in the subgroups, I continued coding until I analyzed 300
reports. As shown in Table 5.1, characteristics of the final sample (n = 300)
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Table 5.1 Characteristics of Final Sample, Larger Sample, and Population of Drug Arrest Incidents
Final Sample
Larger Sample
Population
n = 300
n = 1,440
N = 14,395
Total Incidents
300
1,414a
14,359b
Black N’hoods

Officer Years of Service

122
41%
108
36%
70
23%
194
65%
106
35%
260
87%
40
13%
31
17-64
158
53%
124
41%
18
6%
71
24%
217
72%
11
4%
7.87

566
40%
528
37%
320
23%
942
67%
472
33%
1,207
85%
207
15%
30
17-64
807
57%
526
37%
81
6%
347
25%
998
71%
64
5%
8.10

7,521
52%
5,878
41%
960
7%
10,653
74%
3,706
26%
12,307
86%
2,052
14%
31
17-74
7,767
54%
5,699
40%
891
6%
3,841
27%
9,814
68%
607
4%
8.80

Violent Crime Rate

124.41

124.68

154.16

Property Crime Rate

466.48

467.94

558.84

Possession Arrests

265
88%
35
12%
65
22%
48
16%
71
24%
58
19%
58
19%

1,258
89%
156
11%
270
19%
276
20%
309
22%
282
20%
277
20%

12,714
89%
1,645
11%
2,401
17%
2,597
18%
3,417
24%
3,195
22%
2,749
19%

Mixed N’hoods
White N’hoods
Black Arrestees
White Arrestees
Male Arrestees
Female Arrestees
Arrestee Age
17-29 years
30-49 years
50+ years
Black Officers
White Officers
Hispanic/Other Race Officers

Sale/Mftg. Arrests
Year 2009
Year 2010
Year 2011
Year 2012
Year 2013
a

Based on 1,414 incidents due to missing data on 26 cases (1%) in SLMPD’s spreadsheet
Based on 14,359 incidents due to missing data on 36 cases (<0.5%) in SLMPD’s spreadsheet

b
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and larger sample (n = 1,440) are closely similar. Characteristics of the final sample and
the larger sample are similar to those of the population (N = 14,395), but they differ
slightly due to the samples being stratified rather than purely random: black
neighborhoods and arrestees are underrepresented in the samples, and white
neighborhoods and arrestees are overrepresented. The sample of n = 300 incidents,
therefore, is generally representative of the drug arrest incidents that occurred in St. Louis
between 2009 and 2013.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 5.2 Descriptive Statistics of Drug Arrest Incidents by Neighborhood Type (n = 300 incidents)
White N'hoods
Black N'hoods
Mixed N'hoods
n = 70
n = 122
n = 108
Arrestee Characteristics
Black Drug Arrests
White Drug Arrests
Male Arrests
Female Arrests
Age of Arrestee
Neighborhood Characteristics
Total Drug Death Rate
Black Drug Death Rate
White Drug Death Ratea
Violent Crime Rate
Property Crime Rate
Rented Housing Units
Officer Characteristics
Black Officers
White Officers
Hispanic or Other Race Officers
Years of Service

29% 2;3
71% 2;3
79%
21%
30.05

79% 1
21% 1
89%
11%
32.11

72% 1
28% 1
90%
10%
30.39

0.81
1.48
0.85 2
87.52 2; 3
307.88 2; 3
42% 2; 3

1.35
0.90
17.14 1; 3
176.11 1; 3
459.27 1; 3
58% 1

1.06
0.92
1.31 2
119.01 1; 2
577.41 1; 2
65% 1

24%
70%
6%
9.35 2; 3

29%
69%
2%
7.37 1

18%
78%
4%
7.48 1

two-sample t-test p < .05 (two-tailed tests) or chi square test of independence p < .05
1 = sig differ from white n’hoods 2 = sig differ from black n’hoods 3 = sig differ from mixed n’hoods
a

One case is omitted from the calculation of mean due to a very high white drug death rate of 1,000 per 1,000 white residents
Note: Descriptives of the drug death rates and rented housing units are based on descriptives of the population of drug arrests (N
= 14,395) since these measures were not attached to the sample of drug arrest incidents
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Given the emphasis on racially-characterized neighborhoods in the analysis, it is
important to understand differences across neighborhood types. Table 5.2 presents select
characteristics of arrestees, neighborhoods, and officers in white neighborhoods (n = 70),
mixed neighborhoods (n = 108), and black neighborhoods (n = 122). Using a series of
two-sample t-tests and chi square tests of independence, I tested whether visible
differences in characteristics across neighborhoods were statistically significant.
There are significantly more white arrestees in white neighborhoods (71%) than
in black (21%) or mixed (28%) neighborhoods. The percentage of black arrestees is
significantly higher in black (79%) and mixed (72%) neighborhoods than in white
neighborhoods (29%). With respect to gender, the majority of drug arrests involved male
arrestees. Males comprise 79% of the arrests in white neighborhoods, 90% of arrests in
mixed neighborhoods, and 89% of arrests in black neighborhoods, and these differences
are not significant. The larger percentage of female arrestees in white neighborhoods
(21%) than mixed (10%) and black (11%) neighborhoods is not statistically significant,
but it is notable and should be explored in future research. Moreover, the average drug
arrestee in white and mixed neighborhoods is 30 years old and is older, but not
significantly older, in black neighborhoods (32 years). As noted in Chapter 4, the drug
death rate, a proxy for drug involvement, is statistically similar across the neighborhood
types. However, whereas the black drug death rate is statistically similar across
neighborhood types, the white drug death rate is significantly higher in black
neighborhoods (mean = 17.14) than white (mean = 0.85) or mixed (mean = 1.31)
neighborhoods. Black and mixed neighborhoods have significantly higher violent and
property crime rates and residential instability than white neighborhoods. Turning to
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officer characteristics, most of the arresting officers are white. The percentage of black
officers making arrests for drugs is higher in black neighborhoods (29%) and white
neighborhoods (24%) than mixed neighborhoods (18%). Hispanic officers and officers of
other races makeup a small percentage of arresting officers but are more likely to make
drug arrests in white neighborhoods (6%) than mixed (4%) or black (2%) neighborhoods.
However, there are no significant differences in officer race across racialized
neighborhoods. Finally, officers making drug arrests in white neighborhoods have
significantly more years of experience (mean = 9.35 years) than those in mixed (mean =
7.48 years) or black (mean = 7.37 years) neighborhoods.
ANALYTIC STRATEGY
To understand the nature of drug enforcement practices, the analysis focused on
the pathways to drug arrests by paying special attention to officers’ description of the
initiation of the drug arrest incident. This stage of the encounter is important because it is
the gateway to drug arrests. Encounters can be either citizen-initiated or officer-initiated.
Officer-initiated drug arrests are based on officers’ discretion to stop, question, and frisk
(i.e. conduct a pat down search of citizens’ outer surface for weapons) citizens based on
reasonable suspicion (Terry v. Ohio 1968), and cultural stereotypes linking blacks to
drugs, crime, and undesirable behaviors have the most potential to seep into these
discretionary decisions (Fridell 2008; Lynch and Patterson 1996). It should be added that
citizen-initiated encounters can also involve racial bias because citizens hold pejorative
racial stereotypes (Quillian and Pager 2001; Sampson and Raudenbush 2004) that might
shape their reports to the police.
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The analysis occurred in Microsoft Excel which is the format SLMPD supplied
the arrest reports. Each row was an incident, and each column was a field of data, such as
the incident number, officer narrative, incident information (e.g. date, time, offense),
arrestee’s demographics (e.g. race, age, gender, marital status), officer’s demographics
(e.g. race, age, gender, years of service, education level), and neighborhood information I
attached (e.g. racial composition, violent and property crime).
The subjective nature of the analysis can pose threats to the study’s reliability
since the research is shaped by knowledge of race, neighborhoods, and police behavior
and because humans inherently hold personal biases, whether implicit or explicit. To
minimize researcher bias and to bolster reliability, I employed a blind analysis of the
narratives by removing and hiding demographic information about the suspect, officer,
and neighborhood from all narratives and randomizing the sequence of the narratives
before analyzing them, leaving only the incident number and officer narrative visible.
Therefore, I did not know demographic information about the arrestee, officer, or
neighborhood during coding. After coding, I “un-hid” the demographics so I could
examine the descriptive statistics and compare pathways to drug arrests within and across
neighborhoods and arrestees.
The analysis employed grounded theory methods, which refer to the exploratory,
inductive process of gleaning themes that emerge from the data (i.e. “grounded”) that do
not stem from preconceived notions (Chamberlain 1999; Charmaz 2006). This was
important since I was unsure of all the possible pathways to drug arrests. Using this open
coding strategy, I began the analysis by reading each drug arrest narrative, extracting text
where the officer described how contact initiated between her/him and the suspect, and
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placing the extracted text in a new column. Then, I read the extracted references in order
to identify all the possible ways police-citizen contact was initiated in these data and
finalized mutually exclusive categories. I assessed the similarities and differences
between categories to ensure their distinctness and collapsed and expanded them as
necessary. After determining the mutually exclusive categories, I reread the drug arrest
narratives and assigned each incident to one of the mutually exclusive categories based
on the officer’s description of the initiation of the drug arrest (Chamberlain 1999;
Charmaz 2006; Corbin and Strauss 2007; Silverman 2011). I conducted the beforementioned steps blind. Once I categorized each incident, I “un-hid” the demographic
information and examined descriptive statistics to determine the prevalence of the
pathways in the data. To understand drug enforcement practices by neighborhood type, I
compared and contrasted officer’s descriptions of the pathways in white, mixed, and
black neighborhoods. To understand drug enforcement practices by arrestee race, I
compared and contrasted the pathways between white and black arrestees in the overall
data and within each neighborhood racial context.
The following sections describe themes that emerged from the analysis and
provide excerpts from some of the narratives. The bolded text in the narratives represents
my emphasis and not the officers’. The selected excerpts illustrate recurrent themes in the
data, with a few demonstrating exceptional but important issues that are consistent with
the theme being discussed. In order to protect the anonymity of the data and to prevent
the ability to retrace events, the narratives exclude identifiers and specific details such as
the names of officers, streets, and businesses as well as the mentioning of vehicle types
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and landmarks. I assigned each incident a random identifying number between 1 and 300
and refer to the incident—and the actors within it—using the identifying number.
PATHWAYS TO DRUG ARRESTS
Six mutually exclusive pathways to drug arrests emerged from the data:
pedestrian stops, officer response to citizen reports, vehicle stops, officer surveillance,
drug investigations, and buy/bust operations. Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of these
pathways. While no pathway represents the majority, the most common way officers
initiate drug arrests is via pedestrian stops. Initiating 27% (n = 81) of the drug arrests,
pedestrian stops represent proactive policing. Officers use discretion when deciding to
stop and interview a person who is walking, standing, or sitting outdoors or who is sitting
in a parked vehicle. According to the narratives, officers may initiate a pedestrian stop
based on their knowledge about a person, area, or situation, after observing an action they
deem suspicious, or when noticing that someone is new to an area.
Figure 5.2 Distribution of the Pathways to Drug Arrests for Sample (n = 300)
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The second most common pathway to drug arrests is officer response to citizen
reports, which initiates 26% (n = 78) of the drug arrests. Officers receive information
from citizens about crimes or problems and respond to the reported incidents. Officers
either receive information directly from a confidential informant about drug involvement
or receive calls for service via radio dispatch. Most of the calls for service are related to
drug involvement, involving citizens who call the 911 center to report a person engaged
in drug use, sale, or manufacturing. Other calls for service are unrelated to drug activity.
For example, some citizens reported nondrug crimes (e.g. burglary, shots fired) or
problems (e.g. car accident) to 911 and after officers received the radio assignment and
responded to the scene, they inadvertently discovered drugs and made a drug arrest.
Whether officers investigate information received from confidential sources, drug-related
calls for service, or non-drug-related calls for service, officers’ response to these citizen
reports represents reactive policing.
The third most common pathway to drug arrests is vehicle stops, which initiate
23% (n = 69) of the drug arrests. Vehicle stops occur when officers stop a vehicle that is
currently being operated (e.g. driving, stopped) after observing a traffic violation, a
vehicle violation, or suspicious behavior. Failure to use a turn signal, speeding, and
failure to stop at a stop sign or red light are the types of traffic violations officers
observed in incidents involving vehicle stops. For example:
“We observed a vehicle change lanes without using a turn signal. The vehicle
then exited the interstate. I activated my emergency lights and pulled the vehicle
over.” (#15, black neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer)
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Vehicle violations, on the other hand, occur when a vehicle’s license plate is expired or
not displayed or when the vehicle’s headlights are not illuminated. To illustrate a vehicle
violation, an officer writes:
“While I was stopped at the intersection, I observed a black vehicle make a left
turn. As the vehicle was turning, I observed that the front headlights were not
on. I immediately drove my marked patrol car behind the vehicle and activated
my emergency roof lights and siren.” (#40, black neighborhood, white arrestee,
white officer)
Many vehicle stops represent proactive policing as officers use discretion about whether
to stop a vehicle for minor infractions, such as failure to use signal, or after observing
furtive movements. Other vehicle stops represent reactive policing, as officers are
responding to more serious violations that could jeopardize public safety, such as
speeding or running a stop sign. In a minority of cases, officers initiate vehicle stops after
observing suspicious or criminal behaviors, such as drug use in progress. An example of
a reactive vehicle stop is when officers
“…were patrolling and observed a silver vehicle, bearing Illinois license plate,
driving directly in front of our marked police vehicle. We noticed a strong odor of
marijuana emanating from the vehicle and we continued to follow its path…We
conducted a traffic stop to investigate the odor.” (#167, white neighborhood,
black arrestee, white officer)
In this incident, the officers smelled the odor of drugs and reacted by conducting a
vehicle stop to investigate.
Officer-initiated surveillance emerged as a unique category, initiating 14% (n =
42) of the drug arrests. Based on the data, officer surveillance is defined as an officer
watching a person, vehicle, or area for an extended time, for stated or unstated reasons,
before observing a suspicious or criminal act and stopping a person or vehicle to
investigate. Oftentimes, officer surveillance involves mobile surveillance in which
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officers in covert patrol vehicles follow a vehicle or person. This pathway generally
represents proactive policing because a specific target suspect is not identified before
officers’ initiation of the surveillance, and officers use discretion when determining the
person to surveil. Moreover, officer surveillance involves prolonged observation before
noticing actions that warrant a stop. Thus, the gap between officers’ choice to surveil and
noticing suspicious behavior is discretionary. To illustrate this pathway, a special units
officer patrolling in a covert vehicle describes how he:
“…observed a gray car occupied by a white male parked at the curb in front. As
we passed the car I observed the subject exit his vehicle and run up to the front
door of the address and enter the house for approximately 5 min.” (#287, white
neighborhood, white arrestee, black officer)
Similar to other arrests that initiated from officer surveillance, notice that the officers
were stationary and watched the person for at least “approximately 5 minutes” with no
justification as to why the individual was selected for surveillance. The officer goes on to
recount that they “…then observed him exit the front door and run back to his vehicle and
enter same. I observed him clutching something in his right hand, which he placed in his
right front pants pocket before entering the driver`s side of his vehicle.” The subject then
drove away from the address. The officers followed the subject to another location and
conducted a vehicle stop to investigate whether the subject had just left “a possible illegal
drug house.” During the vehicle stop, the officers smelled marijuana and conducted a
computer inquiry of the subject, which revealed an active traffic warrant. A search
incident to the arrest for the warrant revealed marijuana.
In many officer surveillance incidents, officers do not explain why they chose to
observe a subject for an extended time period. Other times, officers justify their
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prolonged surveillance based on knowledge about a specific area. In another incident that
initiated from officer surveillance, the officer describes how a specific neighborhood
received many complaints about drugs and violent crime and many arrests had been made
in the last three months. The special unit officer was operating a covert vehicle and
explains that:
“…a multi-family residence has been a location of interest in the neighborhood
regarding the aforementioned complaints. Here, I observed 8 to 10 unknown
black males standing in front of this location. From our position, I observed one
of these black males run to the rear of this location through the west gangway.
Finding this suspicious, I drove to the rear of this location in an attempt to observe
where this subject was heading. Before I could reach the entrance to this south
alleyway, a gold colored truck entered this alley ahead of me. I was able to
observe that this vehicle was being operated by one white male driver (arrested
subject). I stopped my vehicle in the mouth of this alley and continued watching
the white male driver and the black male subject. As I watched, I observed the
driver pull his vehicle onto a parking pad located in the rear. Suddenly, I observed
this same black male subject appear at the driver’s window of the driver’s vehicle
and a swift hand to hand transaction was conducted between the two.” (#215,
mixed neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer)
After continuing to observe the subjects, the officer conducted an investigative vehicle
stop, which led to the arrest of the suspect for drug possession. In this incident, and in a
few other officer surveillance incidents, officers began surveillance of a specific place
due to complaints about crime problems. Because the location was targeted for
surveillance, those frequenting the location also became subject to the surveillance and
faced an increased risk for arrest.
Drug investigations initiate only 6% (n = 18) of the drug arrests but are
qualitatively distinct from the other pathways. Arrests stemming from drug investigations
are the culmination of a long-term investigation of a predetermined target suspect. Drug
investigations ensue for weeks or months as officers gather information and conduct
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surveillance on suspects who are usually involved in large-scale drug distribution or
manufacturing operations. After officers have established enough evidence, they request
and acquire a search warrant from the judge. In these data, drug arrests that stem from
drug investigations involve the execution of search warrants by 16-28 officers and
detectives from SWAT and special units.
Like drug investigations, buy/bust operations makeup a small percentage of the
pathways to drug arrests (4%, n = 12) but are qualitatively distinct from the other
pathways. Buy/bust operations occur when supervisors inform officers of increased drug
activity in a specific area. To disrupt drug activity, a group of officers deploys buy/bust
operations in the area. One of the officers operates in an undercover capacity, posing as a
potential drug buyer, and wears a wire that audio records the interaction. The other
officers surveil the operation and listen to the audio. Whereas a specific suspect is
preselected in drug investigations, a specific target suspect is not predetermined in
buy/bust operations. Instead, officers use discretion when picking a suspect for the
operation which, in these data, is always a random person who is hanging out in an area.
To illustrate the selection of the buy/bust target, officers write:
“Undercover officer observed an unknown black male at the intersection. The
detective engaged the male in a conversation. During the conversation,
Detective stated he wanted to purchase marijuana. The male advised Detective
that he could take him to purchase some marijuana in exchange for ten dollars.
The male entered the undercover vehicle and directed Detective to the address.”
(#32, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
“While driving east, I observed two black males sitting on the north side of the
street. I engaged in conversation with one of the subjects. I advised him I
wanted to purchase narcotics. He stated he was not in possession of any;
however, he provided me with the following phone number and stated he would
be in possession of some later.” (#41, black neighborhood, black arrestee, black
officer)
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“Detective observed a black male sitting on a street barrier and stopped his
vehicle parallel to the subject and asked the subject if he had some ‘beans’,
referring to capsules of heroin. The subject replied ‘How many’ and the Detective
said he wanted four pills. The subject then advised the Detective to pull his
vehicle to the curb.” (#157, black neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
After the undercover officer engages a suspect and asks about buying drugs, the suspect
either takes the undercover officer to a location to buy drugs or sells them directly to the
undercover officer. The surveillance officers then “bust” the scene as the transaction
concludes and arrest the buy/bust suspect.
PATHWAYS TO DRUG ARRESTS BY NEIGHBORHOOD TYPE
Broader policing research suggests that officers engage in different policing
practices in different neighborhood contexts. To understand the nature of drug
enforcement practices across neighborhood contexts, I analyzed and compared the
pathways to drug arrests across white, mixed, and black neighborhoods. The distribution
of these pathways across neighborhood types, as displayed in Table 5.3, shows variations
in drug enforcement practices across racially-characterized neighborhoods.
Table 5.3 Pathways to Drug Arrests by Neighborhood Type (n = 300 incidents)
White N'hoods
Black N'hoods
Mixed N'hoods
n = 70
n = 122
n = 108
Pedestrian Stop
19%
31%
27%
2; 3
1
Response to Citizen Report
46%
19%
22% 3
Vehicle Stop
17%
25%
25%
Officer Surveillance
11%
17%
13%
Drug Investigation
7%
2% 3
8% 2
Buy/Bust Operation
0%
5%
5%
Total
100%
100%
100%
Chi square test of independence p < .05
1 = sig differ from white n’hoods 2 = sig differ from black n’hoods 3 = sig differ from mixed n’hoods
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Drug arrests in white neighborhoods are driven primarily by officer response to
citizen reports (46%), which represents reactive policing. This differs from drug
enforcement in black neighborhoods, which is driven by pedestrian stops (31%) and
vehicle stops (25%) more so than officer response to citizen reports (19%). Drug
enforcement in mixed neighborhoods is similar to that in black neighborhoods, being
driven by pedestrian stops (27%) and vehicle stops (25%) followed by officer response to
citizen reports (22%). Officer surveillance is more likely to be used to initiate drug arrests
in black neighborhoods (17%) than in white (11%) or mixed (13%) neighborhoods. Drug
investigations are rarer in black neighborhoods (2%) than in white (7%) or mixed (8%)
neighborhoods. Buy/bust operations are also rare but occur exclusively in black (5%) and
mixed (5%) neighborhoods and never in white neighborhoods (0%). To understand the
nature of drug enforcement by neighborhood type, the following sections compare the
initiation of drug arrests across racialized neighborhoods. Because drug enforcement in
mixed neighborhoods falls in between the other two neighborhood types but is more
similar to drug enforcement in black neighborhoods, the comparison focuses on drug
arrests in black neighborhoods and white neighborhoods where the contrast is the
greatest.
BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS
Consistent with research pointing to more officer-initiated activity in black or
crime-prone neighborhoods, the analysis shows that a substantial portion of drug arrests
in black neighborhoods initiate from proactive policing practices that manifest as
pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and officer surveillance. The analysis of narratives shows
that officers express greater suspicion in black neighborhoods than in white or mixed
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neighborhoods, likely because of the high rates of crime and disorder in those
communities. In fact, officers patrolling black neighborhoods tend to preface their
narratives by citing crime problems the area. To illustrate, when making drug arrests in
black neighborhoods, officers often begin their narratives similar to the following:
“This is a high crime neighborhood which has a high call volume for service from
concerned citizens complaining of various narcotic offenses, shots fired, assaults,
and theft. Citizen complaints for shots fired have been confirmed by this
department`s ‘Shot Spotter’ System which records and documents shots fired in
the neighborhood. Prior arrests have also confirmed these complaints.” (#5, black
neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
Certainly, high rates of crime and citizen complaints in black neighborhoods explain why
police presence is concentrated in those areas. In addition to guiding police deployment,
though, crime problems also guided officers’ decisions to stop a specific person or
vehicle or to conduct surveillance on a specific person, regardless of whether officers
observed the subject engaged in suspicious or prohibited behaviors.
“Due to a recent increase in reports of violent crimes and drug activities…we
have been assigned to conduct operations in the neighborhood. While patrolling
the block we observed 3 to 4 black males standing in the yard. A black male
wearing a white T-shirt and blue jeans began to walk south and then west. We
conducted a rolling surveillance of the subject...” (#20, black neighborhood,
black arrestee, white officer)
“We observed two subjects walking west in the south alley. They then walked
south in the east alley. Due to the violent nature of crimes in the area and gang
activity in the area, we approached them to conduct a field interview.” (#31,
black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
“As I approached the intersection, I noticed a black male wearing a grey coat and
grey hat sitting in front of the vacant structure. Due to the high volume of illicit
drug sales and complaints, I decided to stop and conduct an investigation.”
(#222, black neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
“The said block is an area plagued by drug sales, gang activity, and violent crime.
This area, in the past, has received numerous calls for service for ‘suspicious
persons selling drugs’, ‘shots fired’, ‘shootings’, and ‘disturbances’. While
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turning west, we observed five unknown black males standing and sitting in front
of the apartment building. Due to our knowledge of the area, we elected to
conduct voluntary field interviews with these subjects to determine if they lived
in the apartment building or had a legitimate reason for being in front of the
apartment building.” (#164, black neighborhood, black arrestee, other race
officer)
As these incidents show, officers often justified stopping a person or vehicle or
conducting surveillance because of the neighborhood crime problem. In addition to high
crime in black neighborhoods, the structural characteristics of those communities seem to
provide more opportunities for police scrutiny. In the last three excerpts, officers
observed subjects near alleys or vacant or boarded buildings. These structures are ripe for
criminal activity (Bowers, Johnson, and Hirschfield 2004; Felson 1987; Spelman 1993)
and subsequently, officer suspicion. It is a common theme in the data for officers to stop
a pedestrian or vehicle or initiate surveillance on someone near an alley or a vacant
building, a theme that recurred frequently in black neighborhoods and less so in white or
mixed neighborhoods. As discussed in Chapter 3, rapid population declines and white
flight in St. Louis left black neighborhoods economically distressed and riddled with
physical decay. Signs of physical decay can simply be markers shaping the perceptions of
danger and risk (Sherman 1986).
“We proceeded westbound and observed a black male subject standing on the
front steps of the said address. It should be noted that this is a vacant boarded up
residence. The black male subject walked off the front steps towards a black
vehicle that was driving eastbound. He waved his hands and yelled but the vehicle
didn`t stop. Finding this behavior to be suspicious we curbed our marked police
vehicle in front of the address to attempt a pedestrian check.” (#175, black
neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)

Officers initiating contact with citizens based on neighborhood conditions
comports with the perceptions of citizens in qualitative research, especially in St. Louis
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(Gau and Brunson 2010), who report that officers judged them based on their
neighborhood. In addition to neighborhood crime and features influencing police decision
making, the demeanor or appearance of citizens affected officers’ decisions to initiate
contact. For example, officers initiated pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and officer
surveillance upon noticing behaviors they perceived to be suspicious, such as citizens
appearing nervous, making sudden movements, or changing their behavior when noticing
the officer’s presence.
“While traveling southbound, we observed the male suspect standing outside of a
newer model silver car. He was facing southbound and had his back facing us. As
we drove closer to him he looked over his left shoulder observing our marked
patrol vehicle. He took three steps into the vacant lot where the vehicle was
parked, looked back at our vehicle again paused then quickly began to walk
south from the vacant lot. This area is known to be frequented by individuals
who are engaged in drug sales and use…Believing he might possibly be selling
illegal narcotics we stopped to conduct a further investigation.” (#216, black
neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
“We were conducting operations in the said neighborhood. While traveling north,
I observed a black female subject standing by a dumpster in the north alley. When
I passed her I saw her move behind the dumpster as if she was trying to hide
herself. After observing the suspicious activity I pulled into the alley to conduct a
voluntary field interview.” (#13, black neighborhood, black arrestee, black
officer)
“I was travelling east when I observed a blue car occupied by four black males,
travelling directly in front of me. I performed a random computer inquiry of the
license which revealed no wanteds or warrants…While driving behind the
vehicle, I observed the driver continually look back at me through the rear
view mirror. He appeared to be nervous and again looked back at me
through the driver`s side window as he made a left turn into the parking lot.
Believing his actions to be suspicious, I followed behind the vehicle onto the lot
and curbed it.” (#34, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
“While patrolling near the intersection, we observed a subject riding a bicycle
eastbound on the sidewalk. As we approached this subject in our marked patrol
vehicle, he looked over his shoulder in our direction numerous times and
attempted to cross the street, but was unable to due to the traffic. We pulled our
vehicle alongside him, at which time I asked the subject if we could speak to him,
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to which he responded, ‘Why? What’s going on?’” (#200, black neighborhood,
black arrestee, white officer)
Other times, officers initiated contact with citizens after observing a law violation.
“As we approached the stopped vehicles in the outside lane, a black vehicle
suddenly turned right, into the northbound shoulder, traveling around two
stopped vehicles and then north. I advised Officer of my observations and we
followed the vehicle north. We activated our marked police vehicle`s emergency
lights and siren and curbed it for the observed traffic moving violation.” (#37,
black neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer)
“We observed a black male leaning out of the opened driver door of a pick-up
truck, dumping the inner contents of a cut open cigar onto the street. As we
got closer to the vehicle we smelled the odor of marijuana coming from the
vehicle. In my experience it is common for individuals who are preparing to
ingest marijuana to empty cigars and use the remains to package and consume the
drug. Based on my observations and my experience I stopped our patrol vehicle
and immediately approached the driver side door where he was sitting.” (#67,
black neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
Related to proactive policing is the greater presence of officers and detectives
from special operations units in black neighborhoods than in other neighborhoods.
Whereas patrol officers engage in routine policing, such as responding to radio
assignments, enforcing traffic laws, and stopping suspicious persons, the police
department deploys special unit officers to target specific problems, such as gangs,
narcotics, gun crimes, and burglaries, and “hot spots.” Special unit officers sometimes
operate covert vehicles and wear plain clothes. Because of the directed focus of these
officers, they tend to initiate drug arrests with officer surveillance and investigatory stops,
engaging in some of the most invasive proactive policing in the data. A detective from a
special unit initiated a drug arrest by officer surveillance, recounting that:
“Detective and I were monitoring this parking lot due to open air drug sales. It
should be noted that we have made numerous documented drug related arrests at
this location in the past. While parked on the parking lot, we observed suspect #1
and suspect #2 sitting inside of a vehicle while parked at one of the fuel pumps.
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While near their location, I overheard suspect #1 talking on a cell phone about
what I believed to be drugs, from and unknown source. After listening to his
conversation for several more seconds, I entered our vehicle and briefed Detective
on what I overheard. Seconds after he ended his phone call, he drove off of the
parking lot, travelling north. Believing they were en route to purchase drugs, we
conducted a roving surveillance to further the investigation. (#8, black
neighborhood, white arrestee, black officer)
Driving an unmarked vehicle, the officers followed the subjects to their destination and
observed a black male exit a residence, walk to the driver’s side of the vehicle, and
conduct a hand to hand transaction with suspect #1. After the transaction, the suspect
drove to another location and parked the vehicle. The special unit officers again followed
the vehicle, parked their unmarked car, and approached the suspect in the vehicle on foot.
When they reached the vehicle, the officers discovered capsules filled with heroin in
plain sight and arrested the suspect for drug possession. Like this incident, many special
unit officers engaged in proactive policing that involved prolonged surveillance,
sometimes following and watching citizens before discovering suspected drug activity.
WHITE NEIGHBORHOODS
Officers also use proactive policing to initiate drug arrests in white neighborhoods
but do so less frequently. Pedestrian stops initiate 19%, vehicle stops initiate 17%, and
officer surveillance initiates 11% of the drug arrests in white neighborhoods. Given the
low levels of decay and crime in white neighborhoods, especially violent crime, officers
make few comments about the characteristics (e.g. crime, alleys, vacant buildings) of
white communities. Instead, they mostly describe the behavior of citizens, suggesting that
in white neighborhoods, citizens’ actions guide officer-initiated decisions more so than
neighborhood characteristics. For example, an officer driving a bicycle documented that
he:
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“…observed the parked vehicle occupied by two white males. When I was
parallel to the driver`s side of the vehicle, I could see suspect #1 putting a green
leafy vegetative substance into a rolling paper through the vehicle`s front driver
window…” (#167, white neighborhood, white arrestee, black officer)
In a separate incident involving a vehicle stop in a white neighborhood, officers engaged
in a pursuit after attempting to stop a speeding vehicle (traffic violation) without a license
plate (vehicle violation).
“We were traveling north when we observed a black car without plates traveling
south at a high rate of speed. We waited for the car to pass us and made a u-turn,
activated our lights and siren, and began following the car in an attempt to
conduct a traffic stop. While we were following the car it failed to yield to our
attempts to stop it and violated a red electric signal. The car continued south
where it drove recklessly by weaving in and out of the two southbound lanes
without using a turning signal. The car then violated a red electric signal at the
intersection and finally stopped.” (#232, white neighborhood, white arrestee,
white officer)
Moreover, related to the low crime in white neighborhoods is the lower presence of
special unit officers who primarily engage in proactive policing. The few special units in
white communities tend to focus on nonviolent problems like drug activity, burglary, and
prostitution.
The bulk of drug arrests in white neighborhoods initiate from reactive policing
practices manifested as officers responding to information citizens reported. For example,
in incident #39, officers received a radio assignment from a resident who observed an
unfamiliar vehicle outside her residence. She “observed a black male driver and a white
male passenger exit the vehicle and walk in an unknown direction” and called the police.
Upon arriving to the scene to investigate, the officer approached the vehicle and
discovered the white male driver sleeping. He writes:
“As I illuminated the interior of the vehicle with my flashlight, he opened his eyes
and he seemed surprised at my presence. I asked him to exit the vehicle so that I

134

could conduct an interview with him. He complied and as he attempted to exit the
vehicle, an object fell from his lap on to the curb creating a sound which drew our
attention. I retrieved the object from the ground and discovered it to be a silver
spoon containing an unknown type of residue on the bowl. It should be noted that
a metal spoon is known for heroin users to prepare heroin to be fed into a
syringe.” (#39, white neighborhood, white arrestee, black officer)
The officer arrested the suspect for possession of drug paraphernalia. A search of the
person and vehicle revealed capsules of heroin and crack cocaine, and the officer
additionally charged him for possession of a controlled substance. Like this incident,
citizens in white neighborhoods called 911 for problems in their neighborhoods, such as
disturbances or when noticing individuals engaged in behaviors they deemed unusual.
This theme comports with findings from the quantitative component, which show that
white drug arrests are a function of residential stability. Compared to residentially
unstable neighborhoods, residents in white neighborhoods have lived in their
communities long enough to determine when something is unusual or out of place and
call the police. Transient residents might not notice when an “unfamiliar vehicle” is in
their community or if something is unusual.
Citizens also aid officers by being confidential informants and providing officers
information about ongoing drug activity, especially drug sales and manufacturing.
Confidential informants in white neighborhoods often provided inside information about
drug activity, suggesting that they might be acquaintances or customers of the reported
drug offender.
“I interviewed a confidential informant (C/I) who informed me of a white male
subject. This C/I stated that the subject purchases large quantities of heroin
from north St. Louis City and then sells this illegal product in and around
south St. Louis City. The C/I provided me with the pedigree information of the
subject…On today`s date, this C/I again contacted me and informed me that
the subject was currently in possession of a quantity of heroin…Based on this
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information, we responded to this area in an attempt to locate the subject or the
aforementioned vehicle.” (#235, white neighborhood, white arrestee, white
officer)
“We received information from a confidential source relative to a white female
selling narcotics in the area. The confidential source stated that she typically
carries narcotics and keeps the narcotics she sells inside of her bra or jacket
pockets. The confidential source further stated that she was occupying the said
vehicle and parks her vehicle on a parking lot at the intersection to conduct
narcotic transactions and sits in the passenger side of the vehicle to try to
avoid being noticed by the police.” (#277, white neighborhood, white arrestee,
white officer)
“I was contacted by a confidential source who advised me that a black male
subject driving the said vehicle was going to be delivering heroin. It should be
noted that this C.S. has been proven to be reliable in the past. The C.S. advised
the delivery would take place at approximately 9:00 P.M. I responded to the
area and conducted surveillance on the block.” (#148, white neighborhood, black
arrestee, other race officer)
In black neighborhoods, officers responded to citizen reports as well, an approach that
initiated 19% of drug arrests in those areas. Yet, in addition to the relative infrequency of
this reactive approach, citizen reports in black neighborhoods mostly comprise calls for
service rather than confidential sources. Confidential sources in black neighborhoods
tend to be passersby observing public drug sales in progress rather than acquaintances
reporting inside information. To demonstrate the contrast between confidential sources in
white and black neighborhoods, below is a typical incident involving a confidential
source in black neighborhoods:
“We were in the area when we received information from a confidential source
that there was the said vehicle parked in front of the said address occupied by two
black males who are selling crack cocaine. Confidential source stated the driver
will serve customers, who walk to the side of his vehicle, then he will conduct a
hand to hand transaction and then the customer will leave the area. We responded
to that area to investigate further, when we observed the vehicle parked in front of
the address.” (#44, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
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PATHWAYS TO DRUG ARRESTS BY ARRESTEE RACE
To understand drug enforcement practices by arrestee race, I analyzed the
pathways to drug arrests for blacks and whites. As shown in Table 5.4, drug enforcement
practices across black and white arrestees vary similar to those across black and white
neighborhoods. Like white neighborhoods, a large portion of white drug arrests stem
from officer response to citizen reports (43%) followed by vehicle stops (20%), and like
black neighborhoods, a large portion of black drug arrests stem from pedestrian stops
(33%) and vehicle stops (27%). Officers are more likely to use officer surveillance to
initiate white drug arrests (17%) than black drug arrests (13%). Drug investigations
initiate 6% of white and black drug arrests, but buy/bust operations initiate 6% of black
drug arrests and none of white drug arrests (0%).
Table 5.4 Pathways to Drug Arrests by Arrestee Race (n = 300 incidents)
White Arrestees
Black Arrestees
n = 106
n = 194
Pedestrian Stop
14%*
33%*
Response to Citizen Report
43%*
17%*
Vehicle Stop
20%
25%
Officer Surveillance
17%
13%
Drug Investigation
6%
6%
Buy/Bust Operation
0%*
6%*
Total
100%
100%
*Significant race differences based on chi square test of independence p < .05

BLACK ARRESTEES
Officers tend to initiate drug arrests of black subjects using proactive policing by
stopping pedestrians and vehicles and conducting surveillance. They justify the stops for
reasons similar to those in black neighborhoods: because of high levels of crime in the
area, observing subjects near alleys or vacant dwellings, and observing behaviors they
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believe are suspicious. Behaviors deemed suspicious by officers included a wider range
for black arrestees than white arrestees, including much more trivial suspicions. As a
special unit officer on patrol in a mixed neighborhood recounts:
“While travelling east in the south alley we observed two subjects standing in
the alley. Due to my prior experience working in that area I know it to be a
vacant residence and frequent location for narcotics sales. As we continued to
approach I observed suspect #1 to be clinching his waistband with his right
hand. Through prior training and experience I know it to be common for armed
gun men to hold their waistband in order to maintain retention of a firearm in the
absence of a holster. Believing suspect #1 could be in possession of a concealed
firearm, we decided to conduct a pedestrian check to further investigate.” (#184,
mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
In this case and in many, this officer describes several factors that influenced the
pedestrian stop, including the officer’s prior knowledge of the area and the presence of
subjects near an alley and a vacant residence. The “suspicious behavior” the officer
described was the subject clinching his waistband. Believing the subject was concealing a
weapon, the officer initiated a pedestrian stop, asked the subject to raise his hands, and
conducted a pat down search for “officer safety” (#184, mixed neighborhood, black
arrestee, white officer). The search revealed that the subject did not possess a weapon, as
the officer believed. However, during the frisk, the officer found a baggie of crack
cocaine, which resulted in a drug arrest. Similarly, a patrol officer in a black
neighborhood initiated a pedestrian stop after observing a subject “clutching at the left
side of his waistband as if he were trying to maintain retention of an unknown object”
(#231, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer) and believed the subject
possessed a weapon. A pat down search revealed this subject also did not possess a
weapon, but the officer instead found heroin and arrested the subject for the drug crime.
Characteristic of urban black culture, it is common for black males who wear sagging

138

pants to hold their waistband. Officers deeming these behaviors as suspicious might have
experience correctly identifying weapon holders who clutch their waistbands.
Nevertheless, these false perceptions of danger exemplify the concept “symbolic
assailant,” meaning police misconstrue a person’s mere attire or demeanor as suspicious
or a potential threat (Jones-Brown 2007; Skolnick 1966). In these data, no white arrestee
was stopped for these or similar reasons.
Sometimes officers’ suspicions were incorrect, like in these incidents, particularly
in incidents involving black subjects. In incident #186, officers responded to a radio
assignment for an assault shooting in a black neighborhood. Upon arriving to the
location, the officers met with the shooting victim, gathered a description of the shooter
and his vehicle, and began canvassing the area. The officers observed a vehicle they
thought matched the description and conducted a vehicle stop. The arresting officer goes
on to write that he:
“…ordered the driver to let all of the windows down on the vehicle and to show
me his hands, he complied. I then ordered the front seat passenger to slowly exit
the vehicle and walk back to me. Upon securing the driver I observed a clear
plastic bag containing a green vegetable leafy substance sitting on the center
console of the front seat in plain view, which I believed to be marijuana. An
extensive search of the vehicle revealed no other illegal drugs and a weapon was
not located. The victim was then brought to the scene to identify the vehicle as
well as the driver and passenger to determine if this was the suspect wanted for
the Assault 1. After viewing the subjects and the vehicle, the victim indicated that
this was not the vehicle or the person(s) responsible for the shooting.” (#186,
black neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
While the driver was not the correct suspect for the shooting incident, the mistake led to
the inadvertent discovery of drugs and then a drug arrest. The arrestee commented that he
and his girlfriend “were just riding around and we did not have anything to do with no
shooting. I was about to fire up [light a marijuana cigar] and smoke some green” (#186,
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black neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer). Officers’ unfounded suspicions of
some black citizens seem to comport with the perceptions of black citizens in prior
research who report negative experiences with the police, especially those in St. Louis,
who believe they “…routinely attracted police attention regardless of whether they were
involved in criminal or suspicious activities” and that police “harass [them] constantly for
no reason” (Brunson and Weitzer 2009, 866). While officers in these encounters hold
what they believe to be sufficient reasonable suspicion to stop and search citizens, these
encounters can easily be interpreted as aggressive and harassing, especially from the
perspective of citizens who are stopped because they were simply frequenting a crimeridden area, clinching their waistband, or falsely suspected as a criminal. The tendency to
initiate contact with black citizens—and not white citizens—for these reasons constitutes
bias, and this pattern likely contributes to the overrepresentation of blacks and the
underrepresentation of whites as drug arrestees.
After initiating contact with suspects during a pedestrian or vehicle stop or after
conducting surveillance, officers sometimes immediately conducted a pat down search
for the stated purpose of officer safety, as some officers justified. Officers often
discovered drugs during those frisks and made an arrest for drug possession. Other times,
officers discovered drugs in plain sight upon approaching subjects. In many plain sight
incidents involving black arrestees, officers discovered drugs during suspects’
unsuccessful attempts to conceal contraband.
“I observed a silver car violate the electric signal located at the intersection. We
activated our emergency lights and stopped the vehicle. As I approached the
vehicle from the passenger side, I observed the passenger side rear occupant
discard a small clear plastic baggie to the floor board at his feet. Do [sic] to
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my past experiences, it is known to me that illegal narcotics are commonly
packaged in this manner.” (#84, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
“The car, which appeared to be traveling at a high rate of speed, stopped at the red
traffic signal. Without activating its turn signal, the car turned right and continued
onward. We activated our visor lights and siren and attempted to curb the vehicle.
Upon seeing us, the car, which was stopped at the red traffic signal, made a quick
right turn. As the car was beginning to make the right turn, we observed an
unknown item be thrown from the driver`s window and fall to the street…I
responded back to the area where we had observed the unknown item fall from
the vehicle. Upon reaching the area, I located a clear plastic bag containing
numerous red and clear gelatin capsules filled with suspected heroin.” (#38, black
neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
“As we were travelling westbound, we observed an unknown male and an
unknown female loitering in front of a vacant four family residence. We decided
to conduct a voluntary field interview of the listed subjects. As I curbed our
unmarked vehicle next to the female and stated ‘Police’ I observed the female
turn to the left and conceal her left hand from view. I advised her to show me her
left hand at which time I observed her drop a small item from her left hand. I
exited my vehicle and illuminated the ground with my flash light near her feet. I
observed a small white chunky substance lying on the sidewalk clear from debris
which I believed to be crack cocaine.” (#241, black neighborhood, black arrestee,
white officer)
If officers didn’t discover drugs in plain sight or from Terry frisks, they
inadvertently discovered them after arresting a subject for bench warrants, many being
traffic-related, and conducting a search. A small fraction of white arrestees had active
arrest warrants, but the vast majority of black drug arrestees had arrest warrants from
various jurisdictions throughout the St. Louis metropolitan area. The ubiquity of bench
warrants is overwhelming, but the racial disparity among them is unsurprising given
blacks’ disproportionate exposure to the justice system, poverty, and inability to pay
fines. Similarly, a recent study of police stops in nearby Ferguson, Missouri found that
blacks were twice as likely as whites to be arrested during traffic stops, mostly because of
arrest warrants (Ghandnoosh 2015).
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Sometimes officers became aware of the arrest warrants only after their discovery
of drugs. Yet in many investigatory stops of black subjects, arrests for active warrants led
to the inadvertent discovery of drugs and ultimately a drug arrest. After officers stopped a
person or vehicle, they requested the subjects’ identification card or pedigree information
and conducted a computer inquiry. More often than not, the computer inquiry revealed
active bench warrants. A search incident to arrest for the warrants revealed subjects to be
in possession of drugs. Officers additionally charged them for the drug crime. In the
before-mentioned pedestrian stop of the male and female subjects (#241), the female
subject was arrested for possession of crack cocaine because officers discovered she had
drugs in plain sight. The male subject did not have drugs in plain sight; however a
computer inquiry “…revealed two active city bench warrants for street demonstration”
(#241, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer). The officer arrested the male
subject for the warrant, and a “…search incident to arrest revealed a silver pipe burnt at
both ends, commonly referred to as a ‘crack pipe’ in his left front pants pocket” (#241,
black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer). He was additionally charged for
possession of drug paraphernalia. Inadvertent drug arrests that stemmed from arrests for
bench warrants were especially common in many vehicle stops of black drivers. To
illustrate a typical inadvertent scenario, an officer from incident #80 describes initiating a
vehicle stop after observing the vehicle violate the stop sign.
“As we approached the subject, I observed a vehicle violate the northbound stop
sign. I turned behind the vehicle and activated my emergency lights. The subject
immediately curbed the vehicle. I approached the driver and asked for
identification and insurance. He provided me with his state I.D. I returned to my
vehicle to conduct a computer inquiry. A REJIS search revealed ten active
warrants.” (#80, black neighborhood, black arrestee, other race officer)
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The driver was arrested for the active warrants. During the search incident to the arrest,
officers discovered him to be in possession of marijuana and additionally charged him for
the drug crime. In another incident, officers received a radio assignment for a car
accident. In responding to the car accident, the officers conducted a computer check on
one of the drivers, which
“… revealed 5 active city bench warrants and a prior history of arrest was
indicated. I informed driver #1 she was under arrest for her 5 active city bench
warrants…[a female officer] searched driver #1 incident to her arrest and found a
knotted plastic baggie containing 6 white tablets, with the number 512 on each
tablet, which I believed to be oxycodone. I told driver of vehicle #1 she would be
additionally charged with Violation of the Missouri Controlled Substance Law.”
(#125, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)

In a separate incident, an officer observed a black subject standing near a parked vehicle
and initiated a pedestrian stop “due to the numerous calls for burglaries and drug activity
in the area,” and computer inquiry “revealed an active warrant from this department”
(#177, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer). A search incident to the arrest
for the warrant revealed the subject to be in possession of marijuana, which resulted in a
drug charge. All in all, the ubiquity of arrest warrants among blacks seems to precipitate
secondary punishments. Blacks’ disproportionate contact with the justice system
increases their risk for arrest warrants, and arrest warrants widen the net for more serious
criminal justice involvement, such as incurring a drug arrest and possibly a conviction
and incarceration.
Just as drug arrests in black neighborhoods involve a greater presence of special
unit officers than white neighborhoods, special unit officers were more likely to initiate
black drug arrests than white drug arrests. Another policing practice used differentially
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for blacks and whites was buy/bust operations. A relatively rare policing strategy in these
data, buy/bust operations occur exclusively in black and mixed neighborhoods.
According to my interview with a high-ranking SLMPD official, SLMPD typically
deploys buy/bust operations to areas that have numerous complaints from citizens about
open air drug activity. This logic is consistent with data from the quantitative component
of this dissertation, which show that black neighborhoods, followed by mixed
neighborhoods, have the highest rates of drug-related calls for service in the city. This
would explain why buy/bust operations are deployed in black and mixed communities.
The official also shared that he believed buy/bust operations were a fruitful way to
disrupt drug markets, gather intelligence on serious drug rings, and, because these
interactions are recorded, “present solid cases to prosecutors.” While buy/bust operations
might be advantageous for these reasons, one has to question the equity of this approach
since they are not used to initiate drug arrests in white neighborhoods or of white
subjects. Thus, white drug markets are immune from such disruption.
As mentioned earlier, buy/bust officers use discretion when selecting a subject to
deceive for the undercover operation. The subject is always a random person hanging out
in the target area, and in these data, the random person is always a black citizen; all of the
drug arrests that stem from buy/bust operations involve a black arrestee13. Thus, buy/bust
operations are another policing strategy from which white citizens, and not black citizens,
are immune.

13

I also conducted a keyword search of the narratives in the dataset for the larger sample of 1,440 incidents.
Of all the buy/bust operations in the 1,440 incidents, only one was used to initiate a drug arrest of a white
arrestee, and it was conducted in a white neighborhood.
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After the undercover officers engages a subject during the buy/bust operation and
asks about buying drugs, sometimes the subject would directly sell the undercover officer
the drugs. For example:
“Detective engaged the subject and asked him if he had a ‘dub’. ‘Dub’, is a
common street name for twenty dollars worth of narcotics. The subject went back
to his vehicle and appeared to be retrieving marijuana to sell Detective. The
subject exited his vehicle and walked over to Detective and took a seat on the
front passenger side. At this time the subject traded two baggies of suspected
marijuana for forty dollars of our pre-recorded buy money. Detective announced
our pre-arranged verbal indicator letting near-by detectives know that the deal
was complete.” (#173, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, black officer)
In other instances, the arrested subject was a “connect,” or an intermediary between a
potential drug customer and drug dealer.
“Detective asked subject #1 if he had a twenty for some ‘bud.’ ‘Bud’ is a common
street name for marijuana. Subject #1 told Detective that he knew where he could
get him something and they both went to the covert vehicle and drove east.
Detective and subject #1 exited the covert vehicle and walked towards a group of
black males sitting on park benches. Detective gave subject #1 forty dollars of our
pre-recorded SLMPD buy-money and subject #1 engaged another black male
subject who was sitting on the park bench wearing a black t-shirt and blue jeans.
Subject #1 told Detective that subject #2 had some ‘hard.’ ‘Hard’ is a common
street name for crack cocaine. Subject #1 conducted a hand-to-hand transaction
with subject #2, trading the forty dollars of our SLMPD buy-money for two white
chunks of suspected crack cocaine.” (#256, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee,
black officer)
Both the connect and dealer were arrested for drug distribution. Like these two incidents,
the buy/bust operations in the data involve small drug transactions ranging from $20-$50
worth of drugs. Unless SLMPD targets these low-level drug dealers as an entryway to
more serious drug markets, the cost effectiveness of buy/bust operations might be
questionable.
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WHITE ARRESTEES
White arrestees were generally exempt from the aggressive policing practices
their black counterparts experienced. Pedestrian stops initiated only 14% of their arrests,
officer surveillance initiated 17%, and vehicle stops initiated 20%. Special unit officers
initiated very few white drug arrests compared to black drug arrests, and white drug
arrestees were exempt from buy/bust operations. Rather, a substantial portion of white
drug arrests stem from reactive policing styles as officers responded to reports from
citizens. Confidential sources and calls for service included information about white drug
offenders and other problems (e.g. disturbances, demonstration) that led to the arrest of
white suspects. One common problem citizens reported was their observations of white
subjects sleep, high, or using drugs in public.
“…We were further informed via dispatch that a white male and white female
were passed out in the front seat of this suspicious vehicle. Upon our arrival we
observed a white male slumped in the driver`s seat, and a white female
slumped in the passenger seat. I observed a syringe on the lap of the sleeping
male as well as another syringe, containing a brown substance, on the lap of the
sleeping female.” (#140, white neighborhood, white arrestee, other race officer)
“I received a radio assignment for ‘suspicious occupants of an auto.’ Upon our
arrival, we observed the suspect slumped over the wheel of his vehicle. As we
approached the vehicle we observed that the driver’s window was open. This
allowed us to wake up the suspect by reaching through the window and gently
shaking his arm and calling out to him. During this initial interaction, I observed 6
capsules, which I believed to be heroin, in the driver`s side arm rest of the door.”
(#281, white neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer)
“I received a call for ‘suspicious person/drugs’. The caller advised that there was
a white male wearing …and a white female wearing...doing drugs inside of a
port-a-potty. Upon my arrival I observed a white male who matched the
description of the suspect given by the dispatcher…I detained him pending further
investigation. While doing a pat down search, I asked him if he had anything on
him that he shouldn`t have, to which he spontaneously stated, ‘Yeah I have some
shit in my cigarette pack in my right front pants pocket.’ I then asked what he
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meant by ‘shit’ to which he stated, ‘Heroin.’” (#116, white neighborhood, white
arrestee, white officer)
Not only did citizens observe white subjects sleeping or high in public and call the police,
officers also observed such behaviors and initiated contact with white subjects. Thus, this
pattern is also observed in some pedestrian and vehicle stops and officer surveillance. In
incident #36, an officer noticed a car parked in the middle of the street and recounts that:
“A white male subject was sitting in the driver seat of the vehicle with his head
leaning against the driver side window. A white female subject was sitting in
the passenger seat of the vehicle and appeared to be lethargic, her pupils were
dilated and her head was rolling from side to side. I observed a spoon that
appeared to be coated with white residue lying on the center console of the truck.
I also observed a syringe with what appeared to be a light brown liquid, which I
believed to be heroin, lying on the driver seat next to the male and a syringe that
was uncapped lying on the passenger seat next to the female…Medic 2 arrived at
the scene and began attempts to revive the female. She was given Nar-Can and
became responsive immediately. I informed the female she was under arrest for
‘VMCSL – Possession of Paraphernalia’” (#36, white neighborhood, white
arrestee, other race officer)

Before the ambulance transferred the female suspect to the hospital, the officer informed
her that he would apply for a warrant for her arrest. The male subject was arrested for
possession of drug paraphernalia and a controlled substance. In a separate incident, an
officer conducting surveillance of a restaurant parking lot observed “a subject walking to
the restaurant who seemed to be extremely intoxicated” (#50, mixed neighborhood, white
arrestee, white officer), which led to the person’s arrest for possession of “an off white
rock substance” that appeared to be crack cocaine.
This theme of public intoxication is specific to white arrestees and not black
arrestees and might be a function of whites’ tendency to use illegal hard drugs like
heroin, which have side effects consistent with the behaviors of the aforementioned
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subjects. The quantitative component of this dissertation (Chapter 4) shows that whites
are significantly more likely to use hard drugs than blacks, as measured by the racespecific drug death rate. Further, recent national-level data confirm that whites’ heroin
use rates nearly double blacks’ heroin use rates (Jones et al. 2015).
Related to the nature of white drug activity is whites’ drug purchasing patterns.
Recall in an earlier excerpt a confidential informant told the police that the white suspect,
“purchases large quantities of heroin from north St. Louis City [black neighborhoods]
and then sells this illegal product in and around south St. Louis City [white
neighborhoods]” (#235, white neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer). In another
narrative, a special unit officer alluded to the same theme during his surveillance of 8-10
black males standing in front of a residence. Upon noticing a white driver nearing the
residence, the officer observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand transaction
between a black subject and the white driver. The officer conducted a computer check of
the vehicle’s license plate and found it to be registered to an address in St. Louis County
(predominately white). The officer adds that, “During narcotic investigations, I have
found it common for people who do not reside in Saint Louis City to respond to the city
limits to purchase narcotics” (#215, mixed neighborhood, white arrestee, white officer).
Notice the officer’s use of neighborhood belonging as a synonym for race.
Corroborating this theme is a statement from the SLMPD official and data from
the quantitative component of this dissertation. The SLMPD official stated that it is
common for white citizens from south St. Louis, St. Louis County, and Illinois to travel
to black neighborhoods in St. Louis city to buy and use drugs because they can easily
hide among the disorder in those communities. Additionally, the quantitative component
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shows that the white drug death rate is significantly higher in black neighborhoods than
in white or mixed neighborhoods. Together, this evidence shows that whites travel to
black neighborhoods to engage in drug activity. No evidence shows a pattern of black
drug offenders travelling to specific areas to commit drug crimes.
INTERACTION BETWEEN RACE AND PLACE
Given the intricate link between people and places, drug enforcement practices by
arrestee race may simply reflect drug enforcement practices in the corresponding
racialized neighborhood. It is sensible, for example, that black arrestees and black
neighborhoods tend to be subjected to proactive policing just as white arrestees and white
neighborhoods tend to be subjected to reactive policing. To understand the interaction
between race and place and to better decipher whether racial differences in drug
enforcement practices are more so function of race versus place, I analyzed pathways to
drug arrests by arrestee race in each neighborhood context. This race-place analysis also
helps elucidate findings from the quantitative component, which show racial profiling in
drug enforcement, as citizens face a greater risk for drug arrests in neighborhoods that
mismatch their race.
Table 5.5 Pathways to Drug Arrests by Arrestee Race in Each Neighborhood Type (n = 300 incidents)

Pedestrian Stop
Response to Citizen Report
Vehicle Stop
Officer Surveillance
Drug Investigation
Buy/Bust Operation
Total

White N’hoods
(n = 70)
Black
White
Arrestees Arrestees
(n = 20)
(n = 50)
30%*
14%*
25%*
54%*
25%
14%
10%
12%
10%
6%
0%
0%
100%
100%

Black N’hoods
(n = 122)
Black
White
Arrestees Arrestees
(n = 96)
(n = 26)
35%*
15%*
17%
27%
23%
35%
16%
23%
3%
0%
6%
0%
100%
100%

Mixed N’hoods
(n = 108)
Black
White
Arrestees Arrestees
(n = 78)
(n = 30)
32%*
13%*
15%*
40%*
28%
17%
10%
20%
8%
10%
6%
0%
100%
100%

*Significant race differences within neighborhood type based on chi square test of independence p < .05
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Table 5.5 presents the distributions of the pathways to drug arrests by arrestee
race in white, black, and mixed neighborhoods. At least three patterns are noteworthy.
First, the table shows that within the same neighborhood context, black and white drug
arrests are initiated from different policing practices. Stated differently, when holding
neighborhood racial context constant, arrestee race matters. In mixed neighborhoods, for
example, where the black and white population sizes are comparable and crime rates are
relatively moderate, black drug arrests tend to be initiated by pedestrian stops (32%)
followed by vehicle stops (28%), and white drug arrests tend to be initiated by officer
response to citizen reports (40%). Second, consistent with the preceding analysis by race,
black drug arrestees are more likely than white drug arrestees to be subjected to
investigatory stops, regardless of the neighborhood racial context. Third, patterns for
white drug arrestees in white and mixed neighborhoods are similar to those from the
preceding analysis: officer response to citizen reports is the modal pathway to drug
arrests for white arrestees (54% and 40%, respectively). In contrast, in black
neighborhoods, white drug arrests tend to be initiated by vehicle stops (35%), followed
by officer response to citizen report (27%).
Reasons for officer-initiated pedestrian and vehicle stops and officer surveillance
of black subjects are similar to those in the preceding analysis of black drug arrestees.
However, the justification for officer-initiated contact of black arrestees seems to differ
across racialized neighborhoods. Compared to black or white neighborhoods, initiation of
drug arrests of blacks appears to be based on more minor justifications in mixed
neighborhoods. For example, as a patrol officer in a mixed neighborhood describes:
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“While patrolling the area due to recent robberies and car break-ins, I observed a
black male subject walking south, which I did not recognize from the
neighborhood. I approached the subject to conduct a field interview report. Upon
making contact with the subject he stated, ‘What do you want, why are fucking
with me? I don`t have nothing for you. I don`t have any warrants.’ I advised him
I was conducting a field interview. I conducted a pat down search of the subject
for our safety. While conducting the search of his pants I felt a hard cylinder
object inside his left pants pocket, consistent with a utensil used for smoking
crack.” (#193, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer)
The officer’s account reiterates a few themes. First, notice the officer justified his
presence based on increases in robberies and car break-ins in the area. Second, the officer
initiated the pedestrian stop because he “did not recognize [the subject] from the
neighborhood” as opposed to observing the suspect engaged in reasonably suspicious
actions. Third, the discovery of drug paraphernalia was incidental to the discretionary
stop; the officer conducted a Terry search and discovered the crack pipe, which resulted
in the drug arrest. The subject’s statements that the officer was “fucking with” him and he
“[didn’t] have any warrants” attest to the seemingly arbitrary nature of the officerinitiated contact. Officers also initiated drug arrests of blacks in mixed neighborhoods
based on public order or nuisance problems. A patrol officer writes:
“I observed several black male subjects sitting on a bench in the southwest
portion of the park. I noticed what appeared to be several beer cans situated
beneath the park bench where these subjects were sitting. Due to my knowledge
of the parks in this area being the subject of nuisance crimes in the past and
believing the subjects seated on the bench were drinking alcoholic beverages
illegally, I decided to conduct pedestrian checks of these subjects. I exited my
patrol vehicle and walked toward the subjects...Believing these subjects were all
involved with the illegal consumption of alcoholic beverages in a park, I detained
the subjects for the purpose of an investigation. I then began my investigation by
requesting the identification of the subjects to which subject #1 stated, ‘I have
warrants on me’…the radio dispatcher replied that subject #1 had active bench
warrants for nuisance ordinance and trespassing on private property. I placed him
under arrest for the indicated charges. During a search incident to arrest I located
and then removed a small cellophane bag containing a green vegetable substance
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in the left front pants pocket…” (#220, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white
officer)
This excerpt illustrates officers’ enforcement of public order and how arrests for bench
warrants pave the way for drug arrests for blacks.
As mentioned previously, many white drug arrests initiated from citizens
reporting public intoxication or public drug use by white subjects. When analyzing white
drug arrests across racialized neighborhoods, this theme again emerged, showing that
public drug use by whites was rampant in black neighborhoods. Public drug use by white
subjects in black neighborhoods was detected by citizens who called the police because
they observed a vehicle occupied “by a white male who was injecting narcotics” (#99,
white officer), “two white males using heroin in the parking lot” (#71, white officer), or
“subjects were occupying a vehicle in the rear using and dealing drugs” (#174, white
officer). Officers also detected public drug use among white subjects in black
neighborhoods after conducting surveillance or initiating pedestrian or vehicle stops, such
as an officer who conducted an occupied vehicle check and “could observe both the
driver and the passenger`s heads were looking down” and observed the driver “…with a
silver spoon in his left hand and a bottle of water in his right hand” (#224, white officer).
While public drug involvement by white subjects also occurred in white and mixed
neighborhoods, this theme was consistent with a substantial portion of white drug arrests
in black neighborhoods.
Table 5.5 also shows that regardless of neighborhood type, white drug arrests are
more likely to be initiated by officer surveillance than black drug arrests, especially in
black and mixed neighborhoods. Moreover, vehicle stops were more likely to initiate
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white drug arrests in black neighborhoods (35%) than in white (14%) or mixed
neighborhoods (17%). Officers initiated white drug arrests in black neighborhoods via
vehicle stops after observing vehicles that “…violate the stop sign” (#160, white officer)
or “change lanes without signaling” (#162, white officer). After the vehicle stops, officers
would then observe drugs in plain sight or furtive movements, which led to a search and
the drug arrest. In many incidents in black neighborhoods, officers became suspicious
when observing white subjects sitting in a vehicle for long periods of time, probably
because officers, who are aware of white drug involvement patterns, suspected them to be
waiting to conduct a drug transaction. To illustrate, a special unit officer initiated
surveillance when observing a white subject
“…sitting inside her vehicle while parked on the parking lot. She sat in her
vehicle approximately ten minutes without making any attempts to exit same or
enter any business. She was observed using her cell phone and constantly looking
around as if she was waiting on someone to arrive. Seconds after completing her
last phone call, she then left the lot and proceeded to another location where she
sat inside her vehicle for approximately 5-7 minutes; again, without exiting the
vehicle and looking around the area as if she was waiting for someone. Believing
she travelled to a more secure location to purchase illegal narcotics, we
maintained surveillance on her. Shortly thereafter, the driver of a brown car pulled
directly behind the female subject’s vehicle. After parking the vehicle, we
observed the male subject exit his vehicle and walk to the passenger side of the
female’s vehicle where he sat down in the front passenger seat. Believing a drug
transaction was possibly occurring, we approached the vehicle on foot.” (#65,
black neighborhood, white arrestee, black officer)

The officers observed two white, rock-like substances in plain sight and arrested the
female subject. Notice the officers surveilled and followed the subject for at least 15
minutes before observing the drug transaction and approaching the subject.
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DISCUSSION
The qualitative component of this dissertation explored the nature of drug
enforcement practices, based on police accounts, with the goal of understanding how
drug enforcement practices might contribute to racial disparities in drug arrests. Overall,
the analysis revealed that drug enforcement practices are largely a byproduct of broader
law enforcement activities and SLMPD’s aim to reduce disorder and more serious
crimes, such as violence. Drug enforcement that leads to arrests involves few concerted
drug disruptive efforts, such as drug investigations (6%) and buy/bust operations (4%).
Instead, the vast majority of drug arrests initiate for reasons unrelated to drugs, and
officers’ discovery of drug activity is largely incidental to pedestrian stops, vehicle stops,
officer surveillance, and even some responses to calls for service. Moreover, the analysis
revealed the multifaceted nature of drug arrest incidents. Each encounter contained
different variables that officers must weigh into their equation of suspicion and
assessment of potential threats to public order (i.e. subjects in groups versus alone,
pedestrians or vehicles near alleys and abandoned buildings, people hanging out, time of
day, etc.). Of interest to this study, however, is the extent to which neighborhood context
and arrestee race shape officers’ decision-making and activities in drug arrest incidents.
Echoing research on broader policing practices, (Bass 2001; Black 2010; Epp,
Maynard-Moody, and Haider-Markel 2014; Fagan and Davies 2000; Ghandnoosh 2015;
Golub, Johnson, and Dunlap 2007; Smith 1986; Terrill and Reisig 2003; Weitzer 2000),
the analysis showed that drug enforcement practices varied across racialized
neighborhoods and by arrestee race. Drug arrests in black neighborhoods and of black
suspects commonly involved officer-initiated, proactive policing strategies manifested as
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pedestrian stops, vehicle stops, and officer surveillance. On the contrary, drug arrests in
white neighborhoods and of white suspects were largely initiated by reactive policing
practices, as officers responded to information reported to them by confidential
informants and calls for service. Drug enforcement in mixed neighborhoods was more
similar to drug enforcement in black neighborhoods than white neighborhoods, often
being initiated by proactive policing. It is important to note that because of the stratified,
random sampling of arrest reports, white neighborhoods and white arrestees were
overrepresented and black neighborhoods and black arrestees were underrepresented in
the analysis. This means that neighborhood and racial differences in the pathways to drug
arrests—the use of proactive versus reactive strategies—are even greater in the
population of drug arrest incidents.
Officers in black neighborhoods generally expressed more suspicion, were keen
to the high levels of crime and disorganization in those communities, and justified their
initiation of drug arrests based on neighborhood characteristics (e.g. crime, vacant or
boarded buildings, alleys), even when subjects were not engaging in prohibited
behaviors. In addition to neighborhood characteristics, officers initiated drug arrests in
black neighborhoods when observing illegal actions, such as speeding or public drug use,
or behaviors they deemed suspicious. However, suspicious behaviors included a wider
range of actions for black neighborhoods and black citizens than white neighborhoods
and white citizens. Some of these suspicions were trivial and, when investigated, some
suspicions were unfounded. In addition, drug arrests in black and mixed neighborhoods
and of black arrestees involved more officers and detectives from specialized units and
buy/bust operations than white neighborhoods and white arrestees. Similar to citizens’
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perspectives in prior research, residents from black and mixed neighborhoods in St. Louis
report that, “policing in their neighborhoods primarily consisted of pedestrian and vehicle
stops by patrol officers and specialized units” (Brunson and Weitzer 2009, 867). In
contrast, proactive drug enforcement in white neighborhoods and of white citizens was
relatively infrequent and tended to be based on more overt infractions and citizens’
behaviors.
Black arrestees were subject to more aggressive, proactive policing strategies,
regardless of the neighborhood racial context, which suggests that arrestee race
supersedes neighborhood context. White arrestees were generally immune from such
aggressive policing strategies, except in black neighborhoods where officers found them
suspicious. This is likely because of the common knowledge that white drug users travel
to black neighborhoods to buy drugs. Indeed, in prior research, white residents in St.
Louis reported less contact with the police, except they experienced police harassment in
black neighborhoods or in the company of black friends (Brunson and Weitzer 2009,
866). Related to race differences in drug involvement patterns, the analysis showed a
pattern of white drug arrests being initiated when citizens or officers observed white
subjects sleeping, intoxicated, or using drugs in public. This theme was especially
pronounced in black neighborhoods. Nevertheless, in white and mixed neighborhoods,
white drug arrests were largely initiated when officers responded to information citizens
provided, showing the important roles citizens play in shaping drug enforcement.
Another important theme that emerged was related to racial differences in bench
warrants. Although both white and black subjects had active bench warrants on file,
conducting computer inquiries on black subjects more often than not revealed active
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arrest warrants. In many cases, arrest warrants made blacks vulnerable to drug arrests as
officers would make an investigatory stop, conduct a computer inquiry, become aware of
the warrant, arrest the subject for the warrant, and inadvertently discover drugs during a
search for the warrant arrest. Thus, blacks’ disproportionate contact with the legal system
differentially exposes them to bench warrants and widens the net for more serious
criminal justice contact, such as a drug arrest.
Proactive policing involves greater discretion than reactive policing.
Neighborhood and race differences in the use of proactive drug enforcement could be
attributed to a variety of factors. For example, it is possible that white neighborhoods
have fewer pedestrians and loiterers than black neighborhoods, which might explain why
pedestrian stops are infrequent in white neighborhoods and among white citizens. It is
also possible that the differential use of discretionary practices reflect officer bias,
especially in light of officers’ justifications for the proactive encounters. It is beyond the
ability of the analysis to discern whether neighborhood and racial differences in drug
enforcement practices reflect intentional or implicit racial biases. As mentioned earlier,
officers have incentives to avoid documenting racially-motivated policing and
misconduct in drug arrest reports (Skogan and Frydl 2004). Hence, in no narrative did
officers justify initiating contact with citizens based on race, nor did officers self-disclose
their use of inflammatory language or name-calling that is a common complaint among
citizens, especially black citizens (Gau and Brunson 2010; Weitzer and Tuch 2005;
White, Cox, and Basehart 1991). In only three incidents did officers report the use of
force when subduing suspects, and those incidents resulted in documented injuries. If
drug enforcement is racially-motivated—explicit or implicit—racial biases are hidden
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under the guise of reasonable suspicion and under the stated goal to reduce illegal
activities, intertwined in seemingly race-neutral cues, such as observing suspects whom
“appeared to be nervous” (#34, black neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer) or were
“clinching his waistband” (#184, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer), or
when officers “reasonably suspected furtive movements” (#127, mixed neighborhood,
black arrestee, white officer) or “did not recognize [a person] from the neighborhood”
(#193, mixed neighborhood, black arrestee, white officer).
Nevertheless, more important than officers’ motivation is the pattern of
differential drug enforcement by neighborhood and by arrestee race that may or may not
be justified. Even in officers’ best presentation of themselves in the narratives,
descriptions of their own activities strikingly comport with those reported by citizens in
prior research: black places and black persons tend to be the recipients of involuntary,
aggressive, proactive policing strategies, some which seem to be for arbitrary reasons
(Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson and Weitzer 2009; Weitzer 1999; Weitzer 2000) or
based on conditions of the neighborhood (Gau and Brunson 2010) or citizens’ appearance
(Jones-Brown 2007). Excessive use of such strategies likely exposes more black citizens
to drug arrests who would otherwise go undetected and contributes to the
overrepresentation of blacks in drug arrests. In the same vein, the minimal use of officerinitiated drug enforcement in white neighborhoods and of white arrestees contributes to
the benign neglect of the serious drug problems those communities face and their
underrepresentation in drug arrests. Together, the qualitative component points to salient
differences in drug enforcement practices across racialized neighborhoods and arrestee
race that seem to contribute to racial disparities in drug arrests.
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Chapter 6: Conclusions

“Where justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance prevails, and where any
one class is made to feel that society is an organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade
them, neither persons nor property will be safe.”
-Frederick Douglass, 1886
th
-24 Anniversary of Emancipation speech, Washington, D.C.
This dissertation research sought to investigate the source of one of the most
salient issues in criminology and criminal justice: racial disparities in drug arrests. For
decades, blacks have been overrepresented and whites have been underrepresented as
drug arrestees, creating large, longstanding racial disparities in drug arrests and
reinforcing coexisting racial and social inequalities. Despite its relevance to society, the
criminal justice system, research, and policy, few empirical studies have attempted to
elucidate this social problem. A small body of research has analyzed racial disparities in
drug arrests at the individual-level (Mitchell and Caudy 2013; 2015) and city-level
(Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Parker, Stults, and Rice 2005), thus, neglecting the
importance of neighborhood context.
This dissertation contributes to this literature by examining race-specific drug
arrests at the neighborhood-level in St. Louis between 2009 and 2013. Guided by
differential drug involvement, differential scrutiny, and racially-biased policing theories,
this study employed quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative component
tested whether neighborhood context could explain racial disparities in drug arrests.
Culling together multiple sources of neighborhood-level data, predictors in the
quantitative component included: drug death rates as a proxy for drug involvement,
violent and property crime rates, citizen calls for drug service, racial composition,
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economic disadvantage, and residential instability. The qualitative component used
grounded theory methods to analyze a sample of officers’ narratives in drug arrest
reports. It explored the nature of drug enforcement across racialized neighborhoods and
arrestee race in order to elucidate officer decision making and the factors that influenced
the initiation of drug arrests. This mixed-method dissertation revealed important insights
into drug enforcement, in general, and the racial disparity problem, specifically. Despite
its neglect in extant research, this dissertation found neighborhood characteristics to
profoundly shape drug enforcement. The overall findings align with the larger literature
on policing, which highlights that officers behave differently in different neighborhood
contexts (Black 2010; Klinger 1997; Smith 1986).
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Similar to nearly every jurisdiction throughout the U.S., St. Louis has notable
racial disparities in drug arrests, at the city and neighborhood levels. During 2009-2013,
blacks made up 49% of the resident population but comprised 74% of the city’s drug
arrests. Whites were underrepresented, as they accounted for 46% of the resident
population and only 26% of drug arrests. In addition, the prevalence of drug arrests
varied across racialized neighborhoods (i.e. black, white, mixed neighborhoods) during
the five-year period; the vast majority of drug arrests occurred in black (52%) and mixed
neighborhoods (41%). Only 7% of drug arrests occurred in white neighborhoods,
although white neighborhoods made up 23% of St. Louis communities.
These race and neighborhood disparities in drug arrests are incongruent with
patterns of drug involvement. First, the distribution of drug involvement appears to be
even across racialized neighborhoods in St. Louis, as the drug death rate (the proxy for
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drug involvement) is statistically similar across black, white, and mixed neighborhoods.
Second, whites are more involved in serious drugs than blacks, as their drug death rate is
seven times the rate of blacks. Third, while the black drug death rate is similar across
racialized neighborhoods, the white drug death rate is significantly greater in black
neighborhoods than in white or mixed neighborhoods. Indeed, a theme in the qualitative
analysis and my interview with a high-ranking SLMPD official confirm that white drug
offenders tend to travel to black neighborhoods to engage in drug activity, a pattern that
is not characteristic of black drug offenders. Thus, differential drug involvement theory,
as it stands, is refuted. Rather, the differential drug involvement is for whites. Even more,
drug involvement cannot explain the disparity problem. The multivariate analysis showed
that white drug arrests, and not black drug arrests, were a function of drug deaths when
controlling for theoretically-relevant covariates, although the effect of drug deaths was
statistically similar for whites and blacks. Echoing conclusions from prior analyses of the
racial disparity problem (Beckett et al. 2005; Beckett, Nyrop, and Pfingst 2006; Mitchell
and Caudy 2013; 2015), this dissertation finds that neighborhood-level drug involvement
cannot explain neighborhood-level racial disparities in drug arrests.
Perhaps the racial disparity is due to the concentration of police in neighborhoods
with high violent crime rates and citizen calls for drug service, as differential scrutiny
theory contends. Consistent with the theory, the quantitative component showed that drug
enforcement is concentrated in black neighborhoods, followed by mixed neighborhoods,
which have the city’s highest violent crime rates and calls for drug service. White
neighborhoods have the city’s lowest violent crime rates and calls for drug service and
consequently, drug enforcement is nearly non-existent in those communities.
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The qualitative component also revealed evidence of the differential scrutiny of
neighborhoods. Consistent with research on broader policing practices (Bass 2001; Black
2010; Brunson and Weitzer 2009; Ghandnoosh 2015; Smith 1986; Terrill and Reisig
2003; Weitzer 2000), black neighborhoods, followed by mixed neighborhoods,
experienced more officer-initiated and invasive drug enforcement practices than white
neighborhoods. Patrol and specialized unit officers in black and mixed neighborhoods
often initiated drug arrests with pedestrian and vehicle stops and officer surveillance.
High violent crime rates and disorder attracted police to those communities, but officers
often justified their initiation of investigative stops based on the characteristics of the area
(e.g. crime, vacant buildings, alleys) or citizens’ demeanor or appearance, even when the
specific citizen was not engaged in prohibited behaviors. Thus, those simply frequenting
crime-ridden areas were subject to officers’ suspicion and ultimately, police scrutiny.
Adding to neighborhood differences in aggressive policing, undercover detectives
used buy/bust operations exclusively in black and mixed neighborhoods, all against
random, low-level drug offenders whom were black. Drug enforcement in white
neighborhoods involved less aggressive, proactive policing, and officer-initiated activity
was generally based on officers’ observations of citizens’ prohibited behaviors rather
than characteristics of the area or citizens’ demeanor. Instead, officers tended to initiate
drug arrests in white neighborhoods by responding to citizen complaints.
Despite descriptive evidence of differential scrutiny, it is not a salient predictor of
the disparity problem. The multivariate analysis showed that both white arrestees and
black arrestees faced a greater risk for drug arrest in violent-prone neighborhoods when
controlling for theoretically-relevant confounders; however, the effect of violent crime on
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arrests was very modest and similar for both groups. Moreover, black drug arrests, and
not white drug arrests, were a function of citizen calls for drug service; however, citizen
calls for drug service had a moderate effect on black drug arrests, and its magnitude was
similar for both groups. Taken together, differential scrutiny is related to overall drug
enforcement, but it does not explain the racial disparity problem.
While the explanatory ability of differential scrutiny was limited, the largest
predictor of the racial disparity problem was racially-biased policing. When controlling
for factors that should be most relevant to drug enforcement—drug deaths, violent and
property crime, citizen calls for drug service, and social disorganization—the strongest
predictor in the multivariate analysis was neighborhood racial composition. The
quantitative component refuted the racial threat and benign neglect hypotheses (Blalock
1967; Chamlin and Liska 1992; Liska 1992; Liska and Chamlin 1984) and instead found
support for the defended neighborhoods hypothesis (Green, Strolovitch, and Wong 1998;
Lyons 2007; Stewart et al. 2009) while uncovering an underexplored form of racial
profiling: racial incongruity, also known as “out-of-placeness” (Fagan and Davies 2000;
Novak and Chamlin 2012; Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker 2012). Officers were more
likely to arrest whites in areas with more black residents and arrest blacks in areas with
more white residents, controlling for confounders. Thus, racial disparities in drug
enforcement in St. Louis are largely based on officers’ assessments of where people
“belong” in terms of race. Race is salient in St. Louis, and this salience is no surprise in
light of the city’s history of interracial strife and enduring racial segregation, as discussed
in Chapter 3.

163

The magnitude of racial composition on arrests was strong for both groups but
was substantially and significantly larger for white arrestees. It is likely that low drug
enforcement in white neighborhoods exacerbates the strong race effect for whites. Had
drug enforcement been greater in white neighborhoods, more whites would become drug
arrestees, especially in white neighborhoods. Another factor is the drug involvement
patterns of white drug offenders, as previously mentioned. Because of their tendency to
engage in drug crimes in black neighborhoods, and officers’ knowledge of these patterns,
their risk for drug arrest increases as the black population increases. On the other hand,
the effect of racial composition on black drug arrests is best interpreted as notions of
racial incongruity and the defended neighborhoods hypothesis. This is because black drug
arrests are not a function of drug deaths, and no evidence points to black drug offenders
flocking to white neighborhoods to engage in drug offending. Given St. Louis’ legacy of
white supremacy and explicit, concerted efforts to restrict blacks from white places, it is
plausible that blacks’ presence in white areas raises suspicion and social control in effort
to protect white interests, as the defended neighborhoods hypothesis posits.
The qualitative analysis also revealed the importance of race in drug enforcement,
as black and white drug arrestees were subjected to different policing practices, even
within the same neighborhood context. Officers’ descriptions of their own activities
mirror those reported by citizens in prior research: black places and black persons tend to
be the recipients of involuntary, aggressive, proactive policing strategies, some which
seem to be for arbitrary reasons (Brunson and Miller 2006; Brunson and Weitzer 2009;
Weitzer 1999; Weitzer 2000) or based on conditions of the neighborhood (Gau and
Brunson 2010) or citizens’ appearance (Jones-Brown 2007). Excessive use of such
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strategies likely exposes more blacks to drug arrests who would otherwise go undetected
and contributes to the overrepresentation of blacks in drug arrests. In the same vein, the
minimal use of officer-initiated drug enforcement in white neighborhoods and of white
arrestees contributes to the benign neglect of the serious drug problems those
communities face and their underrepresentation in drug arrests. Together, the qualitative
component points to salient differences in drug enforcement practices across racialized
neighborhoods and arrestee race that seem to contribute to racial disparities in drug
arrests. Ultimately, the quantitative and qualitative components found race to drive racial
disparities in drug enforcement more than drug problems and even neighborhood context.
Aside from theoretical predictions, other important findings emerged from the
analyses. For example, both components revealed the importance of citizens in shaping
drug enforcement. The quantitative component showed that white drug arrestees faced a
greater risk for drug arrest in residentially stable neighborhoods. The qualitative
component elaborated this result, finding that officer response to citizen reports drove
white drug arrests, and citizens in stable neighborhoods reported information to the police
that led to arrests of white subjects. Black drug arrests were a function of citizen calls for
drug service in the quantitative analysis, though it could not explain the racial disparity
problem, and such reactive policing was relatively infrequent when initiating black
arrests. Furthermore, the qualitative component revealed how blacks’ disproportionate
contact with the legal system amplifies their risk for future arrest. Specifically, the
ubiquity of bench warrants among black suspects made blacks vulnerable to drug arrests
during investigative stops.
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RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Like all research, this dissertation addressed some research gaps but has also
generated more questions for future research. One limitation of the quantitative
component was the inability to portion drug arrests by drug type (e.g. marijuana versus
hard drugs). It is possible that officers differentially enforce certain drugs. Relatedly,
marijuana use was underrepresented in the analysis since the proxy for drug
involvement—the drug death rate—better captured the use of hard drugs (i.e. heroin,
cocaine, and methamphetamine). Although whites are disproportionately involved in hard
drugs, marijuana might be a drug of choice for black drug users (Mitchell and Lynch
2011). As such, future research should better distinguish drug types when examining
racial disparities in drug arrests and drug involvement. Because of the richness of the
qualitative data and officers’ descriptions of the seized drugs in every incident, in future
studies, I plan to code the types of drugs in those arrests and conduct quantitative
analyses.
In some ways, St. Louis is similar to other cities in regards to its notable racial
disparities in drug arrests and history of racism and interracial tensions. Yet, the
conditions of St. Louis are more pronounced and enduring than those in many cities, as it
is one of the most racially segregated, economically disadvantaged, crime-prone cities in
the U.S. I hypothesize that racial composition will be significantly related to racial
disparities in drug arrests in other jurisdictions too. Racial disparities throughout the U.S.
are too pervasive to be due to drug involvement or solely race neutral factors, such as
variations in crime or social disorganization. Indeed, there is no state where the white
drug arrest rate exceeds the rate for blacks (Mitchell and Lynch 2011, 144–145), and the
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theme of this dissertation and extant research is that race trumps drug involvement and
contextual factors. However, because race is likely more salient to residents and officers
in racially-segregated places, the magnitude of racial composition might be weaker in
less segregated places, and the nature of the relationship might differ. For example, the
finding of racial incongruity in this dissertation might be characteristic of racially
segregated places like New York City (Novak and Chamlin 2012) and St. Louis (Brunson
and Weitzer 2009; Rojek, Rosenfeld, and Decker 2012). Future studies should replicate
analyses from this dissertation in both racially-segregated and racially heterogeneous
places to assess whether the same explanations hold.
Another defining feature of St. Louis is its lack of racial and ethnic diversity,
which precluded the study of Hispanics whom are also overrepresented as drug arrestees
(Ghandnoosh 2015; Mitchell and Caudy 2013; 2015). Although this dissertation informs
black-white racial disparities in drug arrests, which are larger than those between other
racial/ethnic groups, criminology would benefit from more research that examines how
neighborhood context influences drug arrest disparities between other racial/ethnic
groups.
Additionally, this dissertation found evidence of differential scrutiny theory
although it cannot explain the racial disparity problem. The secondary tenet of
differential scrutiny theory is the notion that drug dealing occurs more openly in black
neighborhoods than in white neighborhoods, which is why black drug offenders should
be at greatest risk for police scrutiny. Yet, this hypothesis is more consistent with drug
selling, which comprises only a minority of all drug arrests. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of fully considering the theory and understanding racial disparities in drug
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arrests, it might be worthwhile to examine this notion of differences in visibility of both
drug use and drug distribution across racialized neighborhoods. This topic could be
explored in future qualitative analyses of the police narratives in this dissertation.
While this dissertation found the strongest support for racially-biased policing
theory, its findings did not fully comport with the racial threat hypotheses. This was
because racial threat perspectives focus exclusively on social control against blacks and
are silent about social control against whites, whether it is more lenient or varies under
certain conditions. Yet, white underrepresentation and white privilege add to the racial
gap as much as, if not more than, black overrepresentation. The minimal focus on white
places and white people is characteristic of broader criminological research and leaves
more to be learned about the relationship between race, neighborhoods, and social
control.
The qualitative data in this dissertation provide opportunities to address questions
ripe for future qualitative and quantitative studies. Given the importance of both
neighborhood context and individual-level factors (see Mitchell and Caudy 2013; 2015),
a fuller analysis of the racial disparity problem would account for factors at both levels of
analysis. The drug arrest reports from the qualitative component can be converted into an
incident-level, quantitative dataset for multilevel analyses that simultaneously account for
neighborhood characteristics and incident-level factors, such as the pathways to drug
arrests, arrestee characteristics, and officer characteristics. Moreover, further qualitative
analyses of the pathways to drug arrests can be examined across officer race.
Understanding drug enforcement by officer race has important policy implications
because a common recommendation is to hire more officers of color in order to allay
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problems between the police and communities of color. Examining whether drug
enforcement varies by officer race can be fruitful for informing the need for such policy.
POLICY AND PRACTICE IMPLICATIONS
Findings from this dissertation have important implications for policy and practice
that point to the need for social change and police reform. As the qualitative component
showed, drug enforcement is largely a byproduct of efforts to control serious crime, like
violence, and disorder rather than concerted drug disruptive practices. Violence and
social disorganization shape police behavior and decision making. One way to reduce
racial disparities in drug arrests is to minimize the factors that attract police to
disadvantaged neighborhoods in the first place. Social ills, such as concentrated
economic disadvantage, physical decay, and racial segregation, foster violence and
disorder, and subsequently, police scrutiny. Reducing social disorganization requires
strengthening social institutions and increasing investments in impoverished
neighborhoods.
Minimizing social ills also requires dismantling the ideologies and systems of
white supremacy and racial oppression that undergird them. Since the origins of the U.S.,
these racist ideologies have been instituted into laws, policies, and practices that have
created vicious cycles of racial and social inequities and given rise to social problems like
racial disparities in drug arrests. Akin to the racialized drug wars throughout the 1800s
and 1900s, the drug war in the 1980s suppressed racial and ethnic groups of color
(Provine 2007), and it contributed to the present-day disparity problem. Explicit,
deliberate relegation of blacks to dilapidated neighborhoods, as discussed in Chapter 3, is
another example of how present-day social ills were manufactured based on racism. It is
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no coincidence that racial disparities exist in virtually every American institution: the
housing market, educational system, healthcare, job market, and family disruption, to
name a few. Many of these factors perpetuate crime and criminal justice contact and
reinforce inequality and negative stereotypes. Eradicating racism, racial discrimination,
economic disadvantage, and social ills promotes equality and reductions in social
problems, but it is no small feat. Needless to say, doing so requires substantial social
reform that will not occur overnight.
A more immediate policy solution lies in police reform. First, citizens, police
departments, and governments at all levels must decide what the crime priority should be
and assess the degree to which criminal justice control is an effective strategy for dealing
with drug problems. If the priority is really combating drug problems via arrests, then
police should concentrate more on the drug problems in white communities and
disrupting those hidden drug markets. However, the inadvertent nature of drug
enforcement denotes that drug crimes are a secondary concern to enforcement efforts.
Therefore, alternative responses to drug problems are needed.
By law, officers are required to make an arrest when discovering drugs, which
means that laws restrict options for responding to drug problem. The local government
should work to give the police alternatives to arrests for drug activity, especially drug
possession, such as diversion to drug treatment or confiscation of drugs in lieu of arrests.
These laws should be carefully crafted and specify the circumstances under which
officers should resort to alternatives versus arrests. Alternatives to drug arrests require
support from the public and local legislatures as well as resources for drug treatment and
collaboration with treatment providers in the community. Additionally, decriminalizing
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certain drugs can reduce drug arrests. In fact, in 2013—at the end of this dissertation’s
study period—St. Louis decriminalized possession of marijuana in small amounts, now
making it an ordinance violation. Citizens possessing up to 35 grams of marijuana can be
fined between $100 and $500 in lieu of arrest.
Alternatives to drug arrests can be beneficial for many reasons, and
decriminalizing marijuana is a step in the right direction. But simply reducing the volume
of drug arrests or decriminalizing certain drugs may not be enough to reduce racial
disparities in drug arrests. Giving officers more discretionary options might provide more
opportunities for racial disparities to pervade. For example, in 2009, Massachusetts
decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana (Matthews 2013). Overall
marijuana arrests decreased from roughly 8,500 in 2008 to roughly 1,500 in 2009, but the
racial disparity among marijuana arrests did not decrease; the black-to-white arrest rate
disparity increased from 3.4 in 2008 to 5.4 in 2009 and 3.8 in 2010 (Matthews 2013).
Therefore, reducing racial bias in policing and improving officer decision making might
yield more equitable policing.
Efforts to produce more equitable policing should stem from police agencies that
set organizational missions and philosophies. Police organizations must develop a culture
of intolerance for racially-biased policing. This culture can be developed first through
awareness of the problem—and the sources of the problem—via timely, sound research.
Such research requires collaboration and cooperation between criminological researchers
and police agencies. In addition to research, more transparency and accountability are
needed, such as routinely monitoring racial disparities, informing stakeholders (including
the public), and taking steps to reduce racial profiling.
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Another way to foster a culture of intolerance for racially-biased policing is for
agencies to acknowledge racial profiling and recognize that it constitutes a serious
problem. Some officers deny that racial profiling even exists (Vera Sanchez and
Rosenbaum 2011), despite a substantial amount of research that concludes otherwise.
Data analysts in Charlotte, North Carolina, for example, uncovered that CharlotteMecklenburg police (CMPD) arrested blacks in possession of less than a half-ounce of
marijuana at a rate three times the rate of whites (Harrison 2016). CMPD Chief Kerr
Putney declined requests to be interviewed about this issue but expressed in a written
statement that “disproportionality does not always equate to discrimination” (Harrison
2016). While this logic is certainly true under some circumstances, it is unsupported in
the context of traffic enforcement (Novak and Chamlin 2012; Rojek, Rosenfeld, and
Decker 2012; Rosenfeld, Rojek, and Decker 2012) and drug enforcement.
Denial of racial profiling among police demonstrates either their outright
dismissal of the problem or their ignorance about what racial profiling constitutes and
how their actions (e.g. excessive use of investigatory stops of blacks, targeting citizens
whose race is incongruent with the racial context, stopping citizens based on
neighborhood characteristics) translate into racially-biased policing. This calls for the
need for training on racial biases for officers at all levels of the police organization.
Trainings should focus on improving cultural competence and helping officers become
aware of their own biases, implicit or otherwise, that might shape their behavior. Police
training on racial bias will likely require collaborations with professionals, such as social
psychologists, who are qualified to lead such trainings. In addition to racial bias training,
findings from the qualitative component, and the larger policing literature, suggest that
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officers’ excessive use of investigatory stops of black citizens needs to cease. In many
cases, blacks are stopped, and subsequently searched, based on trivial justifications and
unreasonable suspicions.
I conclude by noting that police agencies are confronted with the paradox of
policing communities of color. On one hand, communities of color have high crime rates
and requests for police services. Certainly, residents in communities of color want police
to control crime in their neighborhoods, but how officers control crime seems to be the
point of disjuncture. The aggressive policing practices in communities of color widen the
net for negative police encounters and dissatisfied citizens and likely contribute to the
racial disparity in drug arrests. Policy-relevant research that incorporates the voices of
citizens and the police is needed to develop concrete steps to help police organizations
balance the goals of effective crime control and racially-equitable policing.

173

References
99th Congress. 1986. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, H.R. 5484, 99th Congress.
100th Congress. 1988. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, H.R. 5210, 100th Congress.
103rd Congress. 1994. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.
104th Congress. 1996. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996.
ACLU Foundation of Massachusetts. 2014. “Black, Brown and Targeted: A Report on
Boston Police Department Street Encounters from 2007–2010.” Boston, MA:
American Civil Liberties Union.
https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/images/education/stopandfrisk/black_brown
_and_targeted_online.pdf.
Alexander, Michelle. 2010. The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness. New York : [Jackson, Tenn.]: New Press ; Distributed by Perseus
Distribution.
Anderson, Elijah. 1999. Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the
Inner City. New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company.
Barnes, Harper. 2008. Never Been a Time: The 1917 Race Riot That Sparked the Civil
Rights Movement. First Edition. New York: Walker Books.
Bass, Sandra. 2001. “Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and
Police Discretionary Decisions.” Social Justice 28 (1): 156–76.
Baum, Dan. (2016). Legalize It All: How to Win the War on Drugs. Harper’s Magazine.
https://harpers.org/archive/2016/04/legalize-it-all/.
Baumer, Eric. 1994. “Poverty, Crack, and Crime: A Cross-City Analysis.” Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency 31 (3): 311–27.
doi:10.1177/0022427894031003004.
Baumer, Eric, Janet L. Lauritsen, Richard Rosenfeld, and Richard Wright. 1998. “The
Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery, Burglary, and Homicide Rates: A CrossCity, Longitudinal Analysis.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 35
(3): 316–40. doi:10.1177/0022427898035003004.
Beckett, Katherine. 2012. “Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement.” Criminology & Public
Policy 11 (4): 641–53. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2012.00844.x.
Beckett, Katherine, Kris Nyrop, and Lori Pfingst. 2006. “Race, Drugs, and Policing:
Understanding Disparities in Drug Delivery Arrests.” Criminology 44 (1): 105–
37. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2006.00044.x.
Beckett, Nyrop, Pfingst, and Melissa Bowen. 2005. “Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests,
and the Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle.” Social Problems 52 (3): 419–41.
doi:10.1525/sp.2005.52.3.419.
Black, Donald. 2010. The Behavior of Law. Emerald Group Publishing.
Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations. New York:
Wiley.
Blumstein, Alfred. 1982. “On the Racial Disproportionality of United States’ Prison
Populations.” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 73: 1259.

174

———. 1993. “Making Rationality Relevant: The American Society of Criminology
1992 Presidential Address.” Criminology 31 (1): 1–16. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.1993.tb01119.x.
Bobo, Lawrence, and James Kluegel. 1997. “Status, Ideology, and Dimensions of
Whites’ Racial Beliefs and Attitudes: Progress and Stagnation.” In Racial
Attitudes in the 1990s: Continuity and Change, edited by Steven A. Tuch and
Jack K. Martin. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Bowers, Kate J., Shane D. Johnson, and Alex F. G. Hirschfield. 2004. “Closing Off
Opportunities for Crime: An Evaluation of Alley-Gating.” European Journal on
Criminal Policy and Research 10 (4): 285–308. doi:10.1007/s10610-005-5502-0.
Braga, Anthony A., David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle,
William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski. 1999. “Problem-Oriented Policing in
Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment.” Criminology 37
(3): 541–80. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1999.tb00496.x.
Braman, Donald. 2004. Doing Time on the Outside: Incarceration and Family Life in
Urban America. University of Michigan Press.
Brunson, Rod K. 2007. “‘Police Don’t Like Black People’: African-American Young
Men’s Accumulated Police Experiences.” Criminology & Public Policy 6 (1): 71–
101. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00423.x.
Brunson, Rod K., and Jody Miller. 2006. “Gender, Race, and Urban Policing: The
Experience of African American Youths.” Gender and Society 20 (4): 531–52.
Brunson, Rod K., and Ronald Weitzer. 2009. “Police Relations with Black and White
Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods.” Urban Affairs Review 44 (6): 858–
85. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1078087408326973.
Burston, Betty Watson, Dionne Jones, and Pat Roberson-Saunders. 1995. “Drug Use and
African Americans: Myth versus Reality.” Journal of Alcohol & Drug Education
40 (2): 19–39.
Carlson, Bonnie E., and Neil Cervera. 1992. Inmates and Their Wives: Incarceration and
Family Life. Greenwood Publishing Group, Incorporated.
Carson, E. Ann, and Daniela Golinelli. 2013. “Prisoners in 2012: Trends in Admissions
and Releases, 1991–2012.” U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs
Bureau of Justice Statistics. http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf.
Chamberlain, Kerry. 1999. “Using Grounded Theory in Health Psychology: Practices,
Premises, and Potential.” In Qualitative Health Psychology: Theories and
Methods, edited by Michael Murray and Kerry Chamberlain, 183–201. SAGE.
Chamlin, Mitchell B., and Allen E. Liska. 1992. “Social Structure and Crime Control
Revisited: The Declining Significance of Intergroup Threat.” In Social Threat and
Social Control, edited by Allen E. Liska, 103–12. SUNY Series in Deviance and
Social Control. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Chamlin, Mitchell B. 1987. “General Assistance Among Cities: An Examination of the
Need, Economic Threat, and Benign Neglect Hypotheses.” Social Science
Quarterly (University of Texas Press) 68 (4): 834–46.
Charmaz, Kathy. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide through
Qualitative Analysis. 1 edition. SAGE Publications Ltd.

175

Chiricos, Ted, Ranee McEntire, and Marc Gertz. 2001. “Perceived Racial and Ethnic
Composition of Neighborhood and Perceived Risk of Crime.” Social Problems 48
(3): 322–40. doi:10.1525/sp.2001.48.3.322.
Clear, Todd R. 2007. Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes
Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse. Studies in Crime and Public Policy.
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Coe, Charles K., and Deborah Lamm Wiesel. 2001. “Police Budgeting: Winning
Strategies.” Public Administration Review 61 (6): 718–27. doi:10.1111/00333352.00142.
Coker, Donna. 2003. “Foreword: Addressing the Real World of Racial Injustice in the
Criminal Justice System.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-)
93 (4): 827–80. doi:10.2307/3491312.
Comfort, Megan. 2009. Doing Time Together: Love and Family in the Shadow of the
Prison. University of Chicago Press.
Corbin, Juliet, and Anselm Strauss. 2007. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques
and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. 3rd edition. SAGE
Publications, Inc.
Cordner, Gary W. 1979. “Police Patrol Work Load Studies: A Review and Critique.”
Police Studies: The International Review of Police Development 2: 50.
Correll, Joshua, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, and Bernd Wittenbrink. 2002. “The
Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially
Threatening Individuals.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (6):
1314–29. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.83.6.1314.
Currie, Elliott. 1993. Reckoning: Drugs, the Cities, and the American Future. 1st ed. New
York: Hill and Wang.
Dunlap, Eloise, Bruce D. Johnson, and Ali Manwar. 1997. “A Successful Female Crack
Dealer: Case Study of a Deviant Career.” In Drugs, Crime, & Justice:
Contemporary Perspectives, edited by Larry K. Gaines and Peter B. Kraska, 205–
26. Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Pr Inc.
Duster, Troy. 1997. “Pattern, Purpose and Race in the Drug War.” In Crack in America
Demon Drugs and Social Justice, edited by Craig Reinarman and Harry Gene
Levine. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Eberhardt, Jennifer L., Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie, and Paul G. Davies. 2004.
“Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing.” Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 87 (6): 876–93. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.87.6.876.
Eith, Christine, and Matthew R. Durose. 2011. “Contacts between Police and the Public,
2008.” Special Report NCJ 234599. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics.
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpp08.pdf.
Elliott, Delbert S., and Suzanne S. Ageton. 1980. “Reconciling Race and Class
Differences in Self-Reported and Official Estimates of Delinquency.” American
Sociological Review 45 (1): 95–110. doi:10.2307/2095245.
Engel, Robin S., Michael R. Smith, and Francis T. Cullen. 2012. “Race, Place, and Drug
Enforcement.” Criminology & Public Policy 11 (4): 603–35. doi:10.1111/j.17459133.2012.00841.x.

176

Epp, Charles R., Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald P. Haider-Markel. 2014. Pulled
over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship. The Chicago Series in Law
and Society. Chicago ; London: The University of Chicago Press.
Fagan, Jeffrey, and Garth Davies. 2000. “Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race
and Disorder in New York City.” Fordham Urban Law Journal XXVIII, 457–504.
Felson, Marcus. 1987. “Routine Activities and Crime Prevention in the Developing
Metropolis.” Criminology 25 (4): 911–32. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.1987.tb00825.x.
Finkelman, Paul. 1996. “Dred Scott Case, Slavery and the Politics of Law, The.”
Hamline Law Review 20: 1.
Floyd et Al v. City of New York. 2013. Vol. 1:08– cv-01034-SAS-HBP.
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/750446/stop-and-friskmemoranda.pdf.
Fridell, Lorie A. 2008. “Racially Biased Policing: The Law Enforcement Response to the
Implicit Black-Crime Association.” In Racial Divide: Racial and Ethnic Bias in
the Criminal Justice System, edited by Michael J. Lynch, E. Britt Patterson, and
Kristina K. Childs, 39–59. Monsey, N.Y: Criminal Justice Press.
Galea, Sandro, Jennifer Ahern, Ken Tardiff, Andy Leon, Phillip O. Coffin, Karen Derr,
and David Vlahov. 2003. “Racial/ethnic Disparities in Overdose Mortality Trends
in New York City, 1990–1998.” Journal of Urban Health : Bulletin of the New
York Academy of Medicine 80 (2): 201–11. doi:10.1093/jurban/jtg023.
Gaston, Shytierra. 2016. “The Long-Term Effects of Parental Incarceration Does Parental
Incarceration in Childhood or Adolescence Predict Depressive Symptoms in
Adulthood?” Criminal Justice and Behavior, March, 0093854816628905.
doi:10.1177/0093854816628905.
Gau, Jacinta M., and Rod K. Brunson. 2010. “Procedural Justice and Order Maintenance
Policing: A Study of Inner‐City Young Men’s Perceptions of Police Legitimacy.”
Justice Quarterly 27 (2): 255–79. doi:10.1080/07418820902763889.
———. 2015. “Procedural Injustice, Lost Legitimacy, and Self-Help Young Males’
Adaptations to Perceived Unfairness in Urban Policing Tactics.” Journal of
Contemporary Criminal Justice 31 (2): 132–50. doi:10.1177/1043986214568841.
Ghandnoosh, Nazgol. 2015. “Black Lives Matter: Eliminating Racial Inequity in The
Criminal Justice System.” Washington, D.C.: The Sentencing Project.
Gillespie, Mark. 1999. “One Third of Americans Believe Police Brutality Exists in Their
Area.” Religion and Social Trends. Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/4003/onethird-americans-believe-police-brutality-exists-their-area.aspx.
Gladwell, Malcolm. 2007. Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking. Little,
Brown.
Golub, Andrew, Bruce D. Johnson, and Eloise Dunlap. 2007. “The Race/Ethnicity
Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City.” Criminology &
Public Policy 6 (1): 131–64. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00426.x.
Goode, Erich. 2002. “Drug Arrests at the Millennium.” Society 39 (5): 41–45.
doi:10.1007/BF02717543.
Gordon, Colin. 2009. Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

177

Grant, Peter R., and John G. Holmes. 1981. “The Integration of Implicit Personality
Theory Schemas and Stereotype Images.” Social Psychology Quarterly 44 (2):
107–15. doi:10.2307/3033706.
Green, Donald P., Dara Z. Strolovitch, and Janelle S. Wong. 1998. “Defended
Neighborhoods, Integration, and Racially Motivated Crime.” American Journal of
Sociology 104 (2): 372–403. doi:10.1086/210042.
Greene, William H. 2011. Econometric Analysis. 7 edition. Boston: Prentice Hall.
Greenwald, Anthony G., Mark A. Oakes, and Hunter G. Hoffman. 2003. “Targets of
Discrimination: Effects of Race on Responses to Weapons Holders.” Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology 39 (4): 399–405. doi:10.1016/S00221031(03)00020-9.
Hagan, John. 1994. Crime and Disrepute. Sociology for a New Century. Thousand Oaks
[Calif.]: Pine Forge Press.
Harrison, Steve. 2016. “For Small Amounts of Marijuana, Blacks Are Far More Likely
than Whites to Go to Jail in Charlotte.” Charlotteobserver, February 12.
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article60170981.html.
Hawkins, D. F. 1987. “Beyond Anomalies: Rethinking the Conflict Perspective on Race
and Criminal Punishment.” Social Forces 65 (3): 719–45.
doi:10.1093/sf/65.3.719.
Holzer, Harry J., Steven Raphael, and Michael A. Stoll. 2004. “Will Employers Hire
Former Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their
Determinants.” In Imprisoning America: The Social Effects of Mass
Incarceration, edited by Mary E. Pattillo, David F. Weiman, and Bruce Western,
205–43. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Huizinga, David, Rolf Loeber, and Terence P. Thornberry. 1994. “Urban Delinquency
and Substance Abuse: Initial Findings.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention.
Human Rights Watch. 2008. “Targeting Blacks: Drug Law Enforcement and Race in the
United States.” Human Rights Watch.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0508_1.pdf.
———. 2009. “Decades of Disparity: Drug Arrests and Race in the United States.”
Human Rights Watch.
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0309web_1.pdf.
Ivanov, Robert Fedorovich. 1985. Blacks in United States History. Moscow: Progress
Publishers.
Jackson, Pamela Irving, and Leo Carroll. 1981. “Race and the War on Crime: The
Sociopolitical Determinants of Municipal Police Expenditures in 90 NonSouthern U.S. Cities.” American Sociological Review 46 (3): 290–305.
doi:10.2307/2095061.
Johnston, Lloyd D., Patrick M. O’Malley, Jerald G. Bachman, and John E. Schulenberg.
2011. Demographic Subgroup Trends for Various Licit and Illicit Drugs, 19752010. Monitoring the Future Occasional Paper Series. Paper 74. Ann Arbor,
Michigan: Institute for Social Research. http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED529136.

178

Jonathan-Zamir, Tal, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and Shomron Moyal. 2013. “Measuring
Procedural Justice in Police-Citizen Encounters.” Justice Quarterly 0 (0): 1–27.
doi:10.1080/07418825.2013.845677.
Jones-Brown, Delores. 2007. “Forever the Symbolic Assailant: The More Things
Change, the More They Remain the Same.” Criminology & Public Policy 6 (1):
103–21. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2007.00424.x.
Jones, Christopher M., Joseph Logan, Matthew Gladden, and Michele Bohm. 2015.
“Vital Signs: Demographic and Substance Use Trends Among Heroin Users —
United States, 2002–2013.” 64(26). Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report.
Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6426a3.htm.
Katz, Jack. 1988. Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil.
Basic Books.
Klinger, David A. 1997. “Negotiating Order in Patrol Work: An Ecological Theory of
Police Response to Deviance.” Criminology 35 (2): 277–306. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.1997.tb00877.x.
Klinger, David A., and George S. Bridges. 1997. “Measurement Error in Calls-forService as an Indicator of Crime.” Criminology 35 (4): 705–26.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1997.tb01236.x.
Kornhauser, Ruth Rosner. 1978. Social Sources of Delinquency: An Appraisal of Analytic
Models. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Krivo, Lauren J., and Ruth D. Peterson. 1996. “Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods
and Urban Crime.” Social Forces 75 (2): 619–48. doi:10.2307/2580416.
Kubrin, Charis E., and Ronald Weitzer. 2003. “New Directions in Social Disorganization
Theory.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40 (4): 374–402.
doi:10.1177/0022427803256238.
Langan, Patrick A. 1985. “Racism on Trial: New Evidence to Explain the Racial
Composition of Prisons in the United States.” The Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology (1973-) 76 (3): 666–83. doi:10.2307/1143517.
Lang, Clarence. 2009. Grassroots at the Gateway: Class Politics and Black Freedom
Struggle in St. Louis, 1936-75. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan
Press.
Langton, Lynn, and Matthew Durose. 2013. “Police Behavior during Traffic and Street
Stops, 2011.” Special Report NCJ 242937. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Justice. Office of Justice Programs. Bureau of Justice Statistics.
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf.
Lauritsen, Janet L. 2010. “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Juvenile Offending.” In Our
Children, Their Children: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Differences in American
Juvenile Justice, edited by Darnell F. Hawkins and Kimberly Kempf-Leonard,
83–104. University of Chicago Press.
Leonard, V. A. 1982. Police Organization and Management. 6th ed. Police Science
Series. Mineola, N.Y: Foundation Press.
Liebow, Elliot. 2003. Tally’s Corner: A Study of Negro Streetcorner Men. Lanham, Md:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

179

Liska, Allen E., ed. 1992. Social Threat and Social Control. SUNY Series in Deviance
and Social Control. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Liska, Allen E., and Mitchell B. Chamlin. 1984. “Social Structure and Crime Control
Among Macrosocial Units.” American Journal of Sociology 90 (2): 383–95.
Liska, Allen E., Joseph J. Lawrence, and Michael Benson. 1981. “Perspectives on the
Legal Order: The Capacity for Social Control.” American Journal of Sociology 87
(2): 413–26.
Logan, John R., and Steven F. Messner. 1987. “Racial Residential Segregation and
Suburban Violent Crime.” Social Science Quarterly (University of Texas Press)
68 (3): 510–27.
Loury, Glenn C. 2002. The Anatomy of Racial Inequality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Lum, Cynthia. 2011. “The Influence of Places on Police Decision Pathways: From Call
for Service to Arrest.” Justice Quarterly 28 (4): 631–65.
doi:10.1080/07418825.2010.526130.
Lynch, Michael J., and E. Britt Patterson. 1996. Justice with Prejudice: Race and
Criminal Justice in America. Harrow and Heston.
Lyons, Christopher J. 2007. “Community (Dis)Organization and Racially Motivated
Crime.” American Journal of Sociology 113 (3): 815–63. doi:10.1086/521846.
Marans, Daniel. 2016. “Why Missouri Has Become The Heart Of Racial Tension In
America.” The Huffington Post. Accessed March 8.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-mizzou-missouri-racialtension_us_564736e2e4b08cda3488f34d.
Martínez, Ramiro, Richard Rosenfeld, and Dennis Mares. 2008. “Social Disorganization,
Drug Market Activity, and Neighborhood Violent Crime.” Urban Affairs Review
43 (6): 846–74. doi:10.1177/1078087408314774.
Massey, Douglas S., Gretchen A. Condran, and Nancy A. Denton. 1987. “The Effect of
Residential Segregation on Black Social and Economic Well- Being.” Social
Forces 66 (1): 29–56. doi:10.2307/2578899.
Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1989. “Hypersegregation in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas: Black and Hispanic Segregation Along Five Dimensions.”
Demography 26 (3): 373–91. doi:10.2307/2061599.
Mastrofski, Stephen D., Michael D. Reisig, and John D. McCluskey. 2002. “Police
Disrespect Toward the Public: An Encounter-Based Analysis.” Criminology 40
(3): 519–52. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2002.tb00965.x.
Mastrofski, Stephen D., Jeffrey B. Snipes, and Anne E. Supina. 1996. “Compliance on
Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests.” Journal of
Research in Crime and Delinquency 33 (3): 269–305.
doi:10.1177/0022427896033003001.
Matthews, Dylan. 2013. “The Black/white Marijuana Arrest Gap, in Nine Charts.” The
Washington Post, June 4.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/06/04/the-blackwhitemarijuana-arrest-gap-in-nine-charts/.
Maxfield, Michael G., and Earl R. Babbie. 2011. Basics of Research Methods for
Criminal Justice and Criminology. 3rd edition. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning.

180

McCarthy, Belinda R. 1991. “Social Structure, Crime, and Social Control: An
Examination of Factors Influencing Rates and Probabilities of Arrest.” Journal of
Criminal Justice 19 (1): 19–29. doi:10.1016/0047-2352(91)90080-F.
Miller, Jerome G. 1996. Search and Destroy: African-American Males in the Criminal
Justice System. Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mitchell, Ojmarrh. 2009. “Is the War on Drugs Racially Biased?” Journal of Crime and
Justice 32 (2): 49–75. doi:10.1080/0735648X.2009.9721270.
Mitchell, Ojmarrh, and Michael S. Caudy. 2013. “Examining Racial Disparities in Drug
Arrests.” Justice Quarterly 0 (0): 1–26. doi:10.1080/07418825.2012.761721.
———. 2015. “Race Differences in Drug Offending and Drug Distribution Arrests.”
Crime & Delinquency, January, 0011128714568427.
doi:10.1177/0011128714568427.
Mitchell, Ojmarrh, and Michael J. Lynch. 2011. “Criminal Justice, Race and the War on
Drugs.” In Disproportionate Minority Contact, edited by Nicolle Parsons-Pollard,
139–55. Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press.
Mosher, Clayton. 2001. “Predicting Drug Arrest Rates: Conflict and Social
Disorganization Perspectives.” Crime & Delinquency 47 (1): 84–104.
doi:10.1177/0011128701047001004.
Myers, Martha A. 1990. “Black Threat and Incarceration in Postbellum Georgia.” Social
Forces 69 (2): 373–93. doi:10.2307/2579664.
Noseworthy, Cathryn M., and Albert J. Lott. 1984. “The Cognitive Organization of
Gender-Stereotypic Categories.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 10
(3): 474–81. doi:10.1177/0146167284103016.
Novak, Kenneth J., and Mitchell B. Chamlin. 2012. “Racial Threat, Suspicion, and Police
Behavior The Impact of Race and Place in Traffic Enforcement.” Crime &
Delinquency 58 (2): 275–300. doi:10.1177/0011128708322943.
Office of National Drug Control Policy. 1989. “National Drug Control Strategy.”
Washington, D.C.: Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Osgood, D. Wayne. 2000. “Poisson-Based Regression Analysis of Aggregate Crime
Rates.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 16 (1): 21–43.
doi:10.1023/A:1007521427059.
Ousey, Graham C. 1999. “Homicide, Structural Factors, and the Racial Invariance
Assumption.” Criminology 37 (2): 405–26. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.1999.tb00491.x.
Ousey, Graham C., and Matthew R. Lee. 2004. “Investigating the Connections Between
Race, Illicit Drug Markets, and Lethal Violence, 1984-1997.” Journal of Research
in Crime and Delinquency 41 (4): 352–83. doi:10.1177/0022427803262059.
———. 2008. “Racial Disparity in Formal Social Control An Investigation of Alternative
Explanations of Arrest Rate Inequality.” Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 45 (3): 322–55. doi:10.1177/0022427808317575.
Pager, Devah. 2007. Marked: Race, Crime, and Finding Work in an Era of Mass
Incarceration. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Parker, Karen F., and Scott R. Maggard. 2005. “Structural Theories and Race-Specific
Drug Arrests: What Structural Factors Account for the Rise in Race-Specific

181

Drug Arrests Over Time?” Crime & Delinquency 51 (4): 521–47.
doi:10.1177/0011128705276294.
Parker, Karen F., Brian J. Stults, and Stephen K. Rice. 2005. “Racial Threat,
Concentrated Disadvantage and Social Control: Considering the Macro-Level
Sources of Variation in Arrests.” Criminology 43 (4): 1111–34.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2005.00034.x.
Payne, B. Keith. 2001. “Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 81 (2): 181–92. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.2.181.
Peterson, Ruth D., and Lauren J. Krivo. 1993. “Racial Segregation and Black Urban
Homicide.” Social Forces 71 (4): 1001–26. doi:10.2307/2580128.
Petrocelli, Matthew, Alex R Piquero, and Michael R Smith. 2003. “Conflict Theory and
Racial Profiling: An Empirical Analysis of Police Traffic Stop Data.” Journal of
Criminal Justice 31 (1): 1–11. doi:10.1016/S0047-2352(02)00195-2.
Pettit, Becky, and Bruce Western. 2004. “Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race
and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration.” American Sociological Review 69 (2):
151–69.
Podsakoff, Philip M., Scott B. MacKenzie, Jeong-Yeon Lee, and Nathan P. Podsakoff.
2003. “Common Method Biases in Behavioral Research: A Critical Review of the
Literature and Recommended Remedies.” Journal of Applied Psychology 88 (5):
879–903. doi:10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879.
Provine, Doris Marie. 2007. Unequal under Law : Race in the War on Drugs /. Chicago :
University of Chicago Press,.
Quillian, Lincoln, and Devah Pager. 2001. “Black Neighbors, Higher Crime? The Role of
Racial Stereotypes in Evaluations of Neighborhood Crime.” American Journal of
Sociology 107 (3): 717–67. doi:10.1086/ajs.2001.107.issue-3.
Ramchand, Rajeev, Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, and Martin Y Iguchi. 2006. “Racial
Differences in Marijuana-Users’ Risk of Arrest in the United States.” Drug and
Alcohol Dependence 84 (3): 264–72. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2006.02.010.
Rastogi, Sonya, Tallese D. Johnson, Elizabeth M. Hoeffel, and Malcolm P. Drewery, Jr.
2011. “The Black Population: 2010.” United States Census Bureau.
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf.
Reeves, Jimmie Lynn, and Richard Campbell. 1994. Cracked Coverage: Television
News, the Anti-Cocaine Crusade, and the Reagan Legacy. Durham: Duke
University Press.
Reichel, Philip L. 1988. “Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type.”
American Journal of Police 7: 51.
Reinarman, Craig, and Harry Gene Levine. 1997. “The Crack Attack: Politics and Media
in the Crack Scare.” In Crack in America Demon Drugs and Social Justice, edited
by Craig Reinarman and Harry Gene Levine, 18–51. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press.
Reisig, Michael D., John D. McCluskey, Stephen D. Mastrofski, and William Terrill.
2004. “Suspect Disrespect toward the Police.” Justice Quarterly 21 (2): 241–68.
doi:10.1080/07418820400095801.

182

Reitzel, John David. 2011. “Race, Crime and Policing: The Impact of Law Enforcement
on Persistent Race-Differentiated Arrest Rates.” In Disproportionate Minority
Contact, edited by Nicolle Parsons-Pollard, 159–83. Durham, North Carolina:
Carolina Academic Press.
Riley, K. Jack. 1997. “Crack, Powder Cocaine, and Heroin: Drug Purchase and Use
Patterns in Six U.S. Cities.” Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice and
Office of National Drug Control Policy.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167265.pdf.
Rojek, Jeff, Richard Rosenfeld, and Scott Decker. 2012. “Policing Race: The Racial
Stratification of Searches in Police Traffic Stops.” Criminology 50 (4): 993–1024.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2012.00285.x.
Rose, Dina R., and Todd R. Clear. 1998. “Incarceration, Social Capital, and Crime:
Implications for Social Disorganization Theory.” Criminology 36 (3): 441–80.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1998.tb01255.x.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Michael J. Deckard, and Emily Blackburn. 2014. “The Effects of
Directed Patrol and Self-Initiated Enforcement on Firearm Violence: A
Randomized Controlled Study of Hot Spot Policing.” Criminology 52 (3): 428–
49. doi:10.1111/1745-9125.12043.
Rosenfeld, Richard, Jeff Rojek, and Scott Decker. 2012. “Age Matters Race Differences
in Police Searches of Young and Older Male Drivers.” Journal of Research in
Crime and Delinquency 49 (1): 31–55. doi:10.1177/0022427810397951.
SAMHSA. 1998. “Risk and Protective Factors for Adolescent Drug Use: Findings from
the 1997 National Household Survey of Drug Abuse.” Office of Applied Studies,
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.
———. 2013. “Drug Abuse Warning Network, 2011: National Estimates of DrugRelated Emergency Department Visits: HHS Publication No. (SMA) 13-4760,
DAWN Series D-39.” Rockville, MD: U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. Center for
Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality.
http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/DAWN2k11ED/DAWN2k11ED/D
AWN2k11ED.pdf.
Sampson, Robert J. 1997. “Collective Regulation of Adolescent Misbehavior Validation
Results from Eighty Chicago Neighborhoods.” Journal of Adolescent Research 12
(2): 227–44. doi:10.1177/0743554897122005.
Sampson, Robert J., and Janet L. Lauritsen. 1997. “Racial and Ethnic Disparities in
Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States.” Crime and Justice 21: 311–74.
Sampson, Robert J., Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Thomas Gannon-Rowley. 2002.
“Assessing ‘Neighborhood Effects’: Social Processes and New Directions in
Research.” Annual Review of Sociology 28 (January): 443–78.
Sampson, Robert J., and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2004. “Seeing Disorder:
Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows.’” Social
Psychology Quarterly 67 (4): 319–42. doi:10.1177/019027250406700401.
Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. 1997. “Neighborhoods
and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy.” Science 277
(5328): 918–24. doi:10.1126/science.277.5328.918.

183

Sampson, Robert J., and William J Wilson. 1995. “Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and
Urban Inequality.” In Crime and Inequality, edited by John Hagan and Ruth D.
Peterson, 37–56. Standford, CA: Standford Univerity Press.
Schuck, Amie M., Dennis P. Rosenbaum, and Darnell F. Hawkins. 2008. “The Influence
of Race/Ethnicity, Social Class, and Neighborhood Context on Residents’
Attitudes Toward the Police.” Police Quarterly 11 (4): 496–519.
doi:10.1177/1098611108318115.
Shaw, Clifford, and Henry McKay. 1942. Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Sherman, Lawrence W. 1986. “Policing Communities: What Works?” In Communities
and Crime, edited by Albert J. Reiss and Michael H. Tonry. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Sherman, Lawrence W., Patrick R. Gartin, and Michael E. Buerger. 1989. “Hot Spots of
Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of Place.” Criminology
27 (1): 27–56. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.1989.tb00862.x.
Silverman, David. 2011. Interpreting Qualitative Data. Fourth Edition. Los Angeles:
SAGE Publications Ltd.
Skogan, Wesley G., and Kathleen Frydl. 2004. Fairness and Effectiveness in Policing:
The Evidence. Washington, DC: National Academies Press.
Skolnick, Jerome H. 1966. Justice Without Trial. New York: John Wiley.
Slocum, Lee Ann, Stephanie Ann Wiley, and Finn-Aage Esbensen. 2016. “The
Importance of Being Satisfied A Longitudinal Exploration of Police Contact,
Procedural Injustice, and Subsequent Delinquency.” Criminal Justice and
Behavior 43 (1): 7–26. doi:10.1177/0093854815609069.
Smith, Douglas A. 1986. “The Neighborhood Context of Police Behavior.” Crime and
Justice 8 (January): 313–41.
Smith, Michael R., and Geoffrey P. Alpert. 2007. “Explaining Police Bias A Theory of
Social Conditioning and Illusory Correlation.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 34
(10): 1262–83. doi:10.1177/0093854807304484.
Snyder, Howard N., and Melissa Sickmund. 1999. “Juvenile Offenders and Victims:
1999 National Report.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/frontmatter.pdf.
———. 2006. “Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report.” Washington,
DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED495786.pdf.
Spano, Richard. 2005. “Potential Sources of Observer Bias in Police Observational
Data.” Social Science Research 34 (3): 591–617.
doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2004.05.003.
Spelman, William. 1993. “Abandoned Buildings: Magnets for Crime?” Journal of
Criminal Justice 21 (5): 481–95. doi:10.1016/0047-2352(93)90033-J.
Spitzer, Steven. 1975. “Toward a Marxian Theory of Deviance.” Social Problems 22 (5):
638–51. doi:10.2307/799696.

184

Spradley, James P. 1979. The Ethnographic Interview. New York: Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich.
Stewart, Eric A., Eric P. Baumer, Rod K. Brunson, and Ronald L. Simons. 2009.
“Neighborhood Racial Context and Perceptions of Police-Based Racial
Discrimination Among Black Youth.” Criminology 47 (3): 847–87.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9125.2009.00159.x.
Stolzenberg, Lisa, Stewart J. D’alessio, and David Eitle. 2004. “A Multilevel Test of
Racial Threat Theory.” Criminology 42 (3): 673–98. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.2004.tb00533.x.
Street, Elwood. 1927. “Community Organization in Greater St. Louis.” Social Forces 6
(2): 248–52. doi:10.2307/3004701.
Terrill, William, and Michael D. Reisig. 2003. “Neighborhood Context and Police Use of
Force.” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 40 (3): 291–321.
doi:10.1177/0022427803253800.
Terry v. Ohio. 1968.
Tomaskovic-Devey, Donald, Marcinda Mason, and Matthew Zingraff. 2004. “Looking
for the Driving While Black Phenomena: Conceptualizing Racial Bias Processes
and Their Associated Distributions.” Police Quarterly 7 (1): 3–29.
doi:10.1177/1098611103259858.
Tonry, Michael H. 1995. Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Tonry, Michael, and Matthew Melewski. 2008. “The Malign Effects of Drug and Crime
Control Policies on Black Americans.” Crime and Justice 37 (1): 1–44.
doi:10.1086/588492.
Travis, Jeremy. 2005. But They All Come Back: Facing the Challenges of Prisoner
Reentry. Washington, D.C: Urban Institute Press.
Trebach, Arnold S. 1987. The Great Drug War: And Radical Proposals That Could Make
America Safe Again. New York : London: Macmillan ; Collier Macmillan.
Tyler, Tom R. 2006. Why People Obey the Law. Princeton University Press.
Uniform Crime Report. 2012. “Crime in the United States, 2011.” U.S. Department of
Justice—Federal Bureau of Investigation. http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-43.
U.S. Census Bureau. 2014. “State and County QuickFacts.” U.S. Department of
Commerce. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html.
U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. 2015. “Investigation of the Ferguson
Police Department.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights
Division. http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf.
Vera Sanchez, Claudio G., and Dennis P. Rosenbaum. 2011. “Racialized Policing:
Officers’ Voices on Policing Latino and African American Neighborhoods.”
Journal of Ethnicity in Criminal Justice 9 (2): 152–78.
doi:10.1080/15377938.2011.566821.
Wakefield, Sara, and Christopher Wildeman. 2011. “Mass Imprisonment and Racial
Disparities in Childhood Behavioral Problems.” Criminology & Public Policy 10
(3): 793–817. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2011.00740.x.

185

Walker, Samuel, Cassia Spohn, and Miriam DeLone. 2011. The Color of Justice: Race,
Ethnicity, and Crime in America. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning.
Warren, Patricia, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, William Smith, Matthew Zingraff, and
Marcinda Mason. 2006. “Driving While Black: Bias Processes and Racial
Disparity in Police Stops.” Criminology 44 (3): 709–38. doi:10.1111/j.17459125.2006.00061.x.
Weisburd, David, and Lorraine Green. 1995. “Policing Drug Hot Spots: The Jersey City
Drug Market Analysis Experiment.” Justice Quarterly 12 (4): 711–35.
doi:10.1080/07418829500096261.
Weisburd, David, Stephen D. Mastrofski, Ann Marie Mcnally, Rosann Greenspan, and
James J. Willis. 2003. “Reforming to Preserve: Compstat and Strategic Problem
Solving in American Policing.” Criminology & Public Policy 2 (3): 421–56.
doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2003.tb00006.x.
Weitzer, Ronald. 1999. “Citizens’ Perceptions of Police Misconduct: Race and
Neighborhood Context.” Justice Quarterly 16 (4): 819–46.
doi:10.1080/07418829900094381.
———. 2000. “Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods.”
Law & Society Review 34 (1): 129–55. doi:10.2307/3115118.
Weitzer, Ronald, and Steven A. Tuch. 2004. “Race and Perceptions of Police
Misconduct.” Social Problems 51 (3): 305–25. doi:10.1525/sp.2004.51.3.305.
———. 2005. “Racially Biased Policing: Determinants of Citizen Perceptions.” Social
Forces 83 (3): 1009–30.
Western, Bruce. 2006. Punishment and Inequality in America. New York: Russell Sage.
Western, Bruce, Becky Pettit, and Josh Guetzkow. 2002. “Black Economic Progress in
the Era of Mass Imprisonment.” In Invisible Punishment: The Collateral
Consequences of Mass Imprisonment, edited by Marc Mauer and Meda ChesneyLind, 165–80. New York: New Press : Distributed by W.W. Norton.
Western, Bruce, and Christopher Wildeman. 2009. “The Black Family and Mass
Incarceration.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 621 (1): 221–42. doi:10.1177/0002716208324850.
White, Mervin F., Terry C. Cox, and Jack Basehart. 1991. “Theoretical Considerations of
Officer Profanity and Obscenity in Formal Contacts with Citizens.” In Police
Deviance, edited by Thomas Barker and David L. Carter, 275–91. Cincinnati,
OH: Anderson.
Willis, James J., Stephen D. Mastrofski, and David Weisburd. 2004. “Compstat and
Bureaucracy: A Case Study of Challenges and Opportunities for Change.” Justice
Quarterly 21 (3): 463–96. doi:10.1080/07418820400095871.
Wilson, Orlando Winfield. 1941. “Distribution of Police Patrol Force.” Chicago, IL:
Public Administration Service.
Wilson, O. W. 1963. Police Administration. 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill Series in Political
Science. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Wilson, William J. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and
Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wiltse, Jeff. 2010. Contested Waters: A Social History of Swimming Pools in America. 1
edition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press.

186

Xie, Min, and Janet Lauritsen. 2012. “Racial Context and Crime Reporting: A Test of
Black’s Stratification Hypothesis.” Journal of Quantitative Criminology 28 (2):
265–93. doi:10.1007/s10940-011-9140-z.

187

Appendix A: Multivariate Tables with Coefficients
Total Drug Arrests
Table 4.4 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Total Drug Arrest Counts (N = 78)

Models 1
White
Arrests

Black
Arrests

b (RSE)
0.30**
(.10)

b (RSE)
0.21
(.18)

Violent Crime Rate

0.93*
(.45)

1.19***
(.20)

Property Crime Rate

0.03
(.07)

Economic Disadvantage

Models 2
SUR χ 2

SUR χ 2

White
Arrests

Black
Arrests

b (RSE)
0.30**
(.10)

b (RSE)
0.26
(.17)

0.42

0.73
(.46)

1.32***
(.20)

2.21

-0.03
(.04)

0.99

0.07
(.08)

-0.04
(.04)

3.42

0.27
(.23)

-0.01
(.12)

1.44

0.25
(.21)

-0.01
(.12)

1.48

Rented Housing Units

-2.89***
(.69)

-0.12
(.34)

14.42***

-2.58***
(.69)

-0.07
(.40)

11.95***

Racial Composition (% black)

3.42***
(.68)

-1.89***
(.32)

59.83***

3.73***
(.68)

-1.71***
(.33)

66.70***

Suspicious Drug Calls Rate(Ln)

0.11
(.18)

0.17*
(.07)

0.13
0.22
(.15)

0.02
(.08)

1.82

Race-Specific Drug Death
Rate(Ln)

Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)

0.19

Constant

-4.79***
(.70)

-3.72***
(.39)

-5.14***
(.58)

-3.34***
(.40)

Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)

1

1

1

1

379.17***

127.21***

407.13***

122.24***

Wald χ 2

*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

0.03
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Drug Possession Arrests
Table 4.5 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Drug Possession Arrest Counts (N = 78)

Models 1

Models 2

White
Arrests
b (RSE)

Black
Arrests
b (RSE)

SUR χ 2

White
Arrests
b (RSE)

Black
Arrests
b (RSE)

SUR χ 2

Race-Specific Drug Death
Rate(Ln)

0.30**
(.10)

0.21
(.18)

0.18

0.30**
(.10)

0.25
(.18)

0.04

Violent Crime Rate

0.90*
(.45)

1.25***
(.21)

0.69

0.69
(.46)

1.36***
(.21)

2.75

Property Crime Rate

0.03
(.07)

-0.04
(.04)

1.55

0.08
(.08)

-0.05
(.04)

4.46*

Economic Disadvantage

0.28
(.23)

-0.02
(.12)

1.49

0.25
(.22)

-0.02
(.12)

1.49

Rented Housing Units

-2.89***
(.71)

-0.06
(.35)

14.28***

-2.57***
(.71)

-0.02
(.40)

11.58***

Racial Composition (% black)

3.50***
(.69)

-1.88***
(.33)

58.42***

3.83***
(.69)

-1.75***
(.34)

66.43***

Suspicious Drug Calls Rate(Ln)

0.11
(.19)

0.14
(.07)

0.02
0.23
(.15)

0.01
(.08)

2.19

Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)
Constant

-4.88***
(.73)

-3.79***
(.40)

-5.26***
(.59)

-3.46***
(.42)

Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)

1

1

1

1

383.71***

125.93***

413.30***

124.38***

Wald χ 2

*p ≤ .05 **p ≤ .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
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Drug Sale/Manufacturing Arrests
Table 4.6 Negative Binomial Regression Results for Race-Specific Drug Sale/Mftg. Counts (N = 78)

Models 1

Models 2

White
Arrests
b (RSE)
0.61***
(.15)

Black
Arrests
b (RSE)
0.07
(.14)

SUR χ 2

Violent Crime Rate

0.90
(.47)

0.84***
(.22)

Property Crime Rate

-0.03
(.09)

Economic Disadvantage

White
Arrests
b (RSE)
0.57***
(.15)

Black
Arrests
b (RSE)
0.18
(.15)

SUR χ

0.02

1.05*
(.45)

1.16***
(.21)

0.06

0.03
(.05)

0.82

-0.03
(.09)

0.01
(.05)

0.27

-0.01
(.22)

-0.07
(.15)

0.10

0.02
(.25)

-0.08
(.18)

0.23

Rented Housing Units

-1.18
(.76)

-0.31
(.40)

1.20

-1.10
(.75)

-0.21
(.51)

1.36

Racial Composition (% black)

0.30
(.66)

-1.64***
(.31)

9.47**

0.59
(.72)

-1.41***
(.36)

8.90**

Suspicious Drug Calls Rate(Ln)

0.27
(.17)

0.46***
(.10)

1.29
0.11
(.18)

0.12
(.12)

0.01

Race-Specific Drug Death
Rate(Ln)

Drug Hotline Calls Rate(Ln)

7.38**

Constant

-8.52***
(.64)

-6.79***
(.50)

-7.97***
(.67)

-5.63***
(.52)

Race-Specific Population Size
(exposure)

1

1

1

1

132.13***

167.74***

124.36***

110.21***

Wald χ 2

2

3.21

